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This case study of alternative, radical journalism in Latin America during the 1970s, 
seeks to clarify and define the characteristics and limits of this model in concrete, 
specific historical circumstances. It traces the history of Alternativa, a leftist 
magazine published between February 1974 and 1980 in Bogotá, Colombia when 
three groups of people from different backgrounds devised a journalistic alternative 
model based on four objectives (counter-informing; investigation, analysis and 
interpretation; divulging the people’s struggles; and propitiating the unity of the left), 
to effect a lasting change in Colombia’s society. The founders’ common Marxist 
background determined the magazine’s content and its approach. Initially, they 
declared themselves independent and neutral toward the left’s groups and decided to 
reach a wide audience through mass circulation. The narrative shows how inner 
tensions resulting from principled differences among the magazine’s creators and 
from political circumstances led to two crises that tested its founding principles and 
  
determined its journalistic evolution. It also shows the struggle of the magazine to 
survive in a hostile climate, against a notoriously reckless and corrupt regime, testing 
the limits of the freedom of the press. In the first phase, the narrative reviews the 
history of the country as seen through the eyes of the publication, which contested the 
official version in the mainstream news media. In the second phase, the investigation 
highlights paramount issues such as human rights violations, corruption and the role 
of the press, through the magazine’s critical coverage of Colombia’s armed forces 
and police. In the third phase, the dissertation explores the magazine’s complex 
relationship with the left, which eventually led to its demise. As author of this 
dissertation, I was witness to the events covered by Alternativa, and was part of the 
staff of writers in the magazine’s third and last stage, with an inside view of a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
By analyzing the magazine Alternativa in Colombia between 1974 and 1980, I hope 
to contribute to the understanding of a type of press that falls within a variety of 
categories and definitions as practiced in countries in the so-called Third World. The 
very name of the magazine suggests the category of alternative press. Others may 
include revolutionary, Leninist, emancipatory, critical, leftist, radical or opposition 
journalism. In mentioning these names, I have to take into account the fact that there 
is no unanimous consent as to any of these typologies, as indicated in my review of 
the literature on the issue (Atton 2002, McQuail 1994, Downing 1984). 
I will argue that Alternativa was unique, given the conditions of the country in 
which it was born and grew. Similar publications were spawned and grown in Latin 
America in the same period, but each was a product of its own time and the society 
that produced it, including the journalistic approaches under which their creators 
operated. While understanding that only a more thorough comparative study can 
qualify this assertion, I believe that no publication similar to Alternativa had such an 
influence as an opinion maker and as an actor in the political and cultural life of its 
country during its lifetime. 
This research will be a case study. The aim is primarily to contribute a careful 
account of the life and times of Alternativa, rescuing it from oblivion as a part of 
Colombia’s political, cultural and journalistic history. By narrating the events 
presented in the magazine’s pages and how they came to be there, I believe a light 
can be shed upon the country’s present situation. In fact, I hope to demonstrate that 
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many of the circumstances that today concern the life of Colombians had their 
genesis in those six years of the magazine’s life. 
As a printed periodical, Alternativa placed itself in the crossroads of history, 
politics, culture and journalism. At first it did so by adopting an uncompromising 
political position based on longstanding leftist ideals that went back to classic Marxist 
revolutionary theory. Consistent with those ideals, it tried to bring a lasting change in 
Colombian society.  
In time it went from one extreme to the other in the left’s spectrum: initially 
by openly advocating a socialist revolution and finally by fashioning an electoral 
alliance which ended up including progressive tendencies within the bourgeois 
Liberal and Conservative parties. I intend to show how this progression was reflected 
in the magazine’s journalistic evolution. For analytical purposes, I divide the history 
of the magazine in three stages: the first from issue 1 to issue 31, when the magazine 
changed format and periodicity; the second from issue 32 to issue 111, when it 
stopped publication for four months and reorganized its staff; and the third from issue 
112 to 257, when it folded. Each of those periods included a deep, soul-searching 
crisis that forced the staff to examine its principles and how to deal with the changing 
political landscape. Each crises represented a step in the road from a dogmatic, 
radical and aggressive position to a more informative and inclusive one. All this 
happened while the magazine fought for its economic and political survival in a very 
hostile environment for human rights. The climate for press freedom was precarious 
and this was the only mass-circulation medium in the country to oppose the bipartisan 
Liberal-Conservative regime.  
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Alternativa used the Marxist lens to look at the reality of the country, offering 
a starkly different perspective than that of the mainstream media. No other medium 
had ever challenged with such force and determination the virtual monopoly held on 
news and information by broadcast and print outlets openly allied with the political 
parties in power and depending upon official approval and advertisers’ patronage. As 
I hope to show in this investigation, one immediate effect of Alternativa was to 
highlight the role of the mainstream press as an instrument of the political 
establishment, used to deliver a manufactured script on the state of the country. 
Contrary to the few leftist party publications of the time, Alternativa declared 
its neutrality and independence from any leftist political group. Instead, it chose to air 
its opinions and differences, uncritically at first, rather than identifying with any of 
them, and working for their unity. From the beginning, it decided to cater to increase 
its power as an opinion maker by becoming a mass-circulation publication rather than 
preaching to the converted, so to speak: the militants and activists of the left.    
As usually is the case with historical narratives, for such is the method 
adopted in this research, the tale of Alternativa is several stories in one. They all 
intersect at the temporal and spatial coordinates of Colombia of the time. I propose to 
follow those stories through the magazine’s explicit political and journalistic 
objectives as defined in the four points I shall identify. My conceptual framework 
seems useful in classifying and understanding the place such a publication had in the 
theoretical and practical communication and journalism landscape of Colombia and 
Latin America.  
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Briefly, those objectives were: (1) counter informing, meaning to cast facts in 
a different light and to present other facts not touched by mainstream mass media; (2) 
doing investigative, analytical and interpretive reports from a leftist perspective; (3) 
informing the public about the struggles of the underprivileged classes and (4) 
helping to achieve the unity of the left. These goals placed the magazine squarely in 
opposition to the regime by using modern journalism methods hardly ever tried 
before in Colombia. They highlighted the struggle of lower classes against the 
undemocratic capitalist regime in order to bring about a lasting political change 
through an organized and belligerent left.   
By counter-informing, the makers of the magazine meant to neutralize the 
monopoly that the ruling class had, through its communication media, depicting the 
country’s reality, from its history to its contemporary political, economic, social and 
cultural state. By doing investigative, analytical and interpretive journalism, the 
magazine proposed to process information available only to experts, in order to 
provide its readers, including the militants on the left, with enough reliable 
information to act according to their principles and goals. By informing on struggles 
of the people, it gave voice to the hundreds of thousands of people, the proletarians, 
the peasants, and minority groups who struggled for better living conditions against a 
notoriously ruthless and corrupt government. By helping to achieve the unity of the 
left, which included both legal forces and illegal armed groups, the magazine hoped 
to encourage revolutionary change.  
Alternativa was possible only because of the peculiar historical conditions that 
gave it birth. In this sense, the history of the country and the story of the magazine are 
 4 
 
the same. This research takes note of those circumstances preceding the magazine’s 
start but it is mainly a story about the six traumatic years of its existence from 1974 to 
1980. It deals with an alliance among the political class, organized mafias benefiting 
from the illegal drug trafficking and other criminal activities, Colombia’s armed 
forces, and the police. At the time, the army and police were in charge of enforcing 
the State of Siege. It was an exceptional constitutional measure used to suppress the 
growing unrest generated by the unequal conditions in the country. 
This alliance was to have paramount importance after the death of Alternativa. 
In the last two decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first 
centuries, it created the paramilitary armies that plunged the country into yet another 
period, through the chronic violence that has affected Colombia history, of land graft 
and indiscriminate terrorism. The alliance also fashioned, in this cyclical story, 
another pact called the Peace and Justice Law, sanctioned by Congress, which was 
designed to accommodate the common interests of the political class and organized 
crime under the protection of the armed forces of the country and irregular 
paramilitary armies.   
At the other side of the equation, this is also the story of how Colombia’s left, 
which, at the time of the birth of Alternativa, truly believed the country was in a pre-
revolutionary situation, managed to largely defeat itself by the sheer force of its 
dogmatic beliefs, internal squabbling and international allegiances. By squandering a 
historical opportunity to become a meaningful actor in Colombia’s future, the left 
cleared the way for the alliance among politicians, organized crime and armed forces 
to implement their shared strategy. Meanwhile, guerrilla movements monopolized the 
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opposition to the government and the legal left vanished into an obscure and 
completely irrelevant limbo.  
Today, as the story of Alternativa shows, not much has changed in the 
fundamental causes of the inequalities and injustices that have plagued the country 
throughout its history. That is, in a way, a vindication of the magazine’s political 
credo that unsuccessfully called for a fundamental change in Colombia. It is also a 
point of reflection for those who still believe that the causes of violence are in the 
nature of Colombians rather than in the historical inequalities fostered by a ruthless 
political class.     
 
A personal story 
This is also a personal story. I was hired as a staff reporter for Alternativa in April of 
1977, at the beginning of the third phase of the magazine, which was publishing again 
after a four-month period of evaluation and reorganization. At the time, I was a book 
salesman at El Zancudo, which had been Alternativa’s bookstore chain until the end 
of the previous year. I was also half way through my undergraduate studies in 
communications at Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, a private institution, and was 
registered as a Philosophy major at Universidad Nacional, the country’s largest public 
university.  
Before entering the universities in 1975, I had worked as a clerk at Banco 
Popular for two years, where I participated in two strikes, as a union representative. It 
was during this period that I met Hernando Corral, also a union leader, whom I found 
later at Alternativa’s newsroom and who was instrumental in my being hired as a cub 
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reporter. At Universidad Tadeo Lozano I also participated in two student movements, 
in one of which we took over the university for several months, and in events in 
Universidad Nacional, where I took part in the regular clashes between the students in 
one side, and the police and the army in the other. These events—the strikes and the 
student movements—of which I was a witness and protagonist, were reported in 
Alternativa, a magazine which my colleages and I read assiduously as the only 
medium that, in our opinion, told the truth about the situation in the country. 
 At Alternativa, I began to work with Antonio Caballero, who was my editor, 
writing articles for the international section. My only previous experience as a 
journalist, other than my communication studies, was as a writer for Revolución 
Socialista, the paper of the Socialist Block, a very active Trotskyite party at the time. 
I had become a militant while studying at Universidad Tadeo Lozano, so I was also 
very aware of political discussions and the position of the leftist groups on the 
socialist doctrine and the political situation of the country. At Revolución Socialista I 
had access to international media and other information, which later qualified me to 
write for Alternativa. 
 I left the party after I became disenchanted with constant bickering of the 
Trotskyite parties on doctrinaire issues, which left to breakups and divisions. As a 
staff reporter for Alternativa, and no longer a Trotskyite militant, I participated fully 
in the magazine’s routine. Many times I traveled on assignment to other parts of the 
country and even went to Ecuador to cover the political crisis in that country. I 
covered political campaigns, cultural events, popular struggles, and many other 
events, and was kept permanently aware of and informed about the international 
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scene, which I covered until my departure from the magazine in November of 1979. 
In that year I went to New York as the accredited correspondent of Alternativa at the 
United Nations. 
 I suppose my experience as a leftist militant and as a member of Alternativa’s 
staff makes me not only a protagonist of the story being told here but also a primary 
source. Some thirty years have passed since the time I started to work for the 
magazine. Fifteen of those years, from 1980 to 1995, I lived in New York working as 
a foreign correspondent for, of all papers, El Tiempo, the main Colombian 
establishment newspaper, and as a journalist for other publications. Therefore, while 
taking advantage of my memory and participation in the life and times of Alternativa, 
I am also aware of the implications it may have for my research. The important thing, 
in my opinion, is to let the readers know about my connection with Alternativa and 
make up their own minds as to whether my participation has biased or enriched this 
dissertation. From my part, I can only say that it was a privilege and an honor for a 
23-year-old kid still in college, to have been chosen as a member of what many 
consider, and I hope to be forgiven my lack of attribution, as the most important 









Chapter 2: Theoretical framework, review of the literature and 
methodology 
 
Previous and recent history of Colombia’s journalism 
Like most Latin American journalism, Colombia’s was born of political necessities. 
The earliest papers known in the country were related to the struggle against the 
Spanish Empire, including El papel Periódico Ilustrad,  created by national hero 
Antonio Nariño, to spread the ideals of the French Revolution.  
 The best story of Colombia’s journalism, from 1880 to 1980, when 
Alternativa disappeared, has been written by Mariluz Vallejo (2006). In her book, she 
cites almost all publications created during those 100 years, most of which had as a 
common thread their political, partisan (espousing political parties’ views and 
principles) character. El Espectador, the oldest of the papers still alive, was born in 
Medellín in 1887 as a Liberal party publication just when the so-called Conservative 
Party Hegemony, which lasted until 1930, began. It reappeared in 1913, after eight 
years of censorship, with editions in Medellín and Bogotá. Most of today’s surviving 
papers were founded in the 1910s: El Tiempo, Colombia’s paper or record, and the 
most important daily in the country’s history, in 1911; El Colombiano, a Conservative 
medium, in Medellín in 1912; Vanguardia Liberal (Bucaramanga) and El País (Cali) 
in 1919. Shortly after buying El Tiempo, Eduardo Santos, who went on to be 
president of Colombia, said of his paper: 
  
The journalism that many call modern, which only aspires to satisfy 
the childish curiosity of a frivolous public, to give sensational news, many 
times increasing and exaggerating trivial things, and that looks only for what 
is interesting, what arouses epidermis emotions—a completely Yankee 
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journalism to which most South American papers aspire—is not our ideal. 
(Vallejo 2006, p. 20)  
 
Santos’ quote reveals a constant tension in Colombia and Latin America 
between North American and European press models and news values, meaning 
between straight and objective reporting and writing and more interpretive, 
opinionated and literary journalism.  As Vallejo notes in her book, a common thread 
in the history of Colombia’s journalism has been its close identification with political 
parties and the use of their publications as tools in the struggles of their times. As we 
know, such identification gave way to entrepreneurial concerns in the United States 
and news media operations gradually adopted an independent and neutral stance 
toward political parties as they became valuable and profitable assets.  
One consequence of the political nature of Colombia’s press is a different 
conception of freedom of the press. While in the United States the First Amendment 
is there for all to read and invoke, in Colombia and Latin America in general the 
changing political landscape made such a principle a tough pill to swallow for many 
governments, which regularly resorted to controls, confiscations, closings and 
outright censorship when they thought the press threatened their regimes. As 
Waisbord (2000) notes,  
 
the degree of separation between press and government best indicates the 
degree of press freedom. Inspired in the ideals of the modern democratic 
revolutions, this tradition holds the state under suspicion as being 
authoritarian and prone to suffocating the press. Consequently, monitoring 
power means monitoring political autocrats. What better place to watch the 
state than from a press firmly anchored in the market? Economic 
independence is the only ticket for arriving at press freedom and making 
concrete the ideal of a watchdog press.” (p. 4) 
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The term “watchdog journalism” is used by Waisbord in his book to apply the 
concept of “investigative journalism” as it is understood in the United States to the 
particular context of Latin America and the political circumstances of the Spanish and 
Portuguese-speaking subcontinent. In his book, centered in Brazil, Perú, Argentina 
and Colombia, Waisbord attempts to characterize what he considers a trend in the last 
decades of the twentieth century toward a more challenging form of journalism in 
confrontatiing of issues mainly related to corruption. What Waisbord offers, though, 
is an insightful historical perspective based on an implicit question as applied to Latin 
American journalism:  What good is freedom of the press if it is used to hide the 
truth, as most of the news media allied with political parties did? As we will see, this 
was at the center of Alternativa’s argument against the press in Colombia.  
The strong political identification of the press in Colombia made its 
independence from the state and politicians impossible. It became a protagonist in the 
struggle for power. Waisbord again:  
 
For much of its rhetorical force and democratic appeal, the principle of 
press freedom, so dear to the liberal tradition, often clouds the essentially 
political nature of the press and the inextricable relation between the press and 
power. Although it may seem a cliché in times when the ruling dictum is that 
politics is everywhere, it is still important to bear in mind that all news 
making is political. The promise and ideal of an independent press 
uncontaminated by the down-and-dirty world of politics goes against the grain 
of standard research, which has shown that the press is, above all, a political 
institution whose functioning cannot be understood separated from a larger 
political dynamics. (p. 5) 
 
 
Enrique Santos Calderón, Alternativa’s publisher, wrote a brief history of 
Colombia’s press in 1989. “Politicians and Journalists are the same because national 
journalism is and has been the seeding ground for presidents and party leaders” 
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(Santos Calderón 111). Santos’ grand-uncle, Eduardo, owner of El Tiempo, was 
president of Colombia (1938-1942). Upon his death, he spread the shares of his paper 
among family and friends. One of those who did not get any was Santos’ father and 
namesake, who was disinherited because of his sympathies for Spain’s fascist 
dictator, Fancisco Franco, but still remained as the paper’s editor.1  
The political nature of Colombia’s media was apparent during the 1940s, but 
more pronounced during the fifties as described by Alinski (1981). In 1950, Laureano 
Gómez, former publisher of El Siglo, became president of the country. Gómez 
opposed all social reforms proposed by the Liberals in the previous decade. Upon the 
assassination of populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the simmering violence in the 
country erupted and the mobs dynamited and burned El Siglo. At the time, the 
establishment press from the Liberal and Conservative parties, attributed Gaitán’s 
murder to an international communist conspiracy, without any real proof of it, as did 
the main international press agencies and even United States Secretary of State 
George C. Marshal, who was representing his country at the Pan-American 
Conference in Bogotá. President Laureano Gómez censored and intervened in 
operations of El Espectador and El Tiempo in 1952, and after he was deposed by 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953 the control of the media intensified to the point 
that both papers were closed and began publishing under different names. Other 
publications, including small conservative papers, suffered the same fate.  
After the fall of Rojas Pinilla Liberals and Conservatives decided to share 
power with the exclusion of everybody else by making a pact called the National 
                                                 
1 Today in Colombia, one of Enrique Santos’ brothers, Juan Manuel, former editor of El Tiempo, is the 
minister of defense and his cousin Francisco, former managing editor, is the country’s vice-president.  
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Front in 1958. Censorship by the government became in many instances self- 
censorship. It is debatable whether the big dailies were at all interested in showing the 
negative face of the establishment.  
Under these circumstances, the rise of an alternative press in opposition to the 
bipartisan National Front was improbable at best. As Waisbord notes, investigative or 
watchdog journalism was all but nonexistent until Alternativa came into the scene just 
when the pact was ending. The author quotes Gabriel García Márquez.  
 
For alternative publications, journalism and politics were indivisible. 
Journalism was not a disinterested activity, separate from partisan and 
commercial interests, but it was politics by other means. Colombian Novel-
Laureate García Márquez´s thoughts on why he participated in Alternativa 
represent the spirit that animated many journalists who worked in alternative 
publications. ‘In Alternativa, I think, I have found a form of political 
participation (militancia) that I sought for years. Serious journalistic work, 
deeply and clearly committed to reality.’ (p. 28) 
 
 
As for the rest of Latin America, and particularly South America, Alternativa 
was an oddity. Although a few similar publications existed in other countries such as 
Perú for example, where a leftist military regime existed, in most Latin American 
countries the opposition press, or the radical press, was wiped out or simply did not 
exist. This bleak landscape is reviewed in detail and in all its crudity by Pierce 
(1979), who analyzes the circumstances in nine Latin American countries, going from 
one extreme (Cuba) to another (Brazil) of the political spectrum. In between, he 
analyzes the cases of Chile, with its violent regime change; Argentina, on its way to 
become yet another bloody dictatorship; and Perú, where the leftist military regime at 
one point expropriated all newspapers.  
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The greatest value of Pierce’s book is that it explains in detail why magazines 
such as Alternativa were possible in countries such as Colombia, with its nominal 
democracy, and how politics influences the media by sheer brutal force, with 
examples ranging from a radical socialist regime to the most right-wing dictatorships 
the continent has ever seen. Pierce’ chronicles the changes the media suffered while 
going from one system to another—such as in the case of Chile, where the coming to 
power of Unidad Popular created a lively debate on the role of the press in a pre-
revolutionary situation, until Augusto Pinochet overthrew Salvador Allende on 
September 11, 1973.   
Before the fall of Allende in Chile, a titanic struggle went on between the 
forces on the right and those on the left for the control of the media. The issue of the 
role of the press in pre-revolutionary situations had a long tradition, coming in our 
time from the Bolshevik revolution, when Lenin, Trotsky and other leaders wrote and 
theorized about the role of the press in organizing the masses. This was a conception 
of journalism that understood very well the power inherent in any medium to amplify 
the voice of the leaders and carry it into the political arena, based in a Marxist-
Leninist theory of class struggle as a mean to achieve the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Everything not only was an opinion but also like a political directive 
(Mattelart 1973). This conception was adopted by several Latin American 
theoreticians, and was applied in Cuba, where the press was completely controlled 
and used by the State as a political tool. In Chile, the whole school that grew out of 
the power achieved by the socialists included the Belgian scholar Armand Mattelart 
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(1973), Camilo Taufic (1973) and Ariel Dorfman (Dorffman and Mattelart, 1984), 
among others, who systematized what can be called the militant view of the press.  
Perhaps the author who best represents the role of journalism and media in 
society from a Marxist perspective is Chilean writer Camilo Taufic (1973). In his 
work Periodismo y lucha de clases (Journalism and class struggle), he goes to another 
extreme, aligning himself not only with Lenin, Stalin and Mao, but also defining a 
totalitarian role for the media in a country such as Chile before Salvador Allende was 
deposed by Pinochet.  
Mattelart, considered the most influential scholar in Latin America in the 
1970s, attacked the domination of information in the media conglomerates in the 
developed countries and in the Third World. His book Mito Burgués Vs. Lucha de 
clases (Bourgeois Myth Vs. Class Struggle) was a required text in communications 
schools in Colombia and represented the best synthesis of what a communication 
theory should be from the point of view of the radical left. He also wrote, along with 
Ariel Dorfman (1984), a scathing critique of American cultural penetration in the 
book How to Read Donald Duck. 
The opposite view in Latin America came from the developmental school, 
which saw the role of journalism and media in society from an American point of 
view. It was promoted by American scholars who played a pivotal role in shaping the 
academic landscape of journalism and mass communications in Latin America. Under 
the auspices of UNESCO, they brought to the subcontinent the same principles that 
they had applied in the United States, one of whose consequences was the 
disappearance of stand-alone journalism programs from Latin American universities 
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in favor of communication studies (Schramm 1976). Behind the developmental 
school was a classic positivistic and functionalist conception of the media in their 
different formats, as tools used by the governments in the Third World to help 
develop their countries (Shah 1996). Several books sum up this point of view. 
Perhaps the most important was Wilbur Schramm’s Mass Media and National 
Development (Schramm 1976), a text commissioned by UNESCO when the 
organization was under United States control. In it, the American scholar outlined his 
thoughts about the role the media should play in developing countries. Similar views, 
extended to the rest of the developing world, were expressed in Communication 
Change in the Developing Countries (Lerner and Schramm 1967). Another 
distinguished American scholar interested in Latin America was Everett M. Rogers 
(Rogers 1984, 2003). His views are in the book Communication and Development, a 
Critical Perspective, in which he, like his colleagues, stresses the role of the media in 
economic development without venturing into complex contexts such as Colombia’s 
at the time covered by this dissertation.  
The ferment created by the discussion in Chile of the role of the press in a pre-
revolutionary situation, and the ideas of the developmental school, clashed in the  
debate on how to balance the world’s unbalanced flow of information, which by then 
had an overwhelming north-south direction. Known by the general name of the New 
World International Communication Order, the discussion was carried out at 
UNESCO, under the leadership of Sean MacBride (1984), against the bitter 
opposition of the United States, which ended up leaving the organization. The 
discussion around the NWICO greatly influenced views on the role of the media in 
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each country and in the world as a whole. It defined that role in political rather than in 
theoretical terms, all in the contexts of the non-aligned movement and the 
decolonization that was taking place in the former European colonies of Africa, the 
Cold War between the American and Western capitalist sphere and Soviet and 
Chinese Communism, among other historical events. The MacBride report, titled One 
World, many Voices (1984), elaborated by the International Commission for the 
Study of Communication Problems, was a sober look at the panorama of world 
communication, a treatise on the state of media globalization at the time and an 
argument for the worldwide democratization of the flow of information. This was a 
debate which I, as an international affairs writer, covered in Alternativa at the time. 
The magazine was itself a testimony to the thesis of the MacBride report, for it was 
able to inform people about the international scene thanks to a profusion of sources of 
information through such as alternative press agencies as Prensa Latina and Inter 
Press Service and the access to international publications that the mainstream press 
either did not know about or did not care to review. 
 
Alternative and radical media 
One author who has attempted a typology of alternative and radical media is Atton 
(2002). While acknowledging that both categories “hardly appear in the dominant 
theoretical traditions of media research,” (p. 7) he attempts to define a theory on the 
subject. Atton’s work makes use of cultural studies to approach a problem, which 
defies classification using standard models such as those proposed in the Four 
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Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1973)  woefully inadequate 
and outdated, especially in relation to Third World media. 
  
What is a theory of the press? In Four Theories, the question is never 
really answered because it is never explicitly addressed. The book assumed 
that the answer is obvious, and much of the commentary on it does the same. 
But in fact the book used the term “theory” in a very haphazard manner… If 
that is so, then a communication theory is not the same sort of thing as a 
communication system. Four Theories is ill-applied to the study of 
comparative media systems. Because these theories are really all different 
kinds of creatures, it is possible for any number of them to coexist in any 
given system.  (Nerone in Semati, 2004, p. 29). 
 
   
Atton’s work took its lead conception from Downing (1984), who attempted a 
typology when the information revolution based on computers was still in its infancy 
and before the radical transformation of communist countries after 1989. Downing 
defined four characteristics for Alternative media. He differentiated Alternative media 
from “Transmission-belt socialism”, which, he argues, rather than liberating media, 
constrain them by demanding unquestioning allegiance to the party, its intelligentsia 
and the institutions of the state. Those characteristics, as synthesized and interpreted 
by Atton, are:  
 
1. the importance of encouraging contributions from as many interested 
parties as possible, in order to emphasize the ‘multiple realities’ of social 
life (oppression, political cultures, economic situations); 
2. that radical media, while they may be partisan, should never become a tool 
of party intelligentsia; 
3. that radical media at their most creative and socially significant privilege 
movements over institutions; 
4. that within the organization of radical media there appears an emphasis on 





Downing’s typology was envisioned as a way to analyze Western and Eastern 
media Europe in the late twentieth century. Later, Atton adapted it  to try to include 
new technologies and other manifestations of alternative media such as zines, a form 
of comic books directed mostly to youth groups. 
In Latin America, the concept of media has been analyzed by Simpson 
Greenberg (1986), who finds two predominant tendencies in the conceptualization of 
alternative media: as opposition to the mass media, giving it an eminently non-
professional, and self-governing quality; and as every communication phenomenon 
that implies opposition to the dominant discourse of power. He also identifies two 
fundamental currents in the treatment of the issue by Latin American scholars. One is 
seeing alternative communication as an exclusive antidote to the transnational 
capitalist structures, with researchers in this group considering alternative 
communication an answer to the transnational, unidirectional, and authoritarian 
character of mass media. The second is the insertion of alternative media into 
strategies for structural change worked out by self-designated political-ideological 
“vanguards,” by which he meant intellectuals organized in parties or groups that 
guided the working class with their theoretical knowledge. According to this line of 
thought, the soundness of communication experiences, other than those within the 
transnational power structures, depends on their insertion in a totalizing strategy such 
as a that of a Marxist persuasion geared toward taking over political power.  
In this historical context, Alternativa provides the basis for understanding and 
alternative press’s nature and role within existing press models and theoretical 
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frameworks inasmuch as the magazine conceived as its mission to change the system 
and certainly, as we shall see, the over qualified staff had “vanguard” characteristics. 
As told in the third chapter of this dissertation, Alternativa originated in the 
confluence of three currents of thought converging. Each of these three currents is a 
point of entry to frame the theoretical aspects under which the phenomenon of the 
magazine can be considered; they all brought with them their experience with media 
and its application to the professional and political activities they were engaged in at 
the time. All of them believed that journalism could be a vehicle to help create a 
lasting change in society, a concept that put journalism in the ntersection of media, 
politics, culture, and power. Summarizing, the currents were: 
  
• The journalists, a group centered in the person of Enrique Santos Calderón, a 
seasoned reporter and writer and columnist at the most important paper in the 
country, which belonged to his family. He was at the time involved with a 
group of artists in a counter-information project in the Southeastern 
neighborhoods of Bogotá, fighting along with the community against a 
highway project. The group used alternative methods of communication such 
as posters and mural dazibaos to reach and unite the communities. 
• The economists, headed by Bernardo García, expert researchers and handlers 
of hard data, who had the wherewithal to interpret figures and numbers with a 
macro-economic perspective. It was the economists who provided the 
expertise and knowledge to attempt something rarely done in Colombia’s 
journalism, which was to interpret and analyze, through the figures they 
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gathered in their research, the country’s problems, with aiming to explain 
what the political class was doing to the country. García had created a 
magazine called Alternativ while studying in Belgium and was the editor of 
the government’s National Statistics Bulletin, which sought to use hard 
economic data to interpret the nation’s reality.  
• The sociologists under the leadership of Orlando Fals Borda, creator of the 
participatory action research methodology, with many years behind him 
working in the countryside trying to understand and change the conditions of 
the working peasantry. Fals and his group had contacts with the popular 
organizations, especially in the countryside, and were able to gather the 
necessary information to illuminate struggles such as strikes, land recovery 
actions and popular protests through on-site correspondents. Fals had used 
techniques such as comic books to educate the peasants and poor communities 
about their own history and avenues for change. 
 
Hovering above them was Gabriel García Márquez, a world-famous fiction 
writer, who had been and continued being a journalist with an impressive track record 
of reporting, who embodied the confluence of literature and journalism since his days 
as a reporter for El Espectador during the 1950s. García Márquez, along with 
murdered Argentinian journalist Rodolfo Walsh, had founded Prensa Latina, an 
alternative press agency. Before and after working for the magazine, his non-fiction 
articles appeared in the most important publications in the world.  
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Besides being useful to analyze the contents of the magazine, the four 
objectives described below can also be seen as constructs, which define this particular 
phenomenon, comparing it to other models or theories. They highlight the magazine’s 
similarities but also its differences and uniqueness in the context of Colombia and 
Latin America. Each of those objectives was the responsibility of the three currents 
that made possible the magazine.   
 
Counter-informing, the role of the journalists.  In my opinion, inasmuch as counter-
informing seeks to challenge the current representation of reality based in the 
mainstream’s news values, it also seeks to dispute the hegemonic interpretation of the 
ruling class.  The existence of the magazine itself was a counter-information fact. It 
put into question the whole script that the dominant classes fed the people through the 
system’s media. The challenge went way beyond the news, which the dailies carried 
in their own de-contextualized manner. It offered a completely new interpretation of 
what was going on in the halls of power, creating a homogeneous picture of a country 
accustomed to perceiving partial and de-contextualized bits and pieces of its reality. 
That is why counter informing automatically puts on the table the role that the 
mainstream media played in public opinion. In a way, the magazine helped the people 
to understand that whatever was taking place in the mainstream press was politically 
motivated to assure domination of one class over the others, in a capitalist system of 
exploiters and exploited. The story in the media was one of deception, of a paper 
democracy in the name of which all the crimes of the past, all the violence and deceit, 
the poverty, the inequalities and injustices, were justified. The magazine put forth a 
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different explanation of how the society worked and it hoped its readers would 
understand and act accordingly.  
 
Doing investigation, analysis and interpretation, the role of the economists. As 
Waisbord (2000) points out, investigative journalism, understood here not only as 
uncovering malfeasance in the government, but also as the necessary research for 
analysis and interpretation, was practically nonexistent in Latin America. The 
magazine not only called attention to the widespread corruption in almost all spheres 
of government, but used the expertise of his staff to shed light on the articulation of 
Colombia’s class system, thus presenting a coherent explanatory picture of the 
country from a leftist perspective. 
 
Informing readers about the people’s struggles, he role of the sociologists. By 
informing readers about the people’s struggles, the magazine opened up a completely 
new information agenda, based on different values and interpretations. Suddenly the 
readers realized that there were people struggling everywhere against the government 
and against the dominant classes and that such struggle originated in conditions and 
circumstances that very few people knew about. In fact, chances were that not even 
the mainstream media knew about them since they were not considered as news.  
Atton qualifies this role in the following manner: 
 
The aim of that part of the alternative media interested in news remain 
simple: to provide access to the media to encourage and normalize such 
access, where working people, sexual minorities, trade unions, protesting 
groups—people of low status in terms of their relationship to elite groups of 
owners, mangers and senior professionals—could make their own news, either 
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by appearing in it as significant actors or by creating news relevant to their 
situation. (p. 11) 
 
 
Promoting the unity of the left. This is what Downing referred to as “The 
privilege of movements over institutions (which) inform his entire approach to the 
extent that he considers radical media as the media of social movements.” (Atton p. 
21)  A Marxist, leftist ideological interpretive persuasion, which permeated its 
content and objectives, informed the magazine. The promotion of the unity of the left 
presupposed its independence and neutrality, with the implicit belief that open 
discussions based on persuasion and arguments could prevail over Marxists fixed 
dogmas and conceptions, all in the name of the fulfillment of the magazine’s ultimate 
goal: to change the political system. It was not local or regional change the magazine 
was seeking; it was revolutionary change at national and supra-national levels. As we 
can see in the narrative that follows, both the first and the second crises came when 
the group of the sociologists first and the economists afterwards, tried to deny the 
principles of neutrality and independence toward the left, which eventually caused the 
model to collapse.  
Alternativa targeted readers who bought magazines at newsstands or 
subscribed to them, readers who were curious, inquisitive and had an open mind 
regarding the state of the country. They were progressive intellectuals, students, and 
leftist militants, as well as people in the mainstream interested in knowing more about 
the system. Unfortunately, the price of the magazine was too stiff for low-wage 
earners, who were, according to the Marxist credo, those called to lead a possible 
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revolution. To compensate, the magazine tried to use alternative distribution channels 
to reach those segments of the population. In addition, every single copy of the 
magazine circulated among a relatively large number of people, thus making the 
readership much bigger than what copy sales told. However, once all issues were 
counted and the readers considered, Alternativa was never able to shake the burden of 
being a magazine written for the people and bought by the petit bourgeoisie.  
An important difference with the alternative press models and typologies 
postulated above is that, although the magazine presented itself as a radical 
publication bent on socialist values, the operation as such was not. Fals Borda and his 
team tried to instill in the working routines of the magazine some semblance of 
democratic discussion of the content of the magazine and of the participation of the 
staff in the decision-making process, but this proved too cumbersome, so much so 
that it threatened to lead to a paralysis of the magazine. In fact, Fals was borrowing 
from the standard Leninist model according to which the media workers themselves 
were the ones controlling the whole process and not the managers. He also borrowed 
from the likes of Mattelart (1973) and Taufic (1972) when he brought workers in to 
teach them journalism and its language.    
 
Other aspects in the review of the literature 
A variety of works has been valuable to me in framing the concepts for this 
dissertation. Here they are explained briefly. 
 
On Colombia’s history 
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Colombian and foreign scholars have extensively treated the historical context in 
which Alternativa existed. Jenny Pearce, a British professor and researcher currently 
at the University of Bradford, has written extensively about Latin America, and 
particularly about Colombia. She defines her book (1990) as “an attempt to find some 
threads in Colombia’s labyrinthine past and present which may explain its 
contemporary crises to non-Colombians” (p. 4). It traces the country’s history back to 
Simón Bolívar and up to the beginning of La Violencia, a civil war between partisans 
of the two main political parties waged in the 1950s. The second part goes from the 
end of La Violencia to 1986. “The thread running through this part is the political 
order’s inability to deal with the dramatic social and economic change which 
accompanied economic modernization, in particular the shift in juts a few decades 
from a predominantly rural to an urban society” (p. 5). Part three describes the 
aftermath of the period in which Alternativa was published, a continuation of the 
genocide in the countryside and the cities, orchestrated by the far-right allied with the 
army and the drug traffickers. Pearce had the benefit of an outside look at a reality 
whose complexity was challenging and daunting. In her book, she includes a 
contextual look at the forces of the left. At the beginning and at the end of the book, 
she offers a very useful list of organizations and acronyms. “There is one thread 
which runs through Colombia’s history which is clearer than any other. That is the 
way the country’s ruling elite has always identified the fate of the nation with its 
own,” (10) she concludes at the end of the introduction. 
Daniel Pécaut (2006) a Belgian researcher and scholar traveled to Colombia in 
the 1960s as a visiting professor at Universidad Nacional. Like Pearce, he has written 
 26 
 
extensively about the country whose reality he knows intimately. His book Crónica 
de dos décadas de política colombiana is a compilation of articles published between 
1968 and 1986. He begins with an analysis of the government of Lleras Restrepo and 
ends with a summary of the governments of presidents Betancur and Barco, (1982-
1988) and their attempt to reach the elusive peace. The sequence of these articles 
offers a dynamic view of the progression of events and circumstances in the country, 
written with the clear intention of illustrating the complexity of the forces in play to 
those looking at the country from outside. Pécaut’s knowledge of the economical 
context of Colombia’s history is a useful complement to the country’s political 
history during the years prior, during and after the existence of Alternativa.  
In William Avilés’ Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civic-Military 
relations in Colombia, (Avilés 2006), the author explores the history of the country’s 
armed forces, from the middle of the twentieth century, from the Rojas dictatorship, 
through the period of Alternativa and all the way to the first Uribe administration 
(2002). In this sense, the book offers a useful time line of the military involvement in 
the country, specially, for purposes of this dissertation, of the times when the armed 
forces had an almost complete power under the State of Siege and controlled many of 
the accompanying mechanisms of justice administration. 
In  The Agrarian Question and the Peasant movement in Colombia  (Zamosc, 
1986), makes an in-depth analysis of the role played by the Asociación Nacional de 
Usuarios Campesinos, ANUC (National Association of Peasant Users) a primer for 
those wishing to understand the issues that were written about in Alternativa, 
especially in its first stage. Zamosc’ book goes to the roots of the movement that 
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tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to hold the political class accountable for its unkept 
promises of an agrarian reform and a lasting solution for the country’s poor, and 
places the issue of land ownership at the center of Colombia’s violence, up to the 
present time.  
The work by Dix (1987) does not get as close to the present time but it has the 
value of going back farther into the past, analyzing the situation from the perspective 
of the political parties, Liberals and Conservatives, which monopolized public life in 
the country throughout its whole history. Instead of doing a chronological review, 
however, the book take one aspect at a time, such as the political parties and 
elections, interest groups, government institutions and public policy.  
Perhaps the most interesting work from this perspective is “Popular 
Liberalism, Radical Democracy, and Marxism: Leftist Politics in Contemporary 
Colombia, 1974-1991,” written by Marc C. Chernick and Michael F. Jiménez, in Carr 
and Ellner’s The Latin American Left Movement, From the Fall of Allende to 
Perestroika (1993). The book offers a rundown of the prevalent theories as to why the 
opposition, both legal and armed, grew in Colombia so much, in the context of the 
permanent violence and the State’s repression of popular movements and the 
opposition. The author of the article offers his own theory:  
 
We argue the recent history of the Colombian left is not principally the 
result of the failure of modernizing elite coalitions or of the survival of 
atavistic revolutionary ideologies ill suited to a new era or merely the outcome 
of a crisis in dependent capitalism exacerbated by the drug traffic trade. 
Rather, leftist politics after 1974 are best understood as the working out of 
long-standing forms of opposition to elite rule within a major redesign of 





The seminal text on the violent period of the 1950s is La Violencia en 
Colombia,  (Fals, Guzmán and Umaña 1986) consequently updated in later editions. 
The book was a scholarly watershed where factual material embracing the warfare 
geographically as well as chronologically, using primary sources, empirical evidence 
and professing a degree of objectivity demonstrates that the strife was a mayor 
incident in hemispheric history deserving of serious consideration. 
Besides the books mentioned above, out of many others on the subject, two 
books provide a wide perspective, both on the formation of the left as well as the 
circumstances in which its struggle took place. Fabio López de La Roche (1994), 
attempts to answer several questions that are central to the purpose of this 
dissertation. How did the 1960s and 1970s generation break with previous cultural 
molds such as those of the two political parties and of the Catholic Church? How did 
it go from that break to the idealization of socialism, a reality that Colombians 
ignored almost completely? What were the beliefs and dogmas that the new 
generation believed in and which formed the basis for their struggles? A book that has 
the merit of including many perspectives on these subjects is Entre movimientos y 
caudillos, edited by Gustavo Gallón (1989). The book offers perhaps the most 
complete panorama of the different political trends of the left as well as the political 
context in which its actions took place. Its main merit is that it includes many authors 
who were themselves witnesses to the events they analyze. 
Other books present different takes on the history of Colombia during the last 
part of the past century. One that is quite important for the reconstruction of the 
history of Alternativa is the biographical study Bateman, on Jaime Bateman, the 
 29 
 
historic leader of M-19 and a behind-the-scenes-protagonist of the story of 
Alternativa, written by Darío Villamizar (2002). The book was the first to mention 
publicly the close relationship of Alternativa and the public guerrilla group, besides 
offering a detailed and dramatic view of one of the most important revolutionary 
leaders of the last fifty years in Colombia.  
A complete historical overview of the popular protest in Colombia between 
1958 and 1990 is in Idas y venidas, vueltas y revueltas (Archila 2005). The book 
offers the most complete assessment of the situation of the country during that period, 
making it a useful companion for the story of the magazine and its political milieu. 
Other contributions have been made by authors working at research centers in public 
universities, of which perhaps the most important is Instituto de Estudios Políticos y 
Relaciones Internacionales, IEPRI (Institute for Political Studies and International 
Relations) at Universidad Nacional in Bogotá. The institute has produced several 
books on the recent history of Colombia, all of them geared to explore the genesis and 
development of the chronic and permanent civil conflict in the country (IEPRI 2005).  
 
 
On Latin American journalism 
Three other books could be considered as companions to the previous texts, with the 
added advantage that they address the issue of media and communications in the 
context of the political landscape. Watchdog Journalism in South America. News, 
Accountability and Democracy (Waisbord 2000) traces the uneven development of 
alternative and investigative journalism in the subcontinent, a topic necessarily linked 
to the political conditions of its countries. Although the book deals mainly with the 
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last decades of the twentieth century, it offers a useful and well-documented historical 
context, acknowledging, among other things, the role of Alternativa, quoting both 
Gabriel García Márquez and Enrique Santos Calderón.  
 Useful overviews of the practice of journalism in Latin America are offered 
by Salwen and Garrison (1991) and by Alinski in Latin American Media. Guidance 
and Censorship (1981). A thorough analysis for the specific situation in Colombia 
presenting a range of practical research possibilities is offered in “Trends in 
Alternative Communication Research in Latin America” by Maximo Simpson 
Grinberg in Atwood and McAnany, (1986). Simpson Greenberg attempts a typology 
of the research trends and currents and offers some ideas linked to alternative media, 
mainly related with leftist political ideas. He qualifies the contributions made by 
authors such as Taufic and Mattelart, placing them in an adequate historical and 
political context.  
 
Approaches to the phenomenon of Alternative communication—
whose origins date back to the 1960s—are varied. First of all, diverse 
adjectives are attached to the phenomenon, such as “popular,” “participatory,” 
“indigenous,” “self-governing,” and “emancipatory.” Each of these 
expressions stresses certain aspect of a complex reality. Their common 
denominator lies, in my opinion, in the sense that this form of communication 
constitutes an alternative to the dominant discourse of power at all levels. 
(169). 
 
 A more ambitious and recent work in terms of time span is Centuries of 
Silence. The story of Latin American Journalism (Ferreira 2006), which goes back to 





On the history of journalism in Colombia 
As for the history of Colombian journalism, the most complete panorama is presented 
in the recent book  A plomo herido. Una crónica del periodismo en Colombia, 1880-
1980 (Vallejo 2002). Few books on the history of Colombian journalism offer such a 
complete landscape on its evolution in the twentieth century, up until the year 
Alternativa ceased to exist. The book has many references to the magazine, which it 
considers as the epitome of the leftist press in Colombia. Santos Calderón, one of the 
protagonists of this story and a person who knew intimately the story of journalism in 
Colombia, wrote a chapter on this topic in a monumental historical encyclopedia.  
One of the consequences of the agitation in the 1960s and 1970s was the birth 
of a vigorous, albeit not particularly profitable or professional, editorial industry of 
the left, which parallels and intersects with the life of Alternativa. This story is told in 
the book Cultura Intelectual de Resistencia (Gómez 2005). Besides publishing lists of 
translations of books by Marxist scholars, such as those of Marx himself, Engels, 
Mao Tse Tung, Lenin, Stalin, Trotski, Luxemburgo, Mandel and many others, the 
book registers the genesis of several texts related to the historical context for this 
dissertation. They were the product of a new generation of scholars emerging from 
universities and research center across the country. They included: Estudios sobre el 
subdesarrollo colombiano (Studies on Colombia’s underdevelopment) by Mario 
Arrubla (1978), a groundbreaking book published by at least five different publishing 
houses that went through 13 editions between 1962 and 1984; Jesús Antonio 
Bejarano’s El Capital Monopolista (1972), which chronicled the formation of the 
capitalist economic institutions in Colombia in the twentieth century; Alvaro Tirado 
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Mejía’s, Introducción a la Historia Económica de Colombia (1979), an impressive 
text due to the rigorous and exhaustive use of documentary information, among 
others. 
In terms of culture, cultural industries and the search for identity in the 
country as related to mass media and new technologies, the books by Jesús Martín 
Barbero stand out (1998, 1998). Professor Martín Barbero is one of several Latin 
American researchers who has taken upon themselves the issues created by the advent 
of what they call modernity in the cultural makeup of Latin America. 
Finally, among Colombian scholars, López de la Roche (in Ayala, Ed. 2004) 
has proposed a research agenda on media with its many possibilities, as part of the 
historiography scholarship in Colombia.    
 
On critical communication theory  
On the use of history as a method of inquiry, the author that best reflects the spirit of 
this investigation is Marxist scholar Hanno Hardt, (1992, 1998). In his books, Hardt 
speaks of the centrality of historical research in communication studies, in that the 
acts of human beings in society have to be understood as part of a political, economic, 
social and cultural context that gives them meaning. Hardt is an authoritative critic of 
the a-historical approaches to research by the old functionalist and positivist schools 
of communication theory and advocates for an approach to cultural studies and 
critical theory as a more adequate methodological framework for the analysis of 
media. It only seems fitting, then, that an appropriate theory in which to frame 
phenomena such as the creation, existence and demise of Alternativa, a publication 
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created upon a Marxist conception of society, is one which gives primacy to social 
and political practices in concrete and real settings that are explained through a class 
struggle analysis.  
 Taking the issue further in more up-to-date terms, the work of cultural studies 
theoreticians such as Jane Stokes, (2003) and John Street (2001) propose concrete 
methodologies of interpretations and practical applications to issues of media in the 
contemporary world.  
 For the state of communication’ theory and a conceptual context of the issue 
of media and society. McQuail provides an invaluable primer in his Mass 
Communication Theory (1994).  
 I would like to finish with a reflection by Hanno Hardt on the subject at hand. 
 
  History as a record of human experience is a source of understanding 
the meaning and importance of social phenomena, including the role and 
function of the media in society. In addition to the view of the media as 
symbols of power and profit or as measure of political and commercial 
interests and success, questions of human needs and the relationship between 
the individual and the media as a potential source of societal reform are 
equally important for comparative and international communications research. 
The presence of social trends, the rise and fall of cultural epochs, and the 
impact of politics and economics on social communications raise questions 
about the mechanics of these changes and about the involvement of particular 






This dissertation is the historical narrative reconstruction of the magazine Alternativa, 
as a case study of an original experience in left-wing, opposition and activist 
journalism carried out in the second half of the 1970s. The primary source and main 
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body of the dissertation is based on the review and analysis of the 257 issues of 
Alternativa, which were compiled by the author and bound in 13 volumes located in 
libraries, old used bookstores, files of friends and the author’s personal collection. 
This allowed for a reconstruction of the story of the magazine, and through its pages, 
of a period of the history of Colombia, spanning six years from 1974 to 1980.  
Except for 14 issues, which had to be photocopied, all were studied are in 
original, mint form and will remain as part of the record with the hope that this 
research will create an interest in the use of the magazine as a historical research tool 
among Colombian and foreign scholars. The materials can be consulted at the library 
of Universidad de Antioquia in Medellín, Colombia. For methodological purposes, 
the magazine’s trajectory has been divided into three stages, based on as many 
milestones in its history. I thoroughly reviewed all the issues of the magazine and 
analyzed them for thematic content. I looked for examples of articles that illustrated 
the magazine’s commitment to its four principles. The magazines, from issue 112 
onward, contain articles I wrote as part of its staff. In that sense, I was a personal 
witness to the story narrated here and that give me inside and direct knowledge of the 
issues at hand, both political and journalistic. Despite my reluctance to write in the 
first person and my desire to establish a distance with the subject, I have included 
myself in some instances, in order to alert the reader of my participation in the life of 
the magazine. As told in the introduction, I witnessed many of the events the 
magazine covered and had enough knowledge of the political scene at the time to be 
able to interpret it and write about it as a committed journalist. 
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In the course of this work, Alternativa revealed itself as an extraordinary 
source of first-hand material, which this dissertation only begins to explore. It 
includes references to articles on topics the magazine touched upon for the first time 
in Colombia, in its quest for counter informing and disputing the hegemonic hold of 
the mainstream press on mass-disseminated information. As this dissertation hopes to 
show, Alternativa is probably one of the finest primary sources available to study a 
host of issues of the time, and to understand the current conditions of the country. In 
fact, the magazine took it upon itself to treat many themes for the first time in print, 
while confronting the mainstream press on issues that were either ignored, or 
insufficiently treated.   
In order to complete the picture of the magazine, I interviewed several key 
protagonists of its story, all of whom I knew or met personally at one time or another 
during the life of the magazine. Although most of the material referred to here comes 
from those interviews, the fact that many of the people who participated in the life of 
the publication were my friends necessarily makes my use of the material the result of 
an ongoing conversation of many years. It is the consequence of the collective 
memory of a whole generation of Colombian journalists, many of whom are still alive 
and in dominant positions in the country’s media and literary worlds. The interviews 
mainly concerned the years I was not with the magazine, especially during its 
conception and beginning. The interviews also included recollections about the 
background of the political scene against which the magazine moved, particularly its 
political relations with the armed guerrilla groups, which I did not know about at the 
time. These revelations, especially its relation to the armed group M-19, which is 
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explained for the first time in this research, are an authentic new contribution to the 
political and journalistic story of the country. Finally, the interviews asked about the 
interviewee’s views and opinions on the journalistic aspect of the publication and its 
evolution according to the changing political situation. 
Both Enrique Santos Calderón and Orlando Fals Borda gave me access to 
their archives related to the magazine, which included handwritten minutes of 
Alternativa’s board meetings held during the second stage of the magazine. Other 
unique documents, copies of which remain in my possession, are typewritten letters, 
which the protagonists of the magazine’s crises sent to each other explaining their 
positions. The originals remain in the hands of Santos Calderón. 
Because of space limitations, a thorough comparative study with the 
mainstream press at the time was not possible. This remains, however, a fertile 
ground of research for future projects. Instead, I chose to refer to the mainstream 
media through the magazine’s own pages, thus offering the same criticism that the 
magazine so thoroughly exercised. Nevertheless, I searched for mentions of the 
magazine in the mainstream press, some of which are cited here.  
A secondary source are the mentions of the magazine in scholarly works, most 
of which are noted in the review of the literature, and in publications where partial 
stories of the magazine were told. I should also mention here that as an associate 
professor of Universidad de Antioquia, in Medellín Colombia,  I wrote a previous 
research paper on the subject. Out of that project came a complete index of the 
magazine’s articles in Excel format. That index is not part of this dissertation, but I 
used it for this research and I plan to make it available to other researchers.   
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Chapter 3: Historical context 
 
The history of Colombia since the birth of the country in the early 1800s, when it 
became independent of Spain, has been plagued by social conflicts arising from the 
confrontation among the groups that fought for power and wealth at one time or 
another. The ruling class, which governed over urban dwellers and artisans, 
manufacturing workers, peasants and minorities such as Colombian Indians and 
blacks, aligned into two political parties: the Conservatives, representing big 
landowners and the old establishment, and Liberals, representing mostly merchants, 
traders and a section of the modern learned bourgeoisie.  
 Since its independence in 1819, Colombia has been a nominal democratic 
republic, with an elected government distributed in executive power headed by the 
President and a bi-cameral Congress, and a judicial apparatus. The social contract was 
written in constitutions, which contained consecrated principles inspired mostly by 
western democratic ideals, particularly those stemming from the French and 
American Revolutions. 
 The history of the country, however, has not always followed the written 
principles of the Constitution and Colombia has been ruled by the force of arms as 
much as by the rule of law. All through the nineteenth century, the country was the 
scene of numerous regional and national civil wars fought in the name of higher 
values, of insurrections, and open or veiled dictatorships seeking to control the 
political power of the state for the benefit of the ruling class.  The fight for the 
supremacy of either one of the two parties was waged on the backs of the Colombian 
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poor, who made the armies that fought for their interests. The numerous wars and 
conflicts never translated into a better standing for the working people of Colombia, 
most of whom remained disenfranchised, either at the mercy of, or abandoned by the 
State, controlled by politicians and the oligarchy for their own benefit.  In that sense, 
the country did not achieve the level of national unity or consciousness achieved in 
modern developed democracies such as the United States. 
After a long period of Conservative control, which started in 1886 and ended 
in 1930, the Liberals took power and the modernization of the country began. The 
institutions of the state gradually adapted to the exigencies of the times, with the 
growth of financing and manufacturing, an increasing urban population, and a more 
global scenario. At this stage, the working class began to be part of the political 
landscape through local and national struggles, by organizing in unions and parties 
and by claiming a bigger role in the national affairs. In the first part of the twentieth 
century, socialist ideas arrived in the country and began to influence the worker’s 
organization and ideology. 
The Conservatives’ drive to recover the power lost since the early thirties 
created a growing instability in the political scene. One man in particular, 
Conservative Laureano Gómez, began to agitate for change, accusing the Liberals of 
corruption and malfeasance, thus creating the climate that made possible the surge of 
a growing sectarian violence. It also stimulated the growth of populism represented 
by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a charismatic leader and orator who won the hearts and wills 
of workers, peasants and popular sectors. Gaitán took control of the Liberal party and 
was its presidential candidate for the 1950 elections. If elected, he would have been 
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the first person from the ranks of the popular classes to make it to the presidency on a 
populist platform that bore many similarities with socialist and communist ideals. 
On April 9, 1948, Gaitán was assassinated in a street in Bogotá at a time when 
representatives of twenty-one countries were gathered at the Ninth Inter-American 
Conference. The big press almost unanimously attributed the ensuing conflagration, 
successively known as El Bogotazo, to an international communist conspiracy. 
Gaitán’s murder and the events that followed constituted the breaking point in 
Colombia’s history in the twentieth century. After his death, his ideals and followers 
were persecuted in a systematic genocide carried out by militants professing 
allegiance to the leaders of both parties in a vicious circle of punishment, vengeance 
and land grabbing known as La Violencia (The Violence), which claimed somewhere 
between 300,000 and 400,000 lives in little more than half a decade.  Although the 
killings diminished after 1954, they continued in a more selective way throughout the 
rest of the country’s history, up until the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
Gaitán’s legacy, embedded in the memory of the people, survived in the 
guerrilla movements that later adopted the socialist-Marxist ideology, and in 
numerous cadres who claimed to carry on his ideals of popular participation in the 
political power.  
In 1953, after a power vacuum created by the inability of Conservatives and 
Liberals on how to run the country, the “oligarchy” allowed General Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla to seize power. He immediately declared an amnesty, which turned out to be a 
campaign of selective murders, with as many as 16,000 people killed by the army, the 
police and other government forces, in a deliberate and systematic drive to eliminate 
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political opponents in the countryside. Regarding that amnesty, Manuel Marulanda 
Vélez, the historic leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC, (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), said later: “What was a fair 
request, the amnesty, was used as a trap to brake the guerrilla struggle and defeat the 
peasant war…the popular armed struggle was defeated, not in the military field but in 
the political arena” (Marulanda 11). 
Rojas Pinilla made the two main political parties uncomfortable by showing 
his own populist streak and his intention to remain in power through what he 
conceived as an army-people alliance.  
 
The ruling class saw the military government as a transitory period, 
but Rojas Pinilla had other plans. He began to build up his own base of 
support among the military, public sector-workers, labor and other urban poor. 
In 1954, he set up his own political movement, the Movement of National 
Action (MAN). He envisaged an army/people alliance, but in trying to create 
it, pushed the traditional parties into closer unity against him. In fact, he never 
succeeded in gaining the support needed to generate a third political force 
(Pearce 1990, p. 60). 
 
 
On May 10, 1957, Rojas Pinilla was deposed by a military junta, in a coup 
orchestrated by the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties. He was tried, 
found guilty, stripped of his civil rights, and forced into exile.  
 
The National Front  
Following the dictatorship, the leaders of both parties, Liberal Alberto Lleras and 
Conservative Laureano Gómez, made a pact in 1958 known as the National Front, 
whereby they agreed to share the government, its jobs and budget, and alternate the 
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presidency every four years for a total of 16 years. That pact ended in 1974, when 
Alternativa was born. 
While administrating the country for the sole benefit of the two parties in 
power, the National Front leaders contributed to the creation of a belligerent, armed 
left. They bestowed the same intolerance that both parties showed for one another in 
the past on working classes’ sectors such as manufacturing laborers, students and 
peasants, through exceptional legislation called the State of Siege, enforced by the 
army and the police. They also employed irregular paramilitary squads financed by 
businesspeople and landowners to terrorize the enemies of the government. 
 
No expression of any social conflict was permitted outside the control 
of the two traditional parties. The state could play no role in the mediation of 
such conflicts and, indeed, had no independent role of its own to look after the 
interests of society as a whole. Reformist impulses generated from time to 
time by more enlightened members of the ruling elite were blocked. And, if 
the state had been unable to deal with the country’s changing social profile 
before La Violencia , it was even more woefully inadequate in the face of the 
rapid urbanization, rural modernization and industrialization of the ensuing 
decades and their social consequences. (Pearce 65) 
 
  
The National Front was incapable of stopping the seeds of rebellion from 
growing in several regions of the country, due in part to a promise of an agrarian 
reform that never came through, and to a new weapon that armed peasants added to 
their arsenal: the socialist ideology.  
With the creation of the National Front, the war in the countryside was no 
longer a sectarian struggle between the two main parties, but an offensive to 
reorganize the property of the land and fortify the big landowners, dominant since the 
time of the civil wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to 
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Sánchez, “when the dictatorship fell, the violence whose dominant cause was the 
Liberal-Conservative sectarian struggle imposed vertically to the people, took a 
decisive economic turn. The violence was exercised as a business in order to produce 
changes in land property” (p. 27). Some 200.000 properties changed hands during the 
time of La Violencia. 
On January 1, 1959, the armies of Fidel Castro’s entered La Habana, installing 
the first socialist regime in Latin America. Out of the Cuban revolution came the role 
models that would inspire an entire generation of Latin American youth, including 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who became one of the greatest myths of the socialist 
movement worldwide after his death in the Bolivian jungles in 1967 (Debray 1967). 
The Cuban Revolution was the catalyst for rebel groups created in the 1950s to morph 
into full-fledged armed political movements and into the same guerrilla groups that 
today, at the start of the twenty-first century, are still waging war against the political 
class in Colombia. 
After the Cuban Revolution, the United States matriculated Latin America, 
with the exception of Mexico and Canada, in a front against Cuba using the 
Organization of American States, OAS, for that purpose. To avoid new events such as 
another Cuban revolution, the United States developed a strategy derived from the 
National Security doctrine of 1947, which extrapolated from the defense of the 
hemisphere to internal security inside the countries, with so-called civic-military 
operations, the other face of John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. In Colombia, 
the armed forces were used in projects useful for the population while at the same 
time they combated the rebel-armed struggle in the countryside. By the year of 1962, 
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200 Colombian military personnel had already received training in the United States. 
The total number of those trained from 1950 to 1963 was 2,516. The National 
Security Doctrine was used to assume absolute and dictatorial powers by the armed 
forces in internal wars against any type of opposition from the left in the South Cone 
regimes: Paraguay (1954), Brazil (1966), Bolivia (1971), Uruguay (1973), Chile 
(1973), Argentina (1976), in which the a brutal repression was unleashed against 
people’s movements and armed groups, especially throughout the 1970s.  
In Colombia, the United States had the enthusiastic help of Colombia’s 
political class, whose champion Alberto Lleras Camargo, former OAS secretary 
general and the country’s president from 1958 to 1962, adopted the habit of calling 
communist and subversive any opposition force independent from the government. 
Liberal and Conservative parties controlled the two main workers’ unions with the 
governments of the National Front and the political class always on the side of the 
bosses and landowners, who through the years kept taking away the land of peasants 
and tenant farmers. 
To keep the opposition under control, the National Front governments used 
the State of Siege, a constitutional figure akin to a declaration of internal commotion 
perfectly suited for the strategy of national security, in effect during 126 out of the 
192 months in which the National Front governed. Under the State of Siege, the 
government governed without the approval of Congress, issuing decrees to control 
unrest in the civilian population, especially peasants, students, and unionized workers, 
and to combat an overblown subversion. The armed forces had a free hand to act on 
the national territory as judge and party, through the so-called Verbal War Tribunals, 
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a form of court martial for civilians, notorious for their restrictions of due judicial 
process. The State of Siege gave legal status to the culture of violence, turning the 
armed forces into an instrument of social control, in what amounted to a declaration 
of war by the political class against the poorest among its own people.  
A typical decree under the State of Siege (1128, June 19, 1970) forbade the 
publication or diffusion of news, commentaries or propaganda by any written or 
broadcast method or loudspeaker “in as much as they are susceptible of creating 
alarm, and affect the public tranquility” to spread news about the situation, destiny or 
mobilization of the public forces. The decree allowed for the retention of persons due 
to “perturbation or public order” through speeches, expositions or debates about such 
issues, even those that had taken place in public corporations and manifests or 
communiqués of the same type. People under suspicion of being part of subversive 
activities or stimulating them, were placed under police vigilance and could not travel 
without the secret police knowledge or that of the town’s major. Almost all meetings 
of more than three people, including public, religious, student or workers gatherings, 
civic ceremonies and public shows were forbidden. The States of Siege would 
become a fundamental tool of the government and the political class to control the 
mass media, specially radio, and television through prior censorship. Information was 
censored and regulated and the authorities, specially the military and the police, 
hindered access of journalists to information sources and manipulated the contents to 
hide the truth. As for media favorable to the National Front, they did not show a 
strong intention to portray a different aspect of the country’s reality. 
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In the early 1960s, Conservative politician Alvaro Gómez Hurtado coined the 
term “Independent Republics” to refer to the regions controlled by armed groups, 
which contested the government’s authority. His words instigated actions such as 
Operation Marquetalia in 1962, against organized peasants of the south of Tolima. In 
July of the same year, the government set a price for the head of Manuel Marulanda 
Vélez. The offensive included a “military-civic operation,” the economic and military 
blockade of the territory, the creation of concentration camps, torture and executions 
of prisoners by firing squads, bombardments with the use of napalm and possibly a 
bacteriological war denounced by peasants who fell sick with black smallpox and a 
another unidentified diseases. Petitions to the United Nations, the Red Cross, 
President Valencia, the Cardinal, and Congress were useless. Even French 
intellectuals headed by Jean Paul Sartre signed a manifest in April of 1965 
denouncing the Vietnamization of Colombia, about the same time the American 
marines were invading the Dominican Republic during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency. 
The offensive against a few dozen peasants armed defensively (42 according to 
Marulanda) cost 372 million pesos, more than half the entire defense budget for the 
year 1964. In 1965, La Nueva Prensa, an independent newspaper in the capital, 
counted 21,367 Colombians murdered during the seven years of the National Front.  
This brutal offensive, considered an enormous historical mistake by the 
political class, drove the armed bands of peasants to organize into guerrilla 
movement. In the next two years the ELN (National Liberation Army), the EPL 
(Popular Liberation Army) and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) were founded. On January of 1965, Camilo Torres, the guerrilla priest, 
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launched the “Platform of the Colombian United Front” addressed “To all 
Colombians, popular sectors, the community organizations, unions, cooperatives, 
peasant leagues, indigenous communities and workers organizations, to all non-
conformists, to all those not aligned with the traditional parties” (Gerasi 1971).  
The death of Camilo Torres, during his first combat experience in February 
1966 with ELN, was a hard blow to the legal struggle of the left. Camilo, who as the 
left’s brightest leader of the 1960s had created a people’s mass movement with ideals 
for an authentic change proposal for the lower classes, intensified the discussion on 
whether armed fronts in the countryside could lead to an insurgency strong enough 
for a revolution according to the model proposed by “Che” Guevara. 
Another populist movement in the fringes of the Liberal Party, was the Liberal 
Revolutionary Movement (MRL) founded by Alfonso López Michelsen, a scion of 
the former president. The MRL was a pseudo-rebellion created inside the ranks of the 
Liberal Party protesting the mechanics of the National Front, which prevented it from 
competing for power. Several groups, including the Communist Party, then illegal, 
were ultimately used by the cunning López Michelsen to push his own agenda. In 
August 1967, he accepted the governorship of the newly created Department of 
Cesar, which made official his return to the bipartisan fold. Once inside the Liberal 
Party, as governor and minister of foreign relations, and especially during his tenure 
as president, from 1974 to 1978, he became a loyal representative of the political 
class he used, as he did with the left, to escalate up the steps of power.  
After an accelerated process of urbanization, with all the social and cultural 
changes that came with it, the city dwellers began to see a horizon of modernity 
 47 
 
represented by cultural currents that were circulating simultaneously in many parts of 
the world. A generation produced by the exodus from the countryside to the cities 
provided a fertile recruiting ground for the nascent Colombian left. As Pearce said,  
 
Migration to the cities was already producing strain. Between 1951 
and 1964, the urban population more than doubled as people fled La 
Violencia; by 1964, half of the total population, just over nine million people, 
lived in urban areas. Only a little more than one quarter of a million people 
had jobs in manufacturing. The informal sector became the economy for the 
majority of the urban poor, and criminal the means of survival in the city. 
Growing urban discontent in search of a political expression was apparent by 
the early 1990s (1990, p. 66).  
 
Among the new inhabitants of the urban centers were hundreds of thousands 
of students who entered with their hopes and enthusiasm the ranks of numerous leftist 
groups, which took shape in schools and universities. They headed the popular 
protests against the National Front regimes and received the hardest blows during 
their repression. 
New ideological seeds began to grow and new ideas to circulate among a 
radicalized youth based at universities and colleges, leftists intellectuals and activists, 
and armed bands of peasants. This was when the modern Colombian left was born. 
Then dialectic and historical materialism, Marxist political economy, the thoughts of 
Mao Tse Tung, Lenin, Stalin, Rosa Luxembourg, Gramsci, Mariátegui, Trotsky, 
“Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro, began to circulate widely in university classrooms 
around the country. There was also an avalanche of works by European thinkers such 
as Saussure, Freud, Marcuse, Sartre, Lucaks, Erich From, Fannon, Hossbaum, 
Bachelard, Levy Strauss, Althusser, Barthes and Foucault, among others (López de la 
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Roche 1994), which contributed to a stimulating intellectual climate for discussions 
about society and the questioning of old stereotypes and paradigms. 
These groups were joined, sometimes as founders, other times as combatants 
and some times as political movements, by members of the Colombian clergy who 
began to question the traditional role of the church on the side of the privileged 
classes. They appropriated the words of Camilo Torres who said that “the duty of 
every Christian was to be a revolutionary and the duty of every revolutionary was to 
make the revolution” (Gerasi 1971). The role of progressive priests inside the church, 
with its mixture of Marxism and Christianity, weakened the traditional Catholic 
Church’s power over Colombians’ beliefs. The Second Latin American Episcopate 
Conference (CELAM) gathered in Medellín in 1968 started Liberation Theology in 
the continent. In Colombia, 50 priests gathered in the hacienda Golconda, which gave 
its name to the movement, in December of the same year launched a manifest calling 
for radical change in the economic and social structures of the country. 
By then the utopian hopes for the possible revolution were in full swing, fed 
by the events in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. Little by little, those who filled 
the ranks of numerous leftists groups were convinced that the change was not only 
possible but also imminent. The problem was that each group had its own model, in 
most cases imported from other countries and known through propaganda 
apparatuses.  
The insurrectional ferment in France was essential for the formulation of a 
theoretical debate around the building of socialism in the country, aired years later 
through the pages of Alternativa. The main founders of the magazine, Bernardo 
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García, Enrique Santos Calderón, Orlando Fals Borda and Gabriel García Marquez, 
were all in Europe at the time. 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the most lucid of the National Front presidents, 
elected in 1966 made a good effort to modernize the public administration under the 
same game rules, which allowed the private capital to consolidate in the 1960s.  He 
knew that the growing migration from the country to the city could create a social 
crisis of great proportions and doubted the capacity of the State to create employment 
and satisfy the needs of the growing urban population. He had helped to develop an 
interventionist policy in the countryside, which gained him the ill will of the big 
landowners and agribusiness, by creating an organization of landless peasants in areas 
where traditionally there had been big estates, through associations watched by the 
government without partisan control. The Asociación Nacional de Usuarios 
Campesinos, ANUC (National Association of Peasant Users) was established in 1967. 
Soon it began to show independence from the government and state control and to 
claim the right to the land through marches and invasions. At the beginning of the 
1970s, thousands of peasants were mobilizing to stop the expansion of cattle ranchers 
and agribusiness, and to preserve the peasant’s economy. 
In 1970, ANUC released a program known as the First Peasant Mandate, 
proclaiming its growing independence from the government and initiating a series of 
recovery actions, which at one point involved some 30,000 people and affected 2,374 
land properties in the country. In that same year, the government again declared a 
State of Siege. Throughout the 1970s, ANUC, created by Lleras with the intention of 
establishing a Liberal base in the country, became a field of struggle for different 
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sectors of the political left for its control. The agrarian policy would be one of the 
main issues of discussion and the cause of much of the division and fragmentation of 
the left. 
Meanwhile, a new wave of student agitation, a product both of the 
government policies and the leftist influence in the classrooms, began in earnest in 
1969, forcing the Lleras government to respond to generalized mobilizations all over 
the country by closing universities and sending the police to fight demonstrators. The 
most important conflict took place at Bogotá’s Universidad Nacional, the country’s 
flagship university, which was closes in February 24 by the government after a series 
of incidents. 
Part of the student’s movement focused on opposing the influence of the 
United States in Colombia’s higher education, which according to the students was 
included in a strategy called the Basic Plan and sought the privatization of the Latin 
American universities through a closer relationship with the private sector and 
corporations. 
In April 19 1970, the oligarchy struck against, this time by denying through 
fraud the triumph of the old General Rojas Pinilla and his ANAPO movement in the 
presidential elections. Rojas Pinilla campaigned on a program called “The 
Decalogue”, which despite all its populist rhetoric which talked about foreign debt, 
the loss of value of the currency, the rise in the cost of living and the exaggerated 
growth of the bureaucracy, could not even be considered a leftist program. On 
election night, when the first results showed the general winning, the government 
seized control of the information and the next day, his rival Misael Pastrana, the 
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Conservative candidate, woke up as the winner by just 63,000 votes. Therefore, on 
that April 19, the same parties that had monopolized power again frustrated the rise to 
power of a popular leader. As it turned out, a fraud orchestrated by the National 
Registrar and condoned by President Lleras Restrepo, declared the Conservative 
candidate the winner (López de la Roche 1994).  
In the task of showing the National Front pact as a providential event in the 
history of the country, the political class always had the unconditional support of the 
biggest newspapers. The censorship applied by Rojas Pinilla during his government 
which led to the closing of big papers such as the dailies El Tiempo and El 
Espectador, turned into a  self-censorship that eliminated from the pages of the 
newspapers everything perceived as inconvenient for the powers that be. Even López 
Michelsen was a victim of the information discrimination during the first years of 
MRL, that left out information on his movement or published it in a distorted way. 
According to López de la Roche 
 
The malicious exercise and ill will of political journalism, 
Manichaeism in the presentation of current events by some editorialists in the 
big dailies was in the 60s much stronger and less refined than today. This 
attitude, in a medium such as ours, was marked by attitudes and historical 
practices of intolerance which did not contribute to building consensus and, on 
the contrary, reinforced the political and ideological polarization between the 
left and the right and the exclusion logic in the appreciation of the political 
adversary (62). 
 
Then again, a period of agitation, demonstrations and confrontations began in 
universities across the country, including private institutions. Pécaut wrote  
 
From then on, the government decides to carry out an in-depth reform 
and takes the decision to close all the big universities one by one. On April 23, 
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11 universities were closed, several of them occupied by the army, such as the 
National University in Bogotá and Medellín, and the Industrial University of 
Santander. Soon others were closed as well, such as Nariño and Cartagena. 
Out of 110,000 students, some 60,000 are affected by the closings (2006, p. 
148). 
 
In March, the students presented a minimum program, which, besides freeing 
jailed students, proposed a series of measures leading to a “co-government” system 
that permitted them to participate in the administration of the universities, including 
the appointment of its directors. The program also called for the limitation of foreign 
influence, especially that of the United States, and the suppression of political jobs 
not related to the universities in the Superior University Councils. The government 
with its young Minister of Education, Luis Carlos Galán, tried to conciliate, half 
accepting some of the tenets of co-government and widening the participation of 
students and teachers. However, the National government reconsidered and by 1972, 
co-government was mortally wounded.  
The student problem was just one of many Pastrana inherited from the Lleras 
administration, including the peasant movement, the guerrilla actions, the pressure of 
economic groups and a high inflation rate that had a strong affect on the cost of 
living. This last aspect was the spark that led the labor movement to propose a general 
strike on March 8, 1971, with the participation of the government-leaning unions, 
CTC and UTC, as well as the communist controlled CSTC. However, inflation did 
not stop: in 1973, it reached 35 percent while in the first six months of 1974 it 
reached 14.8 percent. 
The strike was not successful but the unhappiness with the Pastrana 
government continued. The government faced contradictory pressures. It was 
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endlessly reminded by the political class of the need for deep changes to conjure the 
Chilean specter of a leftist elected government. The great agrarian, urban and 
educational reforms of the government, as well as its international strategy, were 
frozen in Congress, which presented a dismal legislative balance. Former president 
Lleras and his ally López Michelsen became critics of the administration. 
In regards to the agrarian policy, in January 1972, the government called the 
agrarian entrepreneurs and owners to a meeting in which congressional 
representatives were also present but in which the peasants representatives of ANUC 
were not. Then, in a pact called the Chicoral Agreement, the political class and the 
big landowners ended any hope of an agrarian reform, choosing the easier path for 
themselves, and in the process frustrated the aspirations of hundreds of thousands of 
impoverished and landless peasants, many of whom had been displaced and robbed in 
the previous decades.  
In 1972’s legislative elections, ANAPO went from the 1,371,037 votes it 
received in 1970 to 553,955, a punishment for its conciliatory attitude two years 
before. The left was also unable to capitalize the popular discontent, especially due to 
the ambiguities of groups such as MOIR, which went from an abstention strategy to 
an electoral one, getting just 1.8 percent of the votes. The traditional parties did not 
do much better, judging by the fact that almost seven out of every ten potential voters 
did not go to the polls.  
The Pastrana government’s strategy was based in the Plan Currie or Four 
Strategies, which included channeling savings toward employment creation; exports 
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growth; the elevation of agricultural productivity; and the improvement of the fiscal 
system with the reevaluation of subsidies and exemptions.  
The year 1974 found the Liberal and Conservative parties involved in an 
electoral campaign. In the Liberal primaries, the alliance López-Turbay defeated the 
presidential candidacy of Carlos Lleras, who wanted to finish what he had started in 
1966. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, imposed his name as the Conservative candidate 
despite the revulsion that it and that of his father, Laureano Gómez, caused in the 
people as instigators of La Violencia genocide. Candidate Maria Eugenia Rojas, the 
old General Rojas’ daughter and Hernando Echeverry, the candidate of the left’s 
coalition, completed the main electoral picture. The first two candidates, both sons of 
former presidents, campaigned on only small differences between themselves. 
General Rojas’ movement, however, hit hard by the frustration of its voters since 
1972, refused to make alliances with the Communist Party and with Maoist MOIR. 
These two groups and the much smaller Movimiento Amplio Colombiano, 
MAC (Wide Colombian Movement) decided to participate together in the elections 
and created the Unión Nacional de Oposición, UNO (National Opposition Union). 
UNO’s minimum program, published in 1973, was a compromise between several 
leftist organizations. It appealed to a ‘return of democratic freedoms’ and to a 
mobilization of all sectors against the oligarchic and neocolonial regime. It promised 
to satisfy the petitions of ANUC and to carry out a radical urban reform. Actually, the 
mutual distrust never stopped between the Communists and the Maoists. The former 
was forced to explain its alliance with its rival; and the latter insisted on the purely 
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tactical aspect of it. Both pretended to create an organization able to receive those 
voters running from ANAPO. 
While the traditional parties and the left were involved in electoral debates, 
repression continued unabated, especially in the countryside where peasants were 
murdered, jailed, tortured and forced to leave their plots of land. In the cities, strikes 
and protests were violently repressed under the State of Siege. Justice was dispensed 
in military garrisons through the Verbal War Councils, which were summary trials in 
which very often those suspected of subversive activities such as painting walls with 
political slogans or participating in demonstrations were condemned. Pastrana’s 
government chose violence as a primary form of answering social protest. That 
confirmed that the war that the political class had chosen as the way to defend itself 
from its own people continued unabated. 
It was in this crisis climate of general deception, people’s protests and 
repression, in the last few months of the Pastrana administration and in the middle of 
the first electoral campaign not ruled by the National Front, that Alternativa was born. 






Chapter 4: Genesis and conception 
The idea of creating a magazine in Colombia named Alternativa came out of the 
confluence, in 1973, of three groups of people working, from a leftist’s perspective, 
in academic research, sociology and journalism, each with a previous experience in 
media and each with its own idea of what the magazine should be. Each of the three 
groups of people contributed in their own way to plan, organize, fund and run the 
magazine in its firs stage. 
The head of the first group was Bernardo García, an European-educated 
economist, who, while studying in Belgium, became acquainted with Le Nouvelle 
Observateur, a successful mass-circulation magazine created in the realm of French 
socialism, geared toward a general public. It was modern analytical journalism, with 
complex problems treated in an accessible language from a socialist point of view. 
Without being a party medium, Le Nouvelle Observateur managed to energize the 
socialist movement and become an important source of information for a sizeable 
segment of the French public. García had already experimented with a small 
publication called Alternative which circulated among Latin American students in 
Belgium, and was very impressed by the way Le Observateur explained complex 
issues in a quite well-written, almost literary language.  
 García was the one who came up with the magazine’s slogan “Daring to 
Think is Beginning to Fight”, meaning that the real strength was in the force of reason 
more than in confrontation, and that as long as the problems were understood the 
social force would find ways to propose achievable tasks.  
 57 
 
In 1971, García and a group of teachers and students were expelled from 
Universidad del Valle, after his candidacy for the deanship of the School of 
Economics proposed by the students was rejected by the university authorities. García 
had already attempted to create a magazine in Cali, along with a Trotskyite group of 
students who later went on to create the Socialist Block, a party identified with the 
Trotskyite Fourth International Socialist. García left when he refused to engage in 
party-line journalism. He went to Bogotá to work as editor of the Statistics Bulletin 
and director of the Socioeconomic Analysis Division for the Departamento 
Aministrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE (National Statistics Bureau). There he 
teamed up with a young group of leftist economists, including Salomón Kalmanovitz 
and Jorge Villegas, who began to handle detailed statistics, the raw material of their 
research, and to publish them in the Boletín de Estadísticas (Statistics Bulletin), 
which García edited. That publication, one of the predecessors of Alternativa, became 
quite popular among intellectuals, reaching an unheard-of-circulation for a 
specialized magazine of 8,000 to 10,000.  
The social researcher and academic, Orlando Fals Borda, and his colleagues 
represented the second current, the sociologists. Fals had founded, along with the 
Catholic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo, the School of Sociology at Universidad 
Nacional, and was its dean from 1959 to 1967. He had also been in Europe in the 
heated months of May 1968, when he was director of research for United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, UNRISD, in Geneva. Besides, he had 
published several books, including Campesinos de los Andes, (1961), Subversion and 
social change (1969) Revoluciones inconclusas en América Latina (1971) and El 
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hombre y la tierra en Boyacá: bases sociológicas e históricas para una reforma 
agraria (1957), which bore witness to his enormous knowledge about the Colombian 
situation. . 
Fals Borda was, and still is, an international expert on participatory action 
research, a reinterpretation of field research methods and the orientation of scientific 
knowledge. According to him, research had to stop being a scholarly curiosity. 
Participatory action research presupposed a direct intervention of the researcher in the 
problems of those communities he was researching, with the goal of changing their 
living conditions. Fals’ Rosca Foundation for Social Research had extensive 
experience in fieldwork with peasant and Indian communities in several regions of 
the country, especially along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. The intention, according 
to participatory action research principles, was not only to research but also to act, 
organize people and induce them to change even at the cost of confronting the 
system. Part of that work was journalistic and educational as well, using formats such 
as comic books to bring the history of popular struggles to their own protagonists in a 
simple, direct narrative. 
In a report-statement sent to the Mission of the Church of Sweden, which 
helped funding the activities of Rosca foundation, Fals Borda narrated the genesis of 
the organization.  
 
In this juncture, there seems to be a tendency to believe that the 
reactionary character of functionalist sociology could be transformed through 
a different type of professional compromise and action. This different 
treatment necessarily required different theoretical frameworks. It was as if 
sociology had been until then, the instrument of domination by the 
bourgeoisie, and could be transformed to service the exploited class of 
society. This was the opinion taken by the founding members of Rosca, and 
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The third current that participated in the creation of Alternativa was that of 
journalists like Enrique Santos Calderón and a close group of artist friends belonging 
to the Fundación Pro Artes Gráficas (Pro Graphic Arts Foundation). Santos was the 
heir to the family that owned El Tiempo, the country’s paper of reference, and the 
firstborn of the younger generation of the most powerful media family in the country, 
which waged an enormous influence over Colombia politics throughout the twentieth 
century. The paper was the journalistic house of several presidents, and many 
important characters in the social, cultural and political life of the nation went through 
its newsroom.  
Because of that, Santos was born with a great responsibility on his shoulders. 
He had great curiosity about reality, a journalistic instinct acquired by living close to 
the rotary press, newspapers and journalists, and an understanding of the nature of 
Colombia’s politics. At the of 30, he was already writing a weekly column in El 
Tiempo called Contraescape and had specific responsibilities in the newsroom as 
deputy managing editor. When Alternativa was conceived, Santos’ group of painters, 
filmmakers and journalists was working with the southeastern communities of Bogotá 
against the plan by the municipal administration to build a big avenue, considered at 
the time too expensive and damaging to the poor inhabitants of the sector. His job and 
that of his friends was to support the community through a communications media 
project that included mural papers and posters.  
                                                 
2 Orlando Fals Borda, Letter to Carl. F. Hallencreuts, Church of Sweden, August 2, 1976. Personal file. 
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In February 1973, Santos and his friends founded the Pro Graphic Arts 
Foundation, with the goal of creating consciousness and raising the educational and 
cultural level among the marginalized sectors of society, especially Indian 
communities, peasants and marginalized urban dwellers. “So that, by knowing their 
situation and their rights, they can—through their own efforts—create a more 
democratic society.”3 Fourteen months later, the Foundation participated as one of the 
founding partners of Editorial Alternativa, based in Bogotá, whose objective, 
according to its statutes was the preparation, editing and commercialization of 
magazines, texts, brochures and other scientific, cultural, political and news product.  
According to Santos,  
 
We all had different conceptions, Bernardo’s group thought a lot about 
those things, about a magazine like Le Nouvelle Observateur. Fals’ group 
thought about a more popular magazine, with a simpler language. And I was 
always in the middle, trying to combine things, not to fall into something 
totally popular, ordinary, but neither doing something for leftist French 
intellectuals either. But we all wanted to do a different type of journalism, 
directly related to the people. And in the middle of 1973 we began to 
integrate, knowing each other’s experiences and at one point we just said why 
don’t we make a good leftist magazine, let’s join efforts and create a national 
circulation publication with a different language. Besides we were all coming 
from a very critical diagnostic of leftist journalism in the country at the time, 
things like mimeographed pamphlets in stapled single sheets. The only paper 
worth its name was Voz Proletaria, which carried the Communist party line. 
(E. Santos, personal interview, September 6, 2005)   
 
The Sociedad Alternativa Ltda. that started the magazine had a paid capital of 
$150,000 divided in six shares, one of them owned by Gabriel García Márquez 
(called Gabo among his friends), who went on to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 
1982. García Marquez’s contribution, besides the money to start the Solidarity 
                                                 




Committee with Political Prisoners, and his investment in Editorial Alternativa, was 
his fame and enormous national and international prestige. The publication of One 
Hundred Years of Solitude in 1968, had catapulted him to a definitive fame and to a 
place among the best writers of the twentieth century. When the book came out, his 
jump to fame was almost immediate, even though he already had a trajectory of more 
than twenty years writing journalism and fiction, and had published several books.  
 
We had the idea to bring García Márquez in and I had to do it. Gabo 
owed me one because just recently we had created the Solidarity Committee 
with Political Prisoners using an award of $10,000 dollars he had received in 
Oklahoma, which happened after he gave the money of a previous award to 
Venezuela’s MAS. They were protests from the left here in Colombia: “how 
is it possible, what happens with the Colombian left, aren’t there any problems 
here?” Then he called me and said, “I won $10,000 dollars and I want to give 
them to a Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners in Colombia.” I said, 
“We don’t have such a Committee here” and he said “Well, create one, no 
joda.” So we did. With USO, ANUC, FECODE we founded the Committee 
which began to act and was an indirect impulse to Alternativa later. With that, 
I called Gabo and told him: “We are going to create a leftist magazine with 
these people.” The first reaction from Gabo was premonitory and skeptic: 
“Those things always fail”. I said, “This is different, it is a very wide thing, 
not sectarian or partisan.” I convinced him, he came here and we sat down. 
We already were very advanced in the discussion as to how that magazine 
should be, what sections should it have, etc. Now with Gabo in we said let’s 
start. Besides, Gabo had promised an exclusive article on the bombardment of 
The Moneda Palace in Chile where Allende had fallen, also with a theory that 
it had been gringo pilots who did it, which turned out to be bogus. (Santos 
2005) 
 
According to Santos, despite his reticence and initial skepticism, Gabo ended 
up more involved in Alternativa and began a new phase in his life as an engaged 
journalist. “All Gabo´s articles at the time he wrote for Alternativa were part of a 
militant journalism stage that he had not developed before: articles on Angola, 
 62 
 
Vietnam, Cuba, about the blockade. During his time in Alternativa he developed a 
whole new stage as an engaged journalist.” (Santos 2005) 
Alternativa’s articles of incorporation tried to reconcile all positions in four 
basic points, in which there was a preoccupation with journalistic rigor. 
 
ARTICLE I – The magazine has as it objective (underlined in the original) to 
produce and divulge useful materials for the education teams of diverse 
groups of peasants, workers, teachers, etc, a) in the information field, b) in the 
analysis of national and eventually international problems, c) in the field of 
the expressions of the groups. 
 
ARTICLE II -  In the information field, the idea is to make a synthesis of 
monthly news, highlighting as a balance the most important ones and 
presenting the most possible objective reports, of those events in which it is 
necessary to offer data, references and reconstructions, with the aim of 
allowing the readers to make more detailed analysis of the national as well as 
the international situation. Thus, opinions and personal interpretations of a 
partisan line are excluded from this area. 
 
ARTICLE III – In the area of special reports the idea is to prepare detailed 
studies on the fundamental national problems, that could become pedagogical 
or collectible material, written in a journalistic language. 
 
ARTICLE IV – In the section that gathers the voice from the base, the idea is 
to publish articles, manifests, declarations, complaints, and features, taking 
care to verify the accuracy and precision of those expressions and to avoid 
excessive vocabulary and extension. The idea is also to provide a voice to 
organizations and popular spokespeople unknown to the public opinion.4
 
 As the first crises of the magazine a few months later proved, this document 
was notorious more for what it said than for what it didn’t. There was no mention 
whatsoever of any political allegiance or intention to make a publication for political 
purposes or to help in achieving the unity or goals of the left. If anything, the articles 
of incorporation were more journalistically neutral than other declarations of 
                                                 




principles published in the future, highlighting concepts such as information, analysis, 
accuracy and precision while seeking to avoid “opinions and personal interpretations 
of a partisan line,” as well as excessive vocabulary and extension.  
Once the magazine came out, these articles of incorporation coalesced in a 
publication completely committed to the political persuasion of the left, an opinion 
publication espousing ideals and goals that were a far cry from “the most possible 
objective reports.”  
To finance the magazine, its creators decided on a scheme to solicit monetary 
contributions from a list they compiled among themselves, thus creating a base of 
sympathizers who were supposed to be partners in the venture, albeit more symbolic 
than anything else. The letter sent to potential subscribers and partners was later 
reproduced with few variations as the first of the magazine’s editorials, which from 
the first issue on would be called “Letter to the Reader.” 
The letter emphasized the lack of an independent and critical national 
publication, thus resulting in an accommodation by the mainstream media, with those 
who held political and economic power governing the national events. The creation of 
Alternativa offered the critical reinterpretation of the national reality through 
political, economic and social analysis, a necessity for professional and popular 
organizations “involved with change,” meaning specifically Colombia’s left. For this 
purpose, the letter asked for monetary contributions in order to survive under 
economic conditions that favored big media.  The Founding Committee signed the 





The shadow of M-19 
Meanwhile, in the background, other discussion was going on about the magazine 
between Santos Calderón and Jaime Bateman Cayón, the leader of the urban guerrilla 
movement M-19, which was also in a formation process by a group of former 
militants of the Communist Party, ANAPO and other people linked previously with 
the armed guerrilla struggle. The relationship between Alternativa and M-19 went 
through several stages. After Santos and Bateman met for the first time, sometime at 
the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973, 
 
He began to tell me right away what they were doing, with a lot of 
confidence, that he knew about the magazine and believed in the unity of the 
left. He began to talk to me exactly about the same reflections we were 
having, of being tired of the Sino-Soviet fight, about the ideological 
cannibalism from the left, looking for a wide way to address the real country, 
how to overcome the sects in which the left was divided. From then on, a 
relationship began, he told me what they were doing, I told him how the 
magazine Alternativa was coming along, we began to see each other quite 
regularly. At that moment, they were publishing Comuneros, which was their 
first publication, and he proposed that I write an article about why there was 




According to Santos, M-19 and Bateman were so interested in that initiative 
that they got in touch with several members of the incipient editorial team.  
 
Later we found out they had also contacted the Fals group and other 
sectors and tendencies within the magazine. Therefore, when Alternativa 
started there was already a kind of sympathy, there were previous contacts, 
parallel projects that were inspired in a wide left conception, non-sectarian, 
with no international alignments. However, in the course of the development 
of the magazine M-19 began to gather strength from inside, they tried to orient 
                                                 




the magazine and influence decisions, gave political direction, contradicting 
very much the initial spirit of openness and tolerance. (2005)  
 
 
Santos told Villamizar that his encounter with Bateman became an “intense 
and long relationship” (Villamizar 1999) that lasted until 1982, when they met for the 





A magazine is born. 
The first editorial was not a political declaration, nor a manifesto, but the affirmation 
by a group of people that they intended to show the readers the true reality of the 
country and that the independent journalistic nature and mission of Alternativa 
prevailed against any commitment with political organizations on the left. This goal 
remained as a guiding principle through the successive crises of the magazine. 
 This declaration implied that the political class dominated the people through 
the control of the information media, which shaped the news to accommodate the 
reality as that political class wanted the people to know it. That was the case with the 
portrayal of the National Front pact as a providential event in the history of the 
country, unconditionally supported by the big newspapers as opinion shapers and the 
tightly controlled and incipient broadcast media. The censorship applied by Rojas 
Pinilla during his government, which led to the closing of partisan media such as El 
Tiempo and El Espectador turned into self-censorship which eliminated from the 
pages of the newspapers everything perceived as inconvenient for the powers that be.  
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Contrasting with the view from the big press, on October 25 1973, the 
announcement of the birth of the Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners 
highlighted the dramatic situation in the country regarding the systemic violation of 
human rights by the state apparatus. During 20 of the last 25 years, Colombia had 
lived under a State of Siege, an exceptional constitutional figure used to repress and 
control political apposition to the government, which also allowed the military to trial 
civilians in Verbal War Councils. The Committee announced at least eight such 
military judicial procedures, most of them directed against protesting workers, 
peasants, students and intellectuals, the occupation of at least  13 universities and the 
arrest of 200 students.  
The Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners stated among its objectives 
to vouch for the integrity and freedom of political prisoners; to have those cases 
already tried revised; and to investigate and denounce before public opinion the 
political repression at all levels. The Committee did not represent any political 
organization, but vowed to speak for all organizations and associations suffering 
persecution because of the offence of giving an opinion and acting in defense of their 
democratic rights. 
The presence in the Solidarity Committee of several founders of Alternativa 
also facilitated their understanding and created a common political ground, for all 
shared the objectives outlined above, particularly the situation regarding the gross 
violations of human rights in many instances and places at the time, which 
nevertheless were alien to many citizens of Colombia and unknown to most. So, point 
three of the announcement, investigating and denouncing before public opinion the 
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political repression, became a rallying cry for the groups of people who began to 
conceive of the new magazine. By any standard, those violations should have been 
treated as news. Not only were they not, but the big press made no attempt to do 
analytical, interpretive or investigative journalism, nor does it to this day.  
 By informing about the struggles of peasants, workers and students, and by 
providing a tribune for parties, groups, factions or sects, as well as providing 
contextual information, national and international, among other things, the makers of 
the magazine believed they could help in building the path to a historical 
revolutionary change. In this sense, they understood the role of the magazine as a 
vehicle of empowerment for those who read it, as a guide to action.  
 However, while the three currents of backers that made the magazine had a 
specific idea of what they wanted to do, there was no identification with the Leninist 
view of the press as an organizer, a doctrine that went as far back as the Bolshevik 
revolution and which had been extensively treated by theorists and politicians. The 
concepts of party or revolutionary press were mentioned occasionally in the 
foundation of the magazine, but no attempt was made to apply them, even though 
there was a prominent school of media theoreticians in Latin America that dealt with 
the topic from a Marxist perspective, led by the Belgian scholar Armand Mattelart. 
The lack of specific press theory, however, was compensated for by an abundance of 
Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the Colombian situation in terms of class struggle, 
the role of the proletarians, the intellectuals, the peasants and the ways and means to 
achieve an authentic socialist revolution. As it turned out, however, the need of a 
revolution was about the only thing all the parties and groups in the left agreed on. In 
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that sense, Alternativa was an alternative publication all right, but it was also a 
politically independent magazine, which very soon began to feel the pressures created 
by it success. Santos says,  
 
Alternativa appears in 1974, a completely unusual magazine, very 
aggressive, with an article denouncing the counter-guerrilla, full of 
information about popular struggles, totally anti-system and pro-left. The first 
issue sold out in less than a week. And there were even attempts to confiscate 
it in some downtown newsstands, which also helped to sell it. It was 
overwhelming. And that success in my opinion planted the seed of the first 
crisis. It unleashed appetites and amplified internal tensions as to how to 
assimilate it, what to do with the magazine (Santos 2006)  
 
According to Enrique Santos Calderón, the debates about the magazine’s 
contents began from the first issue and continued unabated throughout.  
 
After all the debates and all, we set the date of February 15, 1974 to 
put out a biweekly called Alternativa. Everything was a deep discussion, the 
name, the motto “Daring to think is beginning to fight,” and we came out with 
a cover article called “The counter guerrilla in action,” which I wrote, and a 
banner about an exclusive article by Gabo. We had thought, as a big thing, to 
print 3.000 issues but with the article by Gabo we said let us throw ourselves 
into the well and print 10.000 issues. (2005). 
 
 
  The lack of technical and design resources was evident in the first issue of 
Alternativa, which cost $10 Colombian pesos. Other than the cover, the magazine 
was printed on unpretentious newsprint. The photography was poor, badly 
reproduced, sometimes blurred. From the point of view of graphic design, the first 
cover of the magazine was a disaster. It featured a green montage on a red 
background—part photography, part illustration, part drawing, part collage—of some 
soldiers stepping out of a helicopter and running through a field in which there were 
some peasants working. The headline was almost lost. In the lower part, some 
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silhouettes, presumably of guerrillas, carried things that could have been rifles but 
also whips or working tools. The slogan “Daring to Think is Beginning to Fight” that 
should have appeared under the name was not printed until the second issue. Lost in 
the left hand corner was a green banner that announced the article by García Márquez 
about Chile, which, from the point of view of the impact the first edition was 
supposed to create, should have been the cover theme. 
 The back cover, the last page, was a red blot with what was supposed to be the 
silhouette of Camilo Torres and a montage in the lower part, in the same color. One 
has to look carefully to read “Camilo Torres, present, February 15.” The intention to 
associate the date of the birth of Alternativa with the anniversary of the death of 
Camilo Torres eight years before, was lost in a badly done and confused back cover. 
The presentation, graphic design, placement of articles, headlines, showed that it was 
a magazine made with few financial and technical means. Carlos Duplat, a designer 
and filmmaker, was in charge of the artistic direction of the magazine, and wrote 
some articles. The production of the magazine was completely improvised, with very 
little orientation, and brief discussions on the concept, the editorial design or the role 
of caricatures.  
However, the cover and the back cover signaled the magazine’s intention to 
enter with a bang by proclaiming its sympathy for the armed struggle, an issue always 
treated in the big press from the point of view of the government, usually through 
military sources. A photomontage of former president Alberto Lleras on the back of 
the front cover, was irreverent and mordacious, an Alternativa hallmark treatment of 
the mainstream political characters, with an acid humor that made a constant mockery 
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of the pretensions of respectability and truthfulness of the politicians and 
representatives of the dominant classes. 
 Alternativa’s first masthead included as members of the Editorial Committee 
Gabriel García Márquez, Orlando Fals Borda, Jorge Villegas Arango and Bernardo 
García as Director. The Managing Editor was Víctor Manuel Bonilla and José 
Vicente Kataraín was General Manager. The editorial staff was made up of Eligio 
García Márquez, Sebastián Arias, Carlos Vidales and Cristina de la Torre; the artistic 
coordinator was Diego Arango and design and assembly coordinators were Carlos 
Duplat and Susana Rodríguez; photographers were Carlos Sánchez and Consuelo 
Izquierdo. The production was in the hands of Jacobo Neirdorf and Amanda Ojeda 
and María Emilse Puentes did documentation services. Conspicuously absent from 
the masthead was Enrique Santos Calderón, who remained unnamed for reasons 
related to his work at El Tiempo,  where he kept his weekly column Contraescape. He 
was going to appear in the masthead for the first time in issue 22.  
Alternativa’s success was unquestionable and surprised everybody, including 
some stunned policemen who confiscated several copies. Nobody thought about 
doing another printing, which probably would have sold out as well. The magazine 
became the day’s conversation, commented about almost immediately in the corridors 
of power, in popular organizations, among the intellectuals, at universities’ 
classrooms and hallways and it rapidly became news in mainstream press. Suddenly, 
the creators of Alternativa found themselves with a true mass magazine, with national 
circulation and a leftist one to boot. In addition, they discovered that the magazine 
filled the need in the Colombian market of informing readers what was actually 
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happening in other parts of the country. The paper El Periódico wrote, under the 
banner “Freedom of the press” an article headlined “‘Alternativa’ confiscated,” in 
which, despite the police denials, it reported that many of the magazines had been 
seized.    
According to Enrique Santos, there was a double distribution system. One was 
a network of sympathizers, with the groups that Rosca, Fals foundation, had in the 
north coast, leftist bookstores, friendly unions; the other was a commercial 
distribution with El Dorado. “We wanted to break with the traditional leftist patterns 
that only distributed their publications to their people through militants. We wanted to 
reach the general public through commercial networks, combine channels, friends, 
sympathizers, with the normal distribution, the same channels that distributed Cromos 
(a consumer magazine).” (2005). 
From its first number Alternativa put the spotlight on mainstream press, 
identified with the National Front. Every day the big papers walked a very thin line 
between information and propaganda, serving as a sort of amplifying loudspeaker for 
the government, the politicians and the armed forces, legitimizing the acts of 
government, which were very seldom criticized. Alternativa’s vision was so different 
from that of the dailies that it had to produce a shock in readers who were ignorant as 
to how the country was governed, of what was going on in the countryside or even in 
other places in the continent.  
Never before in the history of the country had a publication presented to the 
reading public an analysis from the left on so many things at the same time. The 
National Front media rarely confronted the official accounts, not to mention doing 
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original journalistic investigations in a country where corruption was so rampant as to 
be part of the system of government. Who could have ever imagined that in the 
United States there was training in anti subversive tactics for Colombian policemen 
and soldiers? How could people know what union leaders thought on the issue of 
salaries? Or the infamous history of the Berástagui Hacienda, behind which there was 
a cacique affiliated with ANAPO, or read the M-19 communiqué which no other 
publication dared to print? 
Now the Colombian left was speaking with its own voice to the people, albeit 
a small number of them. The magazine began to uncover what side the big media was 
on, showing in the process the real make up of Colombia’s ruling class. It showed 
why the violence in Colombia had never ended and pictured the silent current of 
people who struggled to survive in the middle of a dysfunctional democracy. One 
death here, another one there did not make any difference. However, when the 
massacres, the displacements, the summary executions, and the murders added up, as 
shown in Alternativa, a pattern of behavior of the State against the civilian population 







Chapter 5:  The first crisis and a new direction 
 
Once the magazine took off in such auspicious fashion, the continuous reflection 
upon its own nature usually was carried out in the first page editorial “Letter to the 
Reader.” The balance of the first issue experience, based on the speed with which the 
magazine sold out, confirmed the need for a publication that challenged the State of 
Siege and the monopoly of information by the mainstream media. The editorial noted 
the overwhelming support received through numerous letters and a long list of 
supporting subscribers, which included noted progressive intellectuals.  The main list 
of some 800 names had been gathered by borrowing names from friends’ notebooks. 
The magazine was printed in coarse newsprint paper, in an odd 13” by 9.5” 
(33 cm by 24.5 cm) size. The only color inside was red in some headlines and shaded 
background for some articles. Graphic design was poor. There were different size 
typefaces, with a small ten-point the most common, and type did not exclude a 
minimum nine-point. From its start, the magazine included plenty of caricatures, all 
of them highly irreverent at the time, which amply compensated for the poor quality 
of the pictures. Most of the editorial material seemed jam-packed into the pages that 
looked disorderly and improvised at first, but the publication evolved in each issue, 
gaining in coherence, giving the reader plenty to explore in this surprisingly bold 
journalistic experiment. 
Gradually, the editorial content became more organized and the sections better 
defined. Although there was a lack of rigor in the use of punctuation and capital 
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letters in headlining, there were no grammar or spelling mistakes. On the making of 
the cover, Santos remembers: 
 
We dedicated a lot of time to discuss it, the way to present it, its 
colors. The cover in issue two was discussed a lot. It represents two fat 
gentlemen who must be bankers, and at the other side of a rifle’s visor there is 
a woman with her child dying of hunger on top of a number of products. 
Artistically, it was well conceived, but as a cover, it was a disaster. You do 
not see it. It has too many elements. (1998) 
 
The magazine’s creators suddenly found themselves with a mass medium that 
increased its circulation by 10,000 copies with each number, starting with a first print 
run of 10,000. The list of organizations supporting the magazine grew by the week 
and the mails published in the “Letters from the Readers” carried support messages 
by major unions and political and intellectual figures. 
 Despite the good intentions about good journalistic writing style and reliance 
on factual information, the text in the first issues was heavily loaded with references 
to the class struggle, the wickedness of the oligarchy, the need to organize and fight 
for a revolution. The political nature of the magazine was paramount over its 
journalistic mission, which interpreted and analyzed the national reality from a leftist 
political point of view that assumed the truth was always on its side.  
  With the magazine still in the process of positioning itself, its makers began 
to take positions on pressing issues for the left, reflecting the contradictions that were 
beginning to take shape inside it. The question of the participation in the upcoming 
presidential and legislative elections, with the country immersed in an electoral 
campaign, was part of an old argument among leftist leaders on whether was it was 
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worth to vote or not, in a country where the majority of the population did not cast 
ballots.  
This time, however, the Communist Party (pro-Soviet) and the Movimiento 
Obrero Independiente Revolucionario, MOIR (Independent Revolutionary Workers 
Movement) (pro-Chinese) had formed the Unión Nacional de Oposición, UNO, 
(National Opposition Union) coalition. The former had always participated in 
elections, in open or concealed ways, while the latter predicated abstention until 
1972, when it participated for the first time in legislative elections. While the left 
agreed that the objective was to take power through a revolution, the Communists 
contemplated using elections as a tool, as the Popular Unity coalition did in Chile. 
The Maoists believed in an armed revolution led by peasants, but agreed to use 
elections as a tactical tool to spread their message.  
However, the fact that both forces decided to participate together was 
considered an advancement toward unity, in the midst of a crowded landscape of 
leftist parties, groups, tendencies and sects, some legal and some clandestine. These 
were also the first elections after the end of the National Front pact, following the 
1970 presidential contest when the parties that held a total monopoly in the political 
arena stole the victory from ANAPO and the Rojas Pinilla. It confirmed what Camilo 
Torres, the guerilla priest once said: those who count (the votes) elect the winners. 
Rather than take sides, and despite its sympathies toward armed struggle and groups 
such as M-19 and ELN, the magazine fulfilled its role of acting as a neutral tribune 




Perhaps the biggest challenge is the frequent request for us to define 
‘the line’ to follow, elections or abstention. But Alternativa does not trace 
lines, because it is not a political group, nor it pretends to be. Nevertheless, the 
magazine does not seek to avoid the challenge that it represents to face—
informatively and politically—the situation of the Colombian left in the 
current electoral debate. We reaffirm the principle of opening these pages to 
the vanguard forces in the country, and starting with the next issue, 
Alternativa will begin a debate over “elections or abstention”, with the 
participation of the main leaders of Colombia’s left. 6
 
 “To define the line” was a veiled reference to the old Leninist doctrine of the 
party press, which defined the paper as an agglutinant, education and organizing 
element within revolutionary organizations as had happened to the Bolshevik Party 
with Pravda and in every other socialist regime, including Cuba with the paper 
Granma. The price those societies paid for the rigid control of information and its 
manipulation for propaganda purposes was to isolate their citizens from the rest of the 
world. Evidently, the idea of the journalists and economists in the founder’s team was 
to do a magazine not to define the line but to explain problems and offer solutions. 
However, that idea was completely overrun by the political conception of a pre-
revolutionary situation, with all the formulas coming from Moscow or Beijing. In this 
instance, the formula “daring to think is beginning to fight” had no space and the 
magazine turned into a combative, denouncement publication, without the depth 
García had envisioned. 
 Those ideas were not shared by Fals Borda. According to García, he even 
brought a group of Indians and urban leaders to discuss how the magazine should be a 
mass publication, using the same language that deprived people used, giving them 
journalism courses so they could talk the same language as the masses.   
                                                 
6 Alt. 3, 3/18/74, p. 1 
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Other than the communication media allied with the National Front, there was 
a crop of printed publications representing parties and groups in the left. They 
included Voz Proletaria, the Communist Party paper, Tribuna Roja, El Bolchevique, 
Revolución Socialista, El Manifiesto, Mayorías, Coyuntura, Ideología y Sociedad, 
Teoría y Práctica, and other smaller regional publications. Compared to Alternativa 
however, these publications were doctrinaire, made “to define the line,” geared more 
toward the inside of the parties than outside, with a dogmatic language and short on 
information content, with no intention of becoming mass publications by reaching the 
general public.  
As a gesture coincidental with its principles, and to maintain its independence, 
the magazine decided not to carry commercial advertising. Nevertheless, from issue 
one, it found advertisers among leftist publishing houses, which before Alternativa 
could have hardly be known by the general public. These makeshift publishing 
operations did their business without much regard for copyrights, royalties or other 
legal issues. Many of them also piggybacked on the magazine to circulate in the rest 
of the country. Alternativa ended up creating a network of libraries called El Zancudo 
(The Mosquito) and a publishing house, Editorial Oveja Negra (Black Sheep), which 
published the works of García Márquez in Colombia, to handle the circulation of 
leftist publications.  
As Santos recognized, the pressure inside the magazine began almost from the 
moment it became successful from the sociologists of Rosca, who expected to apply 
in the magazine their participatory action research theory.  
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In April 1974, four issues were already out and the editors felt compelled to 
restate their criteria as to the objectives of the magazine. Its role was, according to 
García and Santos, to counter inform and foster public opinion around issues the big 
press ignored. It sought to rely to organizations on the left studies, analysis, and 
investigations of the national reality, indispensable for the correct leadership of 
social, political, and economic struggles. There was also a place for workers, 
peasants, students, teachers, and other popular groups to show their struggles and 
present their denunciations and opinions. Finally, they said:  
 
Alternativa does not promote ‘political sectarianism’ of the left, but it 
does not preach an idyllic unity either. The magazine pretends to contribute to 
the critical consolidation of the vanguard forces, meaning to build on a sane 
and open debate, in the analysis of the national reality and in the permanent 
confrontation with the popular struggles. The debate starting in this edition on 
elections and abstention is a sample of this intention.7  
 
 As a reflection for the drive to control the now valuable opinion medium, each 
group controlled pages and sections in the magazine. Santos and García did most of 
the analysis and interpretation of the political scene, the investigative reports of the 
economy, the international information and the “Letter to the Reader.” Fals and Rosca 
did “The Voice from the Base” and “Briefs from the Base” sections, both political 
charged segments dealing with popular struggles in the urban centers and in the 
countryside. The Rosca group also monopolized the agrarian issue with coverage of 
the peasants’ struggles, especially ANUC’s.  
Underlying this division was the presence in the background of the M-19 
movement, who used Alternativa through its cadres inside the magazine, represented 
                                                 




by the Fals group in individuals such as Carlos Duplat and Sebastián Arias. Jaime 
Bateman Cayón, the leader of M-19 who died in a plane accident in 1983, was 
referred to in a book (Villamizar, 2002), telling how he became acquainted with 
Santos Calderón when neither Alternativa nor M-19 existed on paper, and of 
Bateman’s promises to support the magazine “in any way.” In Villamizar’s book, 
Duplat is quoted as saying:  
 
Since I entered Alternativa I come again in contact with El Flaco 
(Bateman). I put together the first issue of Alternativa in January 1974. 
Bateman got close to Alternativa, he saw a great opportunity there. We met 
periodically, he brought me material, we discussed, joked, teased, and we put 
into the magazine all the information we could.  When we got close, he was 
already M-19 and he identified himself as such with me; there was no doubt 
about anything, he personally gave me the materials. (2002. p. 284)    
 
In issue 1, Alternativa had the scoop of the first M-19 communiqué and the 
picture of one of its militants with Bolivar’s sword, which M-19 had stolen. It was 
known later that the picture and the communiqué that came with it was made 
especially for Alternativa, the only publication capable and willing to print it. Later, it 
published a summary of the letter with which M-19 challenged María Eugenia Rojas.  
 
The 19 of April movement, M-19, armed arm of the Anapist people, 
wants you as the undisputable boss of our party to take an unequivocal 
position regarding the revolutionary process in Colombia and commit yourself 
unambiguously—in theory and in practice—with that process of national and 
popular emancipation, which today shakes the anachronistic socioeconomic 
structures of Latin America and engages, in an all out struggle, the 
revolutionary energies of the oppressed peoples in all the continent.8  
 
 
                                                 
8 Alt. 13, 10/6/74, p. 10. 
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The document ended with a call to use all forms of struggle to defeat the 
bourgeois regime, a slogan used by the left since the 1960s to justify both its armed 
and electoral struggle.  
 In issue 11, the heavy and confusing covers made with photographic montages 
gave way to monothematic illustrated themes, with one dominant element, much 
more attractive and above all irreverent to the point of scandalizing. The covers of 
issues 11, 12, and 13 were illustrated by Chinche. Number 11, circulating on July 8, 
1974, showed the smiling face of Misael Pastrana Borrero, who in a few weeks would 
be transferring power to his successor López Michelsen. The headline was a 
provocation: “What are you laughing about?” Issue 12 cover showed the drawing of a 
hand giving the finger, with a thick ring in the little finger and a handcuff with the 
pesos sign ($) on it. The headline this time was “Congress, the voice of the people?” 
 Once the elections ended and the voting controversy passed, tensions inside 
the magazine increased. The “Letter to the Reader” in issue 7 emphasized García and 
his group’s position, supported by Santos, restating the principles of counter 
informing, presenting studies and investigations on the nation’s reality, publishing the 
voices and struggles of popular organizations, and critically promoting the growing 
unity of the left. 
  
This last objective also supposes a debate on the hot issues that leftist 
organizations sometimes avoid discussing with the necessary openness. The 
past elections gave reasons to bring to the surface several things. We can say 
that the reasons and explanations expressed by several of those interviewed 
around the issue of “elections or abstention,” produced positive results, 
despite the fact that some susceptibilities may have been hurt.9  
 
  
                                                 
9 Alt. 7, 13/5/74, p. 1 
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Those “hurt susceptibilities” were located inside the magazine. The newsroom 
meetings were becoming political debates in which each article was impugned or 
supported by both forces. However, while Garcia’s position was explicated in the 
editorials and reflected in the contents of the magazine, Rosca foundation remained a 
behind-the-scenes political project intended on taking control of the magazine to 
accommodate to the philosophy of action research on one side and to the M-19 
strategy on the other.  
The magazine’s inner rivalry between those who wanted a medium of 
investigation and analysis and those who wanted a propaganda medium, discarding 
the neutrality toward the left and its the readers, was expressed in the treatment of the 
agrarian question. Articles on ANUC in particular conceived the organization as an 
instrument to forge the revolutionary insurrection alongside the cities’ workers, in 
order to establish socialism in Colombia in the near future. In issue sixteen, Fals 
Borda wrote an in-depth article with a headline that seemed out of context, “An 
agrarian party will be absurd,” expressing his position from the Marxist point of view. 
Perhaps to avoid a by-line, a privilege reserved for García Márquez, the article had 
the form of an interview where the questions were tailor-made for the answers. 
Nevertheless, just in case the interview could be considered as the political view of 
the whole staff, it had an introduction that qualified the views espoused there:  
 
Continuing the practice of Alternativa of opening its pages to diverse 
points of view, analysis and experiences, we go into this issue with Orlando 
Fals Borda, who has developed research works in the field about the agrarian 
situation since 1950 and in the last years has committed himself to a shared 
analysis with the peasant communities in the departments of the Atlantic 
coast. In next editions, we will offer other reasoned and fundamental positions 
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to extend or contradict these preliminary opinions of one of the members of 
the Editorial Board of the magazine.10  
 
One typical comment, “The peasant reflects different stages and realities in 
the Colombian regions in relation to the revolutionary struggle.”11 To the question of 
whether the peasantry is a revolutionary force, Fals answers: “Yes, and very 
important. In the Colombian case as in most Third World countries, the peasants are 
the main force of revolution. But even in cases like this, the proletariat is called upon 
to play a leading role in the revolutionary process.”12 This conception surely 
conflicted with that of García and his group, influenced by Trotsky, which was 
adamant in that the proletarians had to be the vanguard of the revolution. “Besides, I 
don’t see why socialism can’t begin to be build now, based on real conditions that 
will not vary very much due to cultural inertia, and because the class struggle 
continues under other forms, even after the revolution,” said Fals.13 To the question 
about “the fractioning inside the left that has been causing havoc,” Fals answered  
This stage is certainly going to be overcome. It is a problem of 
political maturity that the struggle will be solved for the benefit of the 
working classes. I believe that a little bit more honesty and correct working 
methods could accelerate this process, without the empty agitation that has 
characterized us. It is important that the revolutionary organizations 
consolidate themselves and get stronger so they can overcome correctly the 
anarchic-unionism situation that seems to threaten them.14
 
As the magazine kept publishing, tensions kept growing. Santos remembers:  
 
There was an attempt to take over the magazine, to carry a putsch 
against Bernardo Garcia’s group, accusing them of being manipulating 
                                                 
10 Alt. 16, 16/9/74, p. 9 
11 Ibid. P. 16 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 10 
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Trotskyites. They tried to recruit me to assume the editorship and endorse that 
kind of coup d’etat against García and Co. I refused, because I thought it was 
terrible to fall into the same cannibalism we were trying to avoid in the left. 
Besides, in the discussions I felt more identified with Bernardo’s conception 
than with the others, I shared the orientation, the journalistic criteria we were 
applying with Bernardo, I worked very well with him.15  
 
One of the criticisms that Santos and García directed against Fals Borda was 
the improvised way in which his followers elaborated the sections that was given to 
them from the beginning, “The voice of the base.” In fact, quite often the section was 
written in a dogmatic style, with little factual information, except when the 
communications came from the workers or peasants directly. Presently, well-
researched notes on several conflicts in the country filled the section, making a real 
difference with the old style before the breakup. In the section “The Forbidden 
History,” another Fals section located at the end of the magazine, the editors 
published the second part of an article written by the Belgian scholar Daniel Pécaut, 
one of the most insightful foreign researchers of the history of the country.  
On October 10, 1974, a group of employers addressed a letter to “The 
Editorial Committee and the Partners”16 Board, mentioning previous letters and 
protesting against possible sanctions by the Editorial Committee against two 
employees, Carlos Vidales and Sebastián Arias, both Rosca members accused of 
promoting conflicts inside the magazine. The letter, signed by nine people, threatened 
to “adopt legitimate forms of organization and union work” and go to the 
“revolutionary press” should the firings take place, accusing those in charge of using 
“employers” methods.  
                                                 
15E. Santos, personal interview, September 27, 2006  
16 Letter to Editorial Committee and Partner’s Board, typewritten. Bogotá, 10/10/74. Personal file. 
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The letter, and the conflict it revealed, precipitated the final decision that split 
the magazine and its workers in two opposite and hostile camps. The next day, 
October 11, during an early and hasty morning meeting, two of the three partners of 
Sociedad Alternativa Ltda. (Society Alternativa Ltd.) decided to separate Rosca from 
the magazine. The proposal introduced by Santos was approved by Alfredo Iriarte, 
García Márquez’ representative, authorized via telegram from London. 
 
They were bent on taking over the magazine at any cost, that García 
and his team had to go. So we decided to precipitate the crisis, call for a 
partner’s meeting and expel Fals and La Rosca. Everybody lobbied Gabo. 
They had the magazine’s infrastructure, the financing with the money they 
received from foreign foundations for their research. Everything, the desks, 
the typewriters, the house where we worked was theirs. But we could not 
continue. We had a tense meeting. Alfredo Iriarte went as García Márquez’ 
representative and by a majority decision we expelled La Rosca Foundation 
form Alternativa. 17   
 
 
The next day, Saturday, as issue 18 of the magazine was ready to go to press 
with a circulation date of October 14, García and Santos inserted an editorial, 
unbeknownst to most workers that amazed many in the left and gave satisfaction to 
others in the right. Under the heading “A necessary information,” the editorial 
announced the separation of Fals and Rosca.  It repeated the principles that had 
inspired Alternativa so far, including fostering the unity of the left, which the current 
crises was undermining.   
 
Another postulate that inspired the creation of Alternativa—to 
critically promote the unity of the left—has demonstrated to be, for obvious 
reasons, a slower and more complex task. We reiterate, however, the openness 
of the magazine to the parties and organizations in the left and the intention—
                                                 
17 La Junta de Socios de la sociedad “Editorial Alternativa Ltda.”, Considerando:… Typewritten letter, 
October 11, 1974. Personal file. 
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which now will be even more definitive—to contribute with the critical 
consolidation of the forward forces. That is to say, build on the analysis of the 
national reality, in an open and sincere discussion of the problems facing the 
Colombian Revolution and the permanent confrontation of the people’s 
struggles.  
We want to reaffirm in this occasion the belief that Alternativa cannot 
pretend to substitute political revolutionary movements, nor their own organs 
of expression, and much less to become itself a political groups, which would 
constitute a clumsy lack of vision in the current situation of the Colombian 
left.18  
 
The behind-the-scene struggle involved Bateman and Santos. “Bateman took 
sides on the debate. And it wasn’t on the side of his friend. When the crises was 
looming, they met several times, talked about it, analyzed the situation and tried to 
find a solution.” Santos continued: 
 
Those discussions started from the first issue of Alternativa due to the 
influence and specific weight that M-19 had there. It was there where M-19 
and El Flaco made a grave mistake, which was to pressure too much, try to 
cope and take over the magazine. It was when the first crises developed and I 
did not go along with that. It was my first fight with Bateman, the breakup, 
and I said: ‘Flaco, you are contradicting and betraying everything you said 
about being open.’ The attitude was to get Bernardo García out, which was the 
most critical on that. At a given moment, El Flaco showed his hegemonic side, 
M-19 wanted to consolidate more its control of the magazine, and I said no.19 
(2005)  
 
Even though it was not certain that an organic relationship between M-19 and 
La Rosca existed, the magazine fitted perfectly in both organizations’ political 
schemes. If the political and legal battle had been won by Rosca, most probably 
Alternativa would have ended with M-19 dictating “the line to follow.” The pressure 
was felt from inside. García remembers Bateman coming around to talk to the staff, 
                                                 
18 Alt. 18, 14/10/74, p. 1 
19 E. Santos, personal interview, September 27, 2006 
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joking about that being his paper. Fals acknowledged his relationship with Bateman 
but only as a friend and a supporter.  
However, in the accounts of the inner fight presented in the magazine or in the 
documents exchanged by both sides, there was no mention of the role of M-19. Later, 
a document of response to interpretations that began circulating immediately among 
the staff about the breakup, titled “Alternativa cleans itself,”20 stated how Fals tried to 
take over the magazine and use it to set in motion a new political group. Because the 
Fals group administered the money and the magazine, the petitions by the group of 
workers asking for salary adjustment, the complaint of not being paid enough and 
working too much sounded hollow.   
The blow resonated throughout the political spectrum, as the following weeks 
showed, marking a crushing event for a magazine that had among its objectives to 
propitiate the union of the fragmented political left.  
  
Then all hell broke loose. Scandal. The people that were with them 
took over the magazine. We had to leave and start doing the magazine in my 
apartment, in Bernardo’s apartment, to work with the fingernails, and not to 
loose our rhythm. It was a scandal and everybody took advantage of that. I 
remember an editorial in El Tiempo, which said something like “God makes 
them and they divide among themselves. (Santos 2005) 
  
 The breakup was widely talked about in the following issues of the magazine. 
There were two issues 19 with the name Alternativa, one made by Rosca under the 
motto “Daring to fight is beginning to think” and the one made by García and Santos, 
“Daring to think is beginning to fight.” In the latter Orlando Fals Borda, Carlos 
Vidales, Sebastián Arias and Vera Castro had disappeared from the masthead. Those 
remaining were García, Cristina de la Torre, Jorge Restrepo, Héctor Melo, María 
                                                 
20 “Alternativa” se depura. Typewritten document. Bogotá, October 18, 1974. Personal file. 
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Teresa de Santos, Jorge Mora and José Vicente Kataraín. Curiously, it was in the 
Alternativa published by Rosca where Santos’ name appeared for the first time in the 
masthead of the magazine as a member of the Editorial Board, with Vidales and Arias 
as editorial coordinator and managing editor respectively. Both García Márquez and 
Santos bitterly accused Rosca of using their names without authorization in the 
magazine. 
 Issue 19 presented an illustrated cover with President López Michelsen 
measuring the boobs of a beauty queen against the old walls of Cartagena in the 
background, and a green banner on a red background in the top right corner that said: 
“Alternativa cleans itself.” Despite having prevailed in the fight to keep the magazine, 
those who wrote the article realized there had been a disaster.  
 
The publication of Alternativa through nine months and the breakup 
that has taken place are valuable experiences that we should keep analyzing 
without stopping to carry out the project that gave them birth. 
 In the development of this whole process, we are the first to recognize 
the faults and vacillations and the lack of foresight, which we have incurred. 
But Alternativa had to defend itself from a concealed maneuver that seeks to 
transform a publication at the service of the whole left into an unacceptable 
organ of a particular group’s interests. We believe that criticism and 
discussion within the left can turn it into a publication that fulfils its role even 
better. 
 Beyond the magazine, the breakup also offers an opportunity to 
analyze certain phenomena that affect the left periodically, always weaken it. 
We will not exhaust the theme in this issue, but we will begin to touch upon it 
and we hope to go deeper into it in future editions.21  
 
 On the other hand, Rosca’s Alternativa, whose cover was an illustration of a 
priest with his fist in front, espoused the idea of subordinating journalistic function to 
a political aim, that of creating “an authentic proletarian publication, at the service of 
                                                 
21 Alt. 19, 28/10/74, p. 8 
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the working classes.” Fals accused the group of not understanding “that journalism, if 
it doesn’t educate, give directions and organize, is not revolutionary journalism.”22 
Fals’s final analysis considered the situation inside the magazine another instance of 
class struggle, defining Santos and García as capitalists infatuated with the 
magazine’s success, while members of Rosca were the true revolutionaries and 
keepers of the orthodoxy. He complained that the idea of incorporating professional 
journalists into the magazine was formed inside the bourgeois press, with all the 
deformations and deviations it entailed, including improving the appearance of the 
magazine, and using traditional means of distribution. He also made a distinction 
between the concepts of leftist press, with a dual role as ideological and political-
organizational media, and revolutionary press, which came into being once the goal 
of taking political power, had been achieved.  
 
In the ideological field, it is expected that a magazine assumes the role 
of facing the dominant ideology and collaborates in its destruction. It must, 
therefore, denounce it and show the domination mechanisms. In the same 
field, it gathers the proletariat ideology and the socialist’s ideals to put them in 
touch with the exploited classes and, specially, workers and peasants. The 
magazine helps, then to clarify the Colombian process and awakes and 
develops class consciousness… On the political terrain, we accept the Leninist 
thesis that the press ‘must serve as a culture and cohesion organ of the actually 
vanguard classes.’ The magazine will collaborate in the development of 
popular and revolutionary organizations, putting them in touch with each 
other, their struggles, and plans with those organized and non-organized that 
read the magazine.”23  
 
This analysis left no doubt as to where both sides stood: on one, Fals Borda 
and his group, effectively wanted to control the magazine to dedicate it to the goals of 
the revolutionary struggle, among other things, because he and his people most 
                                                 
22 Alternativa 19 (Rosca), October 1974. p. 1.  
23 En Alternativa. El Desarrollo de la crisis. Typewritten. Bogotá, October 30, 1974. Personal file. 
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probably considered the current state of Colombian affairs as a “pre-revolutionary 
situation.”  Fals ideas coincided wholly with those of Mattelart, Latin America’s 
foremost expert of the Leninist theory of the press. 
 
In a revolutionary process, the issue is to make the mass 
communication media an instrument to which the social practices of the 
dominated converge. The messages are not imposed from above, but the 
people itself are the generators and actors of the messages destined to them. 
The mass communication media thus losses its epiphenomena or 
transcendental character, by taking away from the national bourgeoisie and 
the imperialist pole their status as generators and arbiters of culture (1973, p. 
97).  
 
On the other side were Santos, García and García Márquez, defending the 
journalistic aspect of the magazine and refusing to make it into the organ of any 
political party or movement. In any case, the behind the scenes role of M-19 and 
Jaime Bateman and his polemic with Santos were never made explicit during this 
time.  
In issue 20, the “Letter to the Reader” was the telegram sent by García 
Márquez that signaled the final defeat of the Rosca group: 
 
UNWARRANTED LABOR LAWSUIT JOYOUSLY DIVULGED 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, CONSTITUTES PERVERSE 
MANOUVER TO CONFUSE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT, GIVING 
ARGUMENTS FASCIST DICTATORSHIPS AGAINST WHICH I WORK.  
THIS PURPOSE WAS MADE EVIDENT WHEN “ROSCA” GROUP 
WHOSE SUCULENT FINANCING SEEMS SUSPECT TO ME, 
ATTEMPTED INTERNAL MANOUVERS TO IMPOSE IN 
“ALTERNATIVA” A DIRECTION GEARED TO PROMOTE DIVISIONS IN 
THE LEFT DISORIENT WORKING CLASS, WHICH IS WHY THE 
MAJORITY OF PARTNERS DECIDED THEIR RETIREMENT. 
NOW “ROSCA” IS GOING TO PUBLISH ANOTHER 
DIVISIONIST “ALTERNATIVA” USING MY NAME, WHICH I HASTEN 
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TO DENY CONVINCED OF THE NECESSARY UNITY OF 
COLOMBIA’S LEFT. (All in capital letters in the original)24  
 
The dispute took the form of the “unwarranted labor suit,” García Márquez 
mentioned, once the internal struggle over the control of the magazine blew open and 
became a public fight. The telegram was a response to a letter sent to García 
Márquez—who at the time was working in London with the Russell Tribunal, a 
public body organized by British philosopher Bertrand Russell to investigated the 
American intervention in Vietnam—by Rosca’s lawyer, who notified him of a labor 
lawsuit “with the aim of obtaining the employers acknowledgment of the minimal 
rights consecrated in the Labor’s Code for the retribution of personal services.”25
It was true that the working conditions inside the magazine had a complete 
lack of formalities such as no affiliation to the social security system; working up to 
twelve hours a day, and on weekends, sometimes for only a part-time salary, with no 
raises and no defined responsibilities. Although the letter mentions the Rosca group 
as sympathetic to their aspirations, Rosca was the employer the letter was 
complaining about. Although the letter attributes the irregular labor climate to the ill 
will of Santos and García Márquez, the latter acting through his representative 
Alfredo Iriarte, it also explained those circumstances by stating the fact that the 
employers did so because they had been called nine months before to work for a 
“revolutionary cause.” The letter from the lawyer came with a communiqué issued by 
workers and collaborators, underlying causes of the “labor” dispute by accusing the 
owners and directors of having a capitalist mentality and turning a profit, which the 
                                                 
24 Alt. 20, 11/11/74, p. 1 
25 Press release. The workers of Alternativa sue their employers. Bogotá, October 21. Typewritten. 
Personal file.  
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magazine never did. Had it done so, most probably it would have been up to Rosca to 
reap the profits.  
The message underscored yet another problem of creating a mass publication 
from the left: financing it. One of the main challenges of the magazine was to become 
self-sustaining, using, if necessary, cheap labor under the guise of working for a 
“revolutionary cause.” The story of the magazine, all the way to the end, in fact 
proved that such a venture was not feasible if it depended on single copies sales and 
subscriptions alone.  
Most of the criticism coming from the Rosca side was answered in issue 20, 
which closed the polemic with the clearest and most concise statement about the 
magazine’s role to date. The statement dealt point by point with Fals’ criticism, and in 
the process configured a primer on the journalistic conception it espoused. The issue 
was the relationship between the press and the political organizations that worked 
within it.  
 
It is not about displaying rolls of ideology, nor about applying 
mechanically to the Colombian stage quotes by Marx, Lenin or Mao on the 
issue of the press. It is not just about placing this magazine within a definite 
national and Latin American political juncture, about fixing its role and 
limitations within the press and the revolutionary process; it is about trying to 
apply Marxism in a creative way to a specific practice; that of journalists 
committed to the cause of the exploited.26  
 
In answering potential questions, the magazine framed the polemic into three 
parts, which went to the heart of the matter: whether only the party press was able to 
help the working classes; whether journalism done in a professional and specialized 
way precluded an identification with popular struggles; and whether the leftist press 
                                                 
26 Alt. 20, 11/11/74, p. 5 
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should avoid commercial channels of distribution and administrative and financial 
standards. All the questions were answered in the negative.  
As for the issue of professionalism, the answer was clear-cut and to the point. 
 
Facing a well-armed dominant class, which monopolizes the mass 
communication media, cannot be done operating with happy groups which 
have achieved a ‘primitive communism’ at its interior. If Orlando Fals insisted 
that Alternativa was an ‘experiment and an ideological and political 
adventure,’ the magazine team thought that it had a responsibility already 
acquired and a commitment too big and unexpected to play with idyllic 
experiments and tries.27  
 
 
As for the publishing techniques, Alternativa responded that the bourgeoisie 
did not have a monopoly on them and to think otherwise was just plain “bourgeois 
populism.”28 The last statement made a clear distinction between the whole doctrine 
of the party press from Lenin on, contradicting some Latin American Marxist 
theoreticians on the issue (Mattelart 1973, Taufic 1972). The magazine would remain 
independent—independent from conflicting groups, not from the cause, as García 
Márquez said later—was going to be done in a professional way by professional 
journalists and was going to work within the system, with the system’s tools, even if 
it stated goal was to beat that system itself.    
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the “bourgeois” press did not waste time 
reporting the troubled state of the magazine. El Siglo, the main Conservative paper, 
called attention in an editorial note to the fact that Santos was a shareholder of El 
Tiempo where he was a “Marxist columnist,” and called him a “Chicó guerrilla,” 
Chicó being the wealthiest city neighborhood at the time. The story itself was 
                                                 




headlined “Alternativa accused of exploiting workers,” with a no-less insidious 
subhead in the affirmative: “The Extremist Magazine does not Comply with Labor 
Laws.”29 Other papers such as El Tiempo emphasized the labor dispute and the 
lawsuit against Santos and his group, publishing the complete letter sent by the La 
Rosca´s lawyer, Adalberto Carvajal, to García Márquez in London.30 The daily El 
Espectador published verbatim García Márquez’ cable from London as well as 
photographs of the covers of Issue nineteen of the two Alternativas.31
Santos recounted details of the climate at the time: 
 
What was terrible about that first crisis was its effect on the 
magazine’s image and on its circulation and above all on the preaching of 
unity that we had been promoting. There was a legal battle to keep the name. 
We kept the name, they came out with Alternativa del Pueblo, the same 
format but another language, another journalistic concept, they inverted the 
slogan to show that they were radicals, that they were with the people, and 
that theirs was the Alternativa of the bases, and that we were the bourgeois 
Alternativa. The division generated a trauma inside the left. Many 
organizations began to speak, some unions in favor, some against. All the PC-
ML came in our favor in the accusations against Fals Borda. It was a hard 
blow for him, because the whole ML in the countryside in the north coast, 
where the Rosca did their field work, denounced him as an agent of the CIA 
and of the German and Dutch imperialism. 
 It was a very bitter experience in that it affected the magazine, which 
never recovered its circulation. That hurt a lot the credibility among the whole 
non-militant left. It was terrible for us to give that spectacle, but we had to do 
it and two Alternativas began to appear. I don’t remember how many issues 
Alternativa del Pueblo lasted. Until they gave up. (2005)32
 
 
 From issue 20, the tone of the magazine began to change gradually toward a 
more informative, journalistic content and started to break new ground in some hot 
topics. The following issues were thick with information and, whether by design or 
                                                 
29 Acusada “Alternativa” por Explotar a Trabajadores. El Siglo, October 22, 1974. P. 1 
30 Crisis en la revista Alternativa. El Tiempo, October 22, 1974. P. 1 
31 García Márquez habla sobre las dos “Alternativas”. El Espectador, October 25, 1974. P. 1 
32 Alternativa del Pueblo published its last issue, number 38, in August, 1975.  
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the sheer need to accommodate more material, in many instances the typeface size 
was reduced. Occasionally the magazine published letters of support from 
organizations or attacks against Rosca, but gradually the polemic subsided.  
Garcia’s group took a prominent role as analysts, from a leftist perspective, of 
the political scene. In issue 22, a feature interpreted the state of the left and its 
perspectives. In the introduction to the article “Where is the left going?,”33 the editors 
promised to open the pages of the magazine to political and union organizations 
regarding the issue, now that it was clear that the López government wasn’t going to 
deliver for the masses that supported him in the previous election. The article began 
by acknowledging that the country was not in a pre-revolutionary situation but in a 
stage in which the current administration was wearing out, just as it had happened at 
the start of the National Front, in 1958, hence the popular protests and agitation. This 
momentous acknowledgement contributed to lower the tone of the dogmatic rhetoric 
implicit in the articles written before the breakup. 
Part of the criticism that Santos and García directed against Fals and his group 
was aimed at the improvised way in which they elaborated the “The voice of the 
base” and the “Briefs from the base” sections, which were designed to divulge the 
popular struggles around the country. That improvisation was because most of the 
information published in the sections came from what they called “correspondents,” 
usually members of the groups involved in the struggles or protests. In fact, quite 
often the section was written in a dogmatic more than a journalistic style, with little 
factual information, and full of admonitions of good intentions and principled 
declarations against capitalist exploitation.  
                                                 




Gabriel García Márquez in Alternativa 
 
The crisis with La Rosca precipitated a discussion inside the magazine that led to a 
change of format to a more conventional 22 cm by 29.5 (11” by 8.5”) size and from a 
biweekly to a weekly publication a few months later.   
The most important change after the breakup was more prominent 
participation by García Márquez as part of the staff, who contributed to the 
restatement of the purposes and goals of the magazine for the months ahead. García 
Márquez had previously promised to become more involved in journalism. Alongside 
the second installment of the article on Chile in issue two, there was a small note 
taken from the French paper Le Nouvelle Observateur which flatly stated that 
“Gabriel García Márquez, author of One Hundred Years of Solitude, considered the 
most important contemporary Latin American writer is, however, about to break with 
literature.”34 The author, who had become a member of the Russell Tribunal 
alongside Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Bouvoir, was quoted as saying “Now that I 
enjoy moral prestige I have to use it. I am not a political man but in Latin America 
everybody has to be political.” From then on, the article said, the writer’s contact with 
words would be through journalistic reportages, which was true to a point, for the 
writer never abandoned his fiction and published several new books in the future. 
García Márquez himself presented the reflections that followed the breakup 
with La Rosca in the first full-length interview published in the magazine in issue 29. 
It followed his decision to make a pause in his fiction writing and announced that he 
was going to work at least six months of the year on the magazine. The interview was 
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an occasion for him to tell of his early years, from his childhood in his native 
Aracataca, to his arrival in Bogotá amid a “lugubrious, sod smelling and non-stop 
drizzle and the men dressed in black with black hats walking stumblingly in the 
streets, hanging from the electric tramways’, speaking bullshit in the cafes.”35 His 
opinions on the landscape of Colombia’s left were not optimistic.  
 
In the face of Lopez’ failure, the answer should be from the left, but it 
is not. The different groups are stuck in a deaf dialog, separated by a swamp 
of sectarianism. I believe, according to what we have discussed here, that one 
of the functions of Alternativa could be to oxygenate that swamp to facilitate 
the agreement between different groups. I believe that we are doing that.36
 
 
 His points of view on the course the magazine was taking confirmed the idea 
that by becoming a weekly and changing his format beginning with issue 32, it had 
completed its first stage. Along with his incorporation on the staff, the change meant 
from now on a somewhat refined changed strategy from the one it had started with.  
 
I think we agree that we have burned a stage where the magazine was 
some kind of populist amalgam, a disorderly reflection of all the left. We have 
burned it because as national press we were very much alone; but now the left 
press has flourished, the void is being filled amply and now we are not needed 
with that focus or in that field. I don’t exclude the circulation or printing 
services we had talked so much about: we agree that the public we have to 
address from now on are not just in the left, or unionized, but also all the 
potential left. We have to conquer a new public for socialist ideas.37  
  
 There he was, the old patriarch setting the course for the magazine and putting 
himself on the line, recognizing that the old idea of an homogeneous and 
revolutionary public had to give way to a more general and flexible characterization 
                                                 





of the publication’s readers. He also took the opportunity to get himself out of the 
electoral fray.  
 
I don’t have any type of personal political aspirations and if anytime 
the circumstances try to force me to go over the simple limits of my job as a 
journalist and writer, I will get off that ship with all honesty and much 
naturally. I don’t have vocation, nor formation, nor decision to go beyond that. 
I know that there are rumors circulating; but in the field of politics, nobody 
shall expect nor fear from me anything different or more important, or more 
heroic, than my work in this magazine.38  
 
 
Arguably, the most important Latin American writer alive, he had just 
published his book The Autumn of the Patriarch, which definitely cemented his 
prestige throughout the world after the universal success of One Hundred Years of 
Solitude. Thus, his contributions to the magazine were especially important, in several 
forms, all of them related to international affairs and issues. Nevertheless, only one of 
them, the interview with American spy Philip Agee, was completely original material 
for Alternativa.  
He had been a founder of the magazine and an active force throughout its 
existence, always weighing in on account of his enormous standing as a public figure 
and as a famous writer, and deciding which side would be victorious in the 
magazine’s successive crises. His political views were all implicit in his articles, such 
as the first one, heralded as an “exclusive in Colombia for Alternativa,” previously 
published in Harper’s. It was an account of the death of Salvador Allende on 
September 11, 1973. The story “Chile, the coup and the gringos,”39 was vintage 
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García Márquez, written in the same prose style that made him famous in the literary 
world.  
The story begins with a dinner between three Pentagon generals and four 
Chilean military in Washington.  The article revealed facts unknown to most about 
Chile’s economy, geography and history. As the first socialist republic of the 
continent, which attempted to nationalize cooper and coal it only lasted 13 days, in 
1932. The United States already knew that Allende was going to win the elections in 
1973, thanks to Plan Camelot, a countrywide survey “to establish in a scientific way 
the Chilean’s degree of political development and social tendencies.”40   
Despite the situation, the Unidad Popular achieved an unexpectedly good 
percentage of votes in the March 1973 elections. Such a menace triggered the final 
sequence of events that led to September 11 and the death of Salvador Allende at the 
hands of Chile’s armed forces. The last paragraph of the article is a moving homage 
paid to this man doomed by his principles.  
 
His greatest virtue was the consequence, but destiny gave him the rare 
and tragic greatness of dying defending  at gunpoint the anachronistic puppet 
of the bourgeois law, defending a Supreme Court of Justice that repudiated 
him and would legitimate his assassins, defending a miserly Congress that 
declared him illegitimate but which was to succumb complacently before the 
will of the usurpers, defending the freedom of the opposition parties that sold 
their soul to fascism, defending all the mothballed paraphernalia of a shitty 
system he had proposed to annihilate without firing a shot. The drama took 
place in Chile, for the Chileans’ misfortune, but it will pass into history as 
something that happened without escape to all men of that time and will 
remain in our lives forever.41  
 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Alt. 2, 1/3/74, p. 27 
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The most explicit of García Márquez’ political views was in a lengthy 
interview, also reproduced from a foreign publication, Italy’s Il Manifesto, where he 
spoke about  Latin American and its improbable revolution. Among the merits of the 
interview were the lucid and sober appreciations of the relationship between 
literature, politics and journalism.  
 
The truth seems to be that literature, journalism and politics are 
complimentary, as long as all of them remain at an equal distance from real 
life. With the advantage, in favor of literature, that it allows us the natural 
expression of vital sentiments such as compassion and nostalgia, for example, 
and helps us to better solve the dose of skepticism that comes with life, which 
feeds from it, and to which pure politicians who are afraid of their hearts don’t 
resign to.42  
 
 
One Hundred Years of Solitude was a story of despair. It was a cyclical novel, 
which, despite the rebellious spirit of its protagonists with their own lives and their 
country’s, led at the end to the same place where it started. Even though the novel 
showed the futility of change, it had a universal acceptance in Europe. Asked about it, 
García Márquez threw the first jab at Latin American revolutionaries.  
 
Fortunately, I believe that the deepest sense of One Hundred Years of 
Solitude is not the distrust in change, but the realist exposition that change will 
not be as immediate, or as easy, or as lyrical as some mystics of the 
revolution, who don’t even know where they are standing on, preach without 
believing it, and sometimes believing it.43  
 
 
The fact was that, except for Cuba, there had not been a successful revolution 
in Latin America. Asked whether there was a need to make an evaluation of the 
                                                 




armed struggle, García Márquez began an exposition of its political thoughts on the 
problems plaguing the continent left.  
 
I believe that the most important reflection we have to do now is to 
recognize that the path to the revolution is blocked and it will remain so for as 
long as it takes the left to admit it. The most important factor in the blockade, 
it seems, is that there is a revolutionary way of being formed in some 
theoretical molds that not always have the same size or the same form as the 
reality of our countries. 44
 
 
García Márquez recognized his militancy in Movimiento Al Socialismo, MAS 
(Movement Toward Socialism), to which he had contributed $10,000 dollars, a 
substantial amount of money at the time, from a literary price. In his own opinion, 
MAS was trying to find a popular, wide appeal for the revolutionary movement, 
rather than just a worker’s or worker-peasant’s rationale.  
 
No form of struggle can substitute the political base that has to support 
it. In that sense, and to finish this indigestible speech in which I have been 
bottled, I believe that the immediate urgency is the development of the 
revolutionary organizations. The problem of the forms of struggle must be 
subordinated to the possibility of policies and conduct that stimulate 
effectively the natural contradictions of our society.45  
 
 
Alternativa’s publication of Gabo´s interview generated an acute polemic that 
not even García Márquez expected. The readers, especially leftist militants who did 
not agreed with the writer, reacted by writing to the magazine  questioning in one way 
or another the thoughts of the writer against the reigning dogmatism that 
characterized the Colombian left at the time. And all of them, in one way or another, 
proved García Márquez’ points. 
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5.1 The four principles  
It took the magazine 14 months and 31 issues to evolve from a biweekly to a weekly 
publication and a hard and painful crisis to decant the formula for its next phase. It 
did so by reaffirming its determination to reach a general public, directly challenging 
the monopoly that the mainstream media had in the representation of the country’s 
reality, and the need to remain independent and neutral toward the left, as a way to 
fulfill the goal of contributing to create the conditions for a change in the country.  
 A careful and detailed analysis of the magazine in its first phase provides a 
picture as to how the objectives of counter informing; doing investigation, 
interpretation and analysis; divulging popular struggles; and calling upon the left to 
talk about its positions as a way to foster an elusive unity, necessarily touched and 
intersected each other in the contents of the magazine.   
 
Counter informing  
Cristina de la Torre, Bernardo Garcia’s wife, who was deeply involved in the 
magazine’s creation and development, provided an analysis of the role it played in its 
David against Goliath struggle with the mainstream-institutional press, at a 
Universidad de Antioquia meeting called to discuss the issue of alternative press, at 
the end of 1976.   
 
Alternativa is born precisely with that first point on its program, the 
one that defines the editorial policy of the magazine. It is born counter 
informing. The first issue of the publication dedicates its cover to the guerrilla. 
At the time there was a huge campaign going on to repress the peasant masses 
in Anorí. The headline of that cover is “The counter guerrilla in action.” I say 
that this is a good example of counter information. Remember the volleys of 
the (mainstream) press and the information it carried on Operation Anorí. It 
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talked about bandits, about the crimes of the ELN. Therefore, it happened that 
our research told what was going on. The army turned the zone into a 
concentration camp. All the peasant population in the region was affected by a 
brutal anti subversive operation. (1976, p. 69)  
  
De la Torre mentioned the complete monopoly of the mass media by the 
ruling classes, translated in “control and manipulation” and a “monopoly over 
people’s consciousness.” (p. 69) This was accomplished by some half a million daily 
newspapers sold every day, plus dozens of radio stations licensed by the state and the 
two television networks that were owned and controlled by the government.  
 
There is a great deal of popular struggle in the country, silenced or 
misrepresented systematically by the big press. It is very rare when the big 
press has informed even in a twisted or false way what is going on… The 
silencing of the press is yet another circumstance, which historically forced us 
to think about the urgency of creating a way out, to express, spread the 
struggles that alone can guarantee a decent future for the people of this 
country. (1976)  
 
By definition, Alternativa counter informed on topics monopolized by the 
news operations sympathetic to the government and firmly embedded in the National 
Front’s power structure. The magazine analyzed and interpreted the press’ coverage 
of areas such as the political activities of the ruling class, the human rights situation 
and the cultural landscape from a leftist perspective, in order to offer the readers new 
ways of looking at the information. In addition, because of the political connections 
of the staff, particularly those of Enrique Santos and El Tiempo, and those of the 
sympathizers with the magazine, it had access to many sources inside the different 
power center of government.    
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The political analysis centered in the upcoming legislative and presidential 
elections, the first after the 16-year old National Front pact.  The first article 
dedicated to the electoral campaign, in which the three main presidential contenders 
were children of former presidents, had a memorable lead, borrowed from a European 
publication (not cited).  
 
In 1945, the father of Álvaro (Gómez) managed to force the 
resignation of the president of the Republic, who was the father of Alfonso 
(López). In 1953, the father of Alfonso and the father of María Eugenia 
(Rojas) deposed the father of Álvaro. In 1957, the father of Álvaro and the 
father of Alfonso got together to oust the father of María Eugenia. Now 
Alfonso, Álvaro and María Eugenia are contending to be the next president of 
Colombia.46  
 
The presidential elections were won by López Michelsen, who had been a 
Liberal dissident and founder of Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal, MRL (Liberal 
Revolutionary Movement), in the early sixties. With close to 3 million votes cast for 
him, well above the 2 million plus the magazine predicted, he claimed, and made it 
his slogan, to have a “clear mandate” to govern the country in the next four years. 
However, despite his prestige and popularity with  wide sectors of the country due to 
his ‘leftist’ past, the López’ period would be one of the most contentious in terms of 
the growth of popular protests and the repression exercised against them, and 
Alternativa would be an exceptional witness to those four years. Pécaut later analyzed 
his victory:  
 
The election of Alfonso López Michelsen had a triumphal air. Wide 
fractions of the middle and popular classes gave their vote to the old MRL 
boss, with the hope of social and political reforms. Four years later, the 
disappointment was clear. The Colombian institutions are going through a 
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deep crises and the responsible politicians do not hesitate to talk about moral 
‘decomposing.’ (Pécaut 1976) 
 
 The victory of Alfonso López was also the expected defeat of Conservative 
candidate Álvaro Gómez, and the electoral burial of ANAPO, which after winning the 
presidential elections four years before, reduced its electoral force by almost 
1.000.000 votes. The magazine reminded its readers of a sentence pronounced by 
López: “I am going to govern with the Constitution in one hand and with the armed 
hand of the army to have it respected.”47 From issue two, Alternativa began 
confronting the armed forces, as no other medium had done in the past, with articles 
were profoundly provocative in content. This was an all-powerful institution, 
entrusted by the political class with the dirty job of fighting the insurgency and the 
popular protests through the State of Siege. The military owned the Ministry of 
Defense and its enormous budget without any control from civilians. The political 
parties were in no position, not were they willing, to make the military accountable.  
Out of 311 seats in both chambers of Congress, Liberals now controlled 179 
against 103 for the Conservatives and 29 for the opposition, including 22 for 
ANAPO. Of those, 25 congressmen controlled media, including radio and television 
stations and newspapers, 54 were big landowners and cattle ranchers, 25 
industrialists, 27 builders and urban landlords, 23 tradesmen, 33 advisors, 20 political 
caciques and 99 professional politicians. Each of them spent an average $2,000,000 
pesos to get elected to a job that paid $15,000 pesos a month. Once the president took 
the oath of office, some people believed López would exercise a new populist 
approach within the framework of what he called the “clear mandate.” The illusion 
                                                 
47 Alt. 4, 1/5/74, p. 6 
 105 
 
began to disappeared when his choice of ministers, six Liberals, five Conservatives 
and the minister of defense, was known. In “Cabinet of hope: shock in the henhouse,” 
the magazine said: “Lopez’s cabinet can only disappoint those who created illusions 
and did not understand that when he talked about ‘hope’ he meant that of his friends, 
industry men, big landowners, bankers, big political bosses, etc. He dealt with them 
and with them he has to share the profits.”48  
 On September 16, López declared an Economic Emergency using Article 122 
of the Constitution. This allowed him to govern by decree, bypassing Congress, 
despite having a comfortable majority on both chambers. He announced that his 
economic measures would benefit the poorest 50 percent of the population, but his 
first decree eliminated the subsidy to wheat, automatically increasing the price of 
bread, an essential foodstuff in poor people’s tables.49  
 His economic policies were intent on reducing inflation by limiting the 
amount of bills and money in circulation, elevating interest rates, and tightening the 
supply of credit. They gave more freedom to big insurance companies to invest in 
other areas of the economy, adding fuel to the rampant speculative frenzy that so 
many headaches had caused, and would cause the country and the government in the 
future. Finally, he implemented a tax reform intended to forestall somehow the huge 
tax evasion of the rich and to redistribute some of the income. 
 The balance of the 100 days of the government, “100 days of what?” was one 
of unfulfilled expectations. “The 100 days have expired and three million innocent 
voters are still waiting. Where, they ask themselves, perplexed, are the great structural 
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transformations, where the deep social reforms that the Liberal president was 
supposed to put in place during this period?”50   
The evaluation of the 100 days ended with a political admonition to the left. 
 
The stage that began with the López Michelsen government presents 
favorable junctures for the advancement of the forces of the left in the 
country. To know how to take advantage of them in the appropriate moments, 
understanding the limits and dangers in the legal framework the system offers, 
is a task facing all the movements committed with Colombia’s revolutionary 
process. In the organized struggles of the people, in the combative unification 
and mobilization of the oppressed classes, is where consolidates the true 




 By year’s end, on “The new mask of the National Front,” the magazine 
concluded that the National Front, instead of ending on August 7, 1974, continued 
“but is looking for its new mask.”52  Under these circumstances, the magazine 
wondered whether the president was going to finish his term, considering that he still 
had 40 months to go. A wide-ranging article called “The state of subversion” 
mentioned popular protests in places as different as Tumaco, Barbosa, (Antioquia), 
the oil zone of Barrancabermeja, Popayán, Córdoba and Sucre.  
 
The litany of strikes, stoppages, popular uprisings and the guerrilla 
blows don’t stop there. Those issues related to the alarm of the Minister of 
Government Cornelio Reyes, are complemented by the list of police 
commander General García Bohórquez, about mafias, kidnappings, murders, 
robberies and assaults that ravage the four biggest cities and the maritime 
ports.53  
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The popular protest had a direct consequence on the human rights situation, of 
paramount importance for the creators of Alternativa, founding members of the 
Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners. The concept of human rights, 
violated throughout most of this particularly violent country’s history, was relatively 
new in Colombia’s press.  
Santos himself wrote the cover article, “The contra guerilla, actions and 
repercussions,”54 a special report based on information accumulated by members of 
Alternativa and the Solidarity Committee with Political Prisoners. That information 
later appeared in El libro negro de la repression (1974), (The Black Book of 
Repression) the most complete digest of the violations of human rights carried out the 
state and the army. This report signaled the tone of the magazine, its intention to carry 
information on the guerrilla struggle, from a sympathetic angle, but also on its 
consequences for the civilian population. Government prohibitions in the war zones 
included the circulation of any kind of literature, gatherings, and union sessions and 
even typical dance songs with messages deemed dangerous. In addition, the magazine 
pointed out, there was a price limit on groceries’ purchase, without consideration to 
the size of families and the existence of helpers. The army also has an absolute 
control over the distribution of drugs and medicines such as serum against snakebites, 
distributed exclusively from military posts. Many colonists bitten by snakes died as a 
result.55  
                                                 




On the same vein, under the headline “Yes, there are tortures in Colombia,”56 
the magazine published an official document from the office of the Attorney General, 
dated September 6, 1972, which flatly stated that the military tortured prisoners and 
even give the name of the officer in charge.  
Eduardo Umaña Luna, a prominent lawyer and human rights activist, actually 
knew something few people in the country did. He was at a debate, back in 1966, 
when Congress passed Decree-Law 3398, with the understanding that this 
“monstrosity” was only temporary. Nevertheless, the Decree-Law became permanent 
on December 16, 1968. According to Umaña, it sanctioned the militarization of the 
country. “Here, at any time, the dominant classes, without using the State of Siege, 
have the tools to compete with Pinochet.”57 Law 48, which applied in cases of 
mobilization for the national defense, international war or internal commotion, was, 
according to Umaña, supra national. It allowed the government to declare anybody a 
deserter even if he was not enlisted, as well as to take over or occupy all property of 
any citizen, under penalty of 6 months to 5 years of prison for resisting.  
The review of human rights during the Pastrana administration, “Four years of 
Repression. What are you laughing about?,” described how the outgoing president 
governed 39 of his 48 months under the State of Siege, permanent martial law and the 
suspension of fundamental democratic liberties. The article ends with a detailed year-
by-year chronology of the main events related to the violation of human rights in the 
country from 1970 to 1974, compiled by the Committee for the Protection of Political 
Prisoners. It details a total of 85 instances including massacres and murders of Indians 
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and popular leaders, land evictions, prohibitions for popular mobilizations, closings 
and invasions of universities and murder of students by the army, tortures and 
disappearances, war tribunals, and even a prohibition to sing for a popular 
Argentinean songwriter’s (Piero) in Bogotá. According to Alternativa, during this 
period the “crime of opinion” was established in June, 1971. 58
 During the López administration, instructions given by the minister of 
government to local provincial and local authorities all over the country to strictly 
apply the law “without waiting for judicial proceedings” 59 to land invaders, meaning 
mostly peasants and Indians, resulted in a renewed wave of repression was unleashed 
in many places. Dozens of peasants were jailed, beaten or murdered by paramilitary 
mercenaries, the police and the army, according to detailed information sent to 
Alternativa by “correspondents” in the field.  
The murder of Indians in Colombia, at the hands of big landowners bent on 
taking their land, or by colonizers trying to encroach in their territories, was a violent 
constant in the history of the country. Political boss and big landowner Víctor 
Mosquera Chaux, a Liberal politician who controlled many votes in the Cauca 
department, was known as the main instigator of the violence against Indians. This 
man, who later became President Designate and ambassador to Washington, had been 
stealing Indian reservation lands since 1944. Mosquera Chaux did get the army to 
intervene in 1974 to root out his adversaries whom he denounced as subversive and 
communists. Two thousand soldiers cordoned off the Indian reservation but withdrew 
when they found nothing. Then the murders began. Two leaders of the CRIC, the 
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organization opposing the Liberal boss, were assassinated. Meanwhile, from the 
capital, the president and his party sent messages supporting the man who more than 
anybody else was responsible for generating the climate leading to the protests and 
resistance from the Indian tribes. 
The culture was represented in the country by nationwide events that 
supposedly captured the identity and idiosyncrasy of national character as reported by 
the mainstream press, included sports like the National Soccer Championship, the 
National Cycling Tour, competition boxing, the National Beauty Pageant, as well as 
media expressions such as the conspicuously mediocre television programming. In all 
these cases, irreverent Alternativa did its best to shown the true nature of the events 
by showing the commercial business behind the myths and by getting the protagonists 
such as the players, the cyclists, the queens, to talk about their experiences.   
A good example was The Colombia Bicycle Tour, an almost mythical race 
that captured the attention of the country because it was broadcast live from the road 
by the competing radio networks. Besides being a competition, the race was also a 
two to three-week sound geographical tour, narrated with passion and flair by some of 
the best voices the country ever had. Cyclists representing departments and regions 
ran day after day through winding, sometimes unpaved, roads, going up steep 
mountains and down again. The tour grew from its beginnings in 1950 to become a 
fundamental part of popular consciousness. Most riders were humble people, but also 
excellent sportsmen and some were the few authentic heroes of the popular classes.  
At the risk of spoiling the party, Alternativa revealed another facet of the 
competition involving big sponsors who treated their “aces” to good hotels, with 
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specialized medical personnel, custom made bicycles, first-rate implements, technical 
advisors and first rate companions. “These teams were made of the best riders and 
were protected by the secret activity of the entrepreneurs who bribed, conspired, and 
bought consciences so their ‘product’ could get first to the finish line.”60 In the early 
1970s, the Tour became a sponsors’ event, and rather than representing departments 
(states) as had happened before, contestant teams were now named after brands. As 
an example of the situation involving cycling, Alternativa mentioned several racers, 
among them one called Siabato. 
 
A mediocre rider. He managed to pass the tests and obtained 
sponsorships by agreements with the entrepreneurs. But he really did not 
compete. When a stage started, Siabato went ahead in full and through several 
kilometers, he remained ahead forcing the broadcasters to mention his name 
and that of his sponsor. As the stage advanced, this leading racer was 
overtaken by other racers and he invariably ended in the last places. The 
history was the same, every day, in each stage. No. Siabato did not compete. 
He just won some pesos by announcing some products.61  
 
On issue 18, precisely when the crises inside the magazine blew open, the 
magazine came out with a cover in which, over a blue background and looking out 
from inside a drawn television screen, well-known actor Pepe Sánchez uttered a 
memorable sentence: “TV is the system’s most dangerous weapon.”62  
Besides Sánchez, other artists interviewed included Julio César Luna, an 
Argentinean leading man living in Colombia, Rebeca López and Franky Linero. That 
such well-known and famous icons dared to speak against the pervasive influence of 
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television, in a clear and unambiguous terms and from a progressive, if not leftist 
perspective, was sort of scandalous. The magazine said:  
 
The TV is an alienation vehicle for the people. It drives them away 
from reality. It distorts the mentality of the poor classes by creating false 
problems that had nothing to do with everyday difficulties: hunger, sickness, 
unemployment. TV’s fictitious realities condition the behavior and the way 
the people think to the soap opera’s heroes. It is the most dangerous and 
unfortunate weapon a system can have: it distracts people from its reality. The 
TV fulfils that mission.63  
 
Studies and investigations on the nation’s reality 
Investigative journalism was practically unknown in Colombia when Alternativa 
came out. Either by design or by sheer incompetence, the mainstream press very 
rarely dared to show the economic ties of the political class, the tight background of 
companies’ networks and connections, and the rampant corruption that plagued the 
country, now fueled by drug trafficking, an activity treated in a systematic way for the 
first time in the pages of the magazine. The only investigative analysis and 
interpretation came in specialized publications of academic or governmental nature, 
such as the one García had edited at Dane. Otherwise the general public never had 
access to an inside view of how the State was controlled by an oligarchic class which 
held all the strings of power.    
Investigative reports on the economy became a hallmark of Alternativa, based 
on the in-depth knowledge that García and his team brought with them to the 
magazine. They let the readers into a situation otherwise not known through the 
mainstream press, with the added pedagogical objective of giving popular 
                                                 




organizations and activists enough elements to judge the country’s state of affairs and 
act accordingly. 
The studies and investigations on the nation’s reality were concentrated on the 
country’s economy, which was going through a period of runaway inflation that ate 
the workers’ salaries, putting a lot of pressure on the government. There were also 
special reports on the capitalists, their interests and connections, revealing a network 
of conglomerates and monopolies, from agribusiness and cattle ranchers to 
industrialists, financiers and bankers. Another important issues were the examination 
of the country’s national resources and the rampant corruption  in many spheres of the 
economy.  
“The high cost of living, a people besieged,”64 analyzed the economic 
situation of the country, explaining the 30 percent-plus inflation and the consequences 
of the rise in the cost of living for the population. “In the stores and supermarkets in 
our country you feel the same anguish. People ask themselves timidly for the value of 
things and return them to the shelves. Sometimes, there are loud protests; but more 
frequently, there is resignation.” 65 The magazine showed how the considerable 
resources of the central bank, the Bank of the Republic, were spread generously 
among the different actors in the economy, agribusiness, banking industry and 
finances, represented in the boards that determined how the money was lent.66 At the 
other end, the costs of such largesse fall upon the working people affected by the 
runaway inflation fueled by the monetary expansion, as noted by several critics of the 
government, including noted economist and advisor Lauchlin Currie.  
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According to the magazine’s interpretation, the government provoked 
inflation in order to keep salaries low and channel the profits to the rich through the 
new economic stabilization policy. Using official figures, the article “A two-stage 
bomb”67 outlined the lost of the buying capacity of the peso in percentages from 1954 
to 1973. In 1973 alone, salaries lost a record 25 percent of their power to buy goods.  
According to the magazine’s analysis, the two sides of the scissors the government 
was using were recession with unemployment to contain inflation and the cost of 
living; and inflation to stimulate production with better prices.  
 
To wit, these are the system’s two most solicited and scientific 
remedies: if the cost of living of the working classes is not punished so to 
‘stimulate’ the capital, then it resorts to recession and unemployment to 




It was now clear for everybody that the government measures had not reduced 
the cost of living and working people was going to be see another 30 percent inflation 
rate. The end of year (1974) analysis of the country’s economic situation determined 
that the economic miracles promised by the López administration had become 
mirages69 with  the working classes still suffering from the rise in prices of essential 
goods, the largest in recent history, resulting in the fall of the real acquisition power 
of salaries, all in a situation of high unemployment.  
By March, almost one year after López’s ascension to power, the economic 
situation was confusing at best. While the president affirmed that there was no crisis, 
his minister of labor talked about the alarming rate of unemployment and the 
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spokesperson for the retail traders talked about the fall in sales due to the lack of 
purchasing power. It was true that there was recession in textiles, automobiles and 
construction; in the latter case, the recent boom had elevated the costs of land and 
constructions materials, making it almost impossible for a middle class worker to buy 
a house. The inflation, according to Alternativa’s interpretation, was created by the 
State in order to finance UPAC, the indexing credit mechanism by which people 
could buy housing. In addition, while there was an “excessive” capital accumulation, 
the money remained safely locked in the bank vaults, waiting for better times for 
investors.70  
Most articles on the country’s economy as well as the reports on 
businesspeople and groups were coupled with stories on popular organizations or the 
people’s struggles, like those opposed to the exploitation of natural resources centered 
in the towns of Barrancabermeja and Condoto and the region of Catatumbo, among 
others. Other stories dealt with strikes and mobilizations in companies and banks, 
owned by those capitalists chronicled in the magazine 
Respectable industry and company men, some of whom were also 
professional politicians, kept showing up regularly on the magazine’s pages, 
associated with the properties they controlled. 
The close interbreeding between politicians and powerful economic interests 
in the country was exemplified by the powerful Santodomingo group, which 
controlled the beer industry, with close links to the Michelsen and López families, 
going back three generations. It was a marriage between the financial oligarchy and 
political power. In a sidebar, an info graphic showed a detailed genealogical and 
                                                 
70 Alt. 29, 24/3/75, p.21 
 116 
 
financial family tree, showing the enormous ramifications of its activities in the 
Colombian economy.71  “How does López’s cousin handle his millions,”72 presented 
an impressive picture of the group, with detailed figures as to how the shares of the 
holdings company Colinsa, S.A. were distributed among which members of the 
family, and the number and value of shares of the holding in 40 other companies. 
They included the country’s main airline, the main beer companies, one of the biggest 
banks as well as investments in cement, tobacco, finances and insurance, media, 
fertilizers and petrochemicals, among others. The cozy relationship between the 
group and the government was revealed in “Bavaria: interlinings of a raise,”73 
showing how the government’s permission to rise price of beer gave the 
conglomerate an extra income of three times its capital.  
Sugar magnate Alvaro H. Caicedo and his family also deserved special 
attention in the pages of Alternativa. In “The millionaire’s freedom of the press,” the 
magazine reproduced the instructions given by Caicedo to journalists working at his 
paper Occidente. The list 29 points, which Alternativa made clear was not a joke, was 
a telling example of how some of the owners of the media understood freedom of the 
press in the country. 
 
1. Not to talk against the Catholic Church, Apostolic and Roman. 
2. Not to talk against his Holiness the Pope. 
3. Not to talk against Religious Institutions. 
4. Not to talk against Religious Communities, male or female. 
5. Not to talk against charity institutions. 
6. Not to talk against armed Institutions. 
7. Not to talk against the Judicial Power. 
8. Not to talk against the presidential Institution. 
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9. Not to talk against the Rightful State. 
10. Not to talk against the Legislative Power. 
11. Not to talk against Pious Institutions. 
12. Not to talk against Cardinals, Archbishops, Bishops, and Prelates of the 
Catholic Church. 
13. Not to talk against the Legitimately Constituted Authority. 
14. Not to talk against the Constitutional Government. 
15. Not to talk against the repressive forces of the State that defends the 
society. 
16. Not to defend mafias or burglars or kidnappers or extortionists. 
17. Not to talk against the good willing institutions of public service. 
18. Not to defend bad-smelling and unemployed hippies. 
19. Not to defend drug addicts. 
20. Not to defend troublesome students. 
21. Not to defend subversive or guerrilla elements. 
22. Not to defend the urban networks that support the guerilla. 
23. Not to defend false priests, such as apostates or guerrilla priests. 
24. Not to defend saloon guerrillas, or perfumed revolutionaries. 
25. Not to defend homosexuals, sexual perverts or pimps. 
26. Not to defend prostitution companies and vice. 
27. Not to defend professional pornographers. 
28. Not to talk against private property or free enterprise. 
29. And, in one word, to defend the good and sane Christian customs against 
anarchy and chaos, that so many seek to preach in order to destroy the 
judicial institutions and the moral bases of the western civilization.74 
 
 
 As it happened with most Colombian governments in the past, Lopez’s was 
overly generous when it came to negotiating the country’s natural resources, as with 
the new laws that applied to natural gas in Guajira department. The topic of oil was 
well-known to García, who along with Jorge Villegas, an early founder of the 
magazine, had researched and written books and articles on it. They included 
allowing foreign companies to repatriate all the profits resulting from the exploitation 
of the natural gas in the department, a modification demanded by the multinational 
corporations. The Lopez administration policy consisted mainly in changing the name 
from concessions to association contracts, without any fundamental changes.  
                                                 




The absurd concessions by this regime give foreign corporations part of the 
national territory to explore and exploit the oil, with no state participation and 
within periods of no less than 30 years. These concessions have lent 
themselves to the most obscure manipulations by international consortia. 
Currently, there are 109 of those contracts in force that cover a total of five 
million hectares of the national territory. Other 550 proposed concessions will 
become association contracts, according to government plans.75  
 
The issue of oil was a tricky one. Any rise in the price of gasoline hit the 
working people hard in the form of increased transportation costs and fueling 
inflation and the high cost of living. For years foreign corporations had benefited 
from a price scale whereby they sold to the government the oil extracted from 
Colombian fields destined for internal refining and consumption at prices higher than 
those of the international markets. The new international situation led to rethinking 
the price scale. The oil companies then began to argue about the scarcity of oil to 
pressure for the renegotiation of prices with the government. Those companies held 
under control enormous extensions of land under concession, which they were 
allowed to keep by perforating one or two wells a year.  
 
In this way, behind the announced modification to the prices of oil, 
clearly the interests of foreign companies will be the great beneficiaries. The 
government has not even announced, after those price modifications, tax 
measures to collect part of the results of the activities, which will remain at 
the hands of foreign exploiters indefinitely. The government has limited itself 
to repeat the same arguments that the companies have introduced to justify the 
rises. Nor has the government been clear in announcing if the rises will be 
accompanied by any modification of the chaotic system of subsidies to 
automotive transportation, which privileges mainly private transportation.76  
 
                                                 
75 Alt. 20, 11/11/74, p. 8 
76 Alt. 28, 3/10/75, p. 17 
 119 
 
As for corruption, in “The Empire of the seesaw” Alternativa quoted former 
president Alberto Lleras, a stalwart of the system about “our present condition of a 
country corrupt to the bone.”77 The picture was not pretty.  
 
In Colombia, administrative corruption today encompasses a total 
action field. From the small ‘tip’ in police roadblocks and transit offices, to 
the multimillion contracts in big companies; from the poorest commissary, to 
the luxurious offices of the ministries of de-centralized institutes. In the 
construction of public works, in awarding bidding contracts, in official 
contracts, there is always the unmentioned percentage: ‘so much for you, so 
much for me.’ Monuments to the seesaw are everywhere in every corner of 
the country, in broken bridges, unfinished roads, half made buildings…”78  
 
Drug trafficking in Colombia was already in full swing. The magazine gave a 
first rundown of several cases: a Colombian Vice-consul was caught with 25 kilos of 
cocaine in New York, jumped bail and lived comfortably in Cali, Colombia, where 
the president refused to extradite him despite a favorable ruling by the Supreme 
Court;  a police lieutenant and several patrolmen were linked to cocaine trafficking in 
Barranquilla; the disappearance of confiscated illegal drugs throughout 1971, valued 
in 600 million pesos; the head of DAS, akin to the FBI in the United States, caught 
with 19 kilos of cocaine in Leticia (Amazonas territory); the F-2 (police intelligence) 
and DAS agents accusing each other of covering several drug trafficking cases; the 48 
secret agents fired in Antioquia for drug trafficking and the director of DAS in that 
department implicated in a contraband case worth millions of pesos.  
The list was a brief sample of some cases of corruption published by the press (El 
Tiempo, El Espectador, El Periódico). It represented a minimal portion of those 
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reported which, in turn, was an insignificant percentage of all the corrupt deals taking 
place every day and never brought to light.  
The unstoppable and rampant corruption in the country created a de facto parallel 
economy. An open letter from Medellín Chamber of Commerce to the government, 
said “immorality has invaded all the sectors of Colombia’s economy.”79 Other 
members of the business class complained about the great influx of the so-called 
“black dollars,” as a result of illicit activities such as drug trafficking and contraband 
of illegally importing goods and exporting foodstuffs to nearby countries, among 
many other things.  
In “Crime and mafia in Colombia, a system within the system,” Alternativa 
presented the most comprehensive picture of the metastasis of the corruption cancer 
invading the political and economic system. 
 
The growing consumption of cocaine in United States, along with the 
surge of South America as the new international route to introduce heroic 
drugs of diverse types into that country, are elements that have contributed to 
make Colombia an important point of refining and processing cocaine to the 
North American market. This besides ‘natural’ advantages such as an 
adequate weather for cultivation, hundreds of clandestine landing strips, 
facilities to install laboratories, a high unemployment index, administrative 
corruption, etc. And, of course, a factor of prime importance, the 
multimillionaire dimensions of the business and the powerful padrinos that 
sustain it from above. 80  
 
Besides drugs there were many other activities reported such as contraband, a 
business in which many congressmen, especially from the Caribbean coast, had direct 
knowledge and participation. 
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The voice of the people’s struggles 
Until the apparition of Alternativa, the struggles of the poor people of Colombia had 
been ignored or presented as a challenge to the government and the State, often as 
cases of public disturbance, and always from the point of view of the authorities and 
the companies’ owners. There was no news about the struggle of the peasants in the 
countryside to regain their land or not to have it taken from them or about the 
mistreatment of Indians at the hands of landowners. Occasionally, the protest of urban 
dwellers in cases such as the fight against the construction of a highway in 
southeastern Bogotá made it into the news, mostly because it broke the routine and 
sometimes the protesters confronted the police. Perhaps the most conspicuous were 
the students, whose protests often turned violent, but without a real explanation as to 
why they were confronting the government. Papers such as El Tiempo, had a virtual 
veto on news about workers’ strikes, or anything that looked like organized 
opposition to the Liberal government for that matter, especially coming from the left.  
 By informing on the people’s movements across the country, from factories to 
neighborhoods, from the countryside to the university campuses, Alternativa showed 
for the first time the true nature of Colombia’s class society.  Where there had been 
isolated fights with little or no consequence, now there were movements that showed 
patterns of what Marxists called class-consciousness, previously unknown to most. So 
even without pretending to be an organizer for any particular political group on the 
left, Alternativa was in fact an organizer for the whole of the working class, the 
peasants and the students, inasmuch as it revealed the existence of a common ground 
for their protests.  
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Although by necessity and context, the struggles had a political tinge, they 
were mostly vindicative in nature for workers, peasants, Colombian Indians and 
students. From the beginning, the voices of popular struggles were concentrated in 
two sections: “Briefs of the Base,” and “The Voice of the Base,” both handled by  
Rosca, which had done field work for years in the countryside and among popular 
organizations. There was a tacit agreement among the partners of Alternativa to leave 
these sections to Fals and his group, and in general, the coverage of the peasants’ 
movement in the country such as ANUC.  
Event though unionized Colombian workers were in a minority, most of the 
time it was up to the unions to lead the worker’s struggles. However, the divided 
union movement, in the context of the political situation in the country, was in crisis. 
During the four-year presidency of Pastrana, it suffered the rigors of a repressive state 
policy that went beyond the curtailment of the rights of collective negotiation, union 
organization and stability for state employees established during the Lleras 
administration. Pastrana picked up those innovations and made them wider, 
exhausting the most varied forms of repression against the working class.81  
 While about 80 percent of the workers did not belong to unions, an immense 
army of the unemployed contributed to reduce the negotiating capacity of the working 
class, and the government knew that, as shown by a confidential memo by the 
government’s National Planning Institute. The government’s policy was to negotiate 
through a tri-party commission (employers, employees, and State), aiming to avoid 
unwanted social explosions and insurrection.  
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In the negotiation with the unions on the theme of salaries, the government 
unilaterally decided to revise the minimum wage in an effort to control the growing 
unrest caused by the accelerated inflation and the loss of purchasing power of the 
worker’s paychecks. At a time when close to 600 unions affiliated with the labor 
federations were about to begin negotiations with their employers, not to mention 
many independent unions, Alternativa asked six union leaders their opinions on 
whether the legal minimum wage adjustment did justice to the Colombian worker, 
how many of their affiliates were close to negotiating and whether there was any 
difference between a Liberal boss and a Conservative. This was the first time the 
unions, through their authorized spokespersons, had the opportunity to answers 
questions in a mass circulation publication. It was an unprecedented opening.    
By far the hardest issue for the unions, besides their fight against the 
government and the bosses, was how to face these obstacles united. Another 
paramount question was how to define the relationship between unionism and 
politics. Both pro-government unions declared their independence from the parties 
but reserved themselves the right to work with them, while the CSTC recognized 
openly its allegiance to the Communist Party. The social democrat union 
spokesperson summarized the matter when he said:  
 
It is an error to divorce politics from unionism. Unionism and politics 
are two intimately united aspects of the working class’ action. However, 
partisanship does not have anything to do with unionism. The union 
movement generates its own political dynamics.82  
 
 
                                                 




In Colombia’s leftist lore, one of the accusations that militants hurled at each 
other was that of “anarchic-unionism,” meaning the misleading idea that unions could 
turn themselves into political parties. 
At a plenary meeting in February, 1974, 432 delegates from 155 unions of 
government workers analyzed the laws that affected them as part of the government 
offensive to weaken their legitimate rights through the previous years, when under the 
power of the State of Siege, issued decree after decree weakening their rights. The 
right to strike was suppressed for teachers and bank and telecommunications 
employees working for the government, among others. Others had it limited to 40 
days, after which mandatory arbitration tribunals decided on the workers’ petitions, 
with no appeal afterwards. Under the economic emergency, any movement deemed to 
take place at a strategic sector for the country’s economy was declared illegal.83 The 
distinction between “official workers” and “public employees,” was a capricious 
difference used at their employee’s discretion, stripping the latter of most of their 
union rights as it had happened with more than 60 unions. The union gathering called 
for a week of protests in March, ending with a big demonstration on March 22, in 
preparation for a national strike sometime in the following months. 
The people’s protest often times took the form of civic strikes, a generalized 
protest encompassing either a town, a whole department, and in some instances as in 
1977, the whole country. Mostly unions and civic organizations with the occasional 
participation of left-wing parties and groups usually coordinated civic strikes. It was 
during the administrations of López and his successor, Turbay, that civic strikes 
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became the most important tool of the so-called popular forces against decidedly 
unpopular governments.  
The article “The great struggles are forthcoming,” made a thorough analysis 
of the agitation in the country due to increasing popular protests, and what they meant 
for the political left.  
Framed or not by an organization, led or not by political groups, 
different ‘popular movements’ have shaken the Colombian society in 1974. A 
quick look puts in evidence how they have been determined by the pre-
electoral juncture and the change of government. What it says is that the 
‘hope’ of the Liberal solution, the system capacity to use demagogic or 
populist methods, and the availability of wide non-organized sectors to 
mobilize around immediate interests, still constitutes a challenge for the 
Colombian left.84  
 
 
The real tragedy for the left was that in a situation of widespread agitation and 
mobilization, the political organizations were unable to channel and organize the 
unrest in a movement really threatening the status quo and representing a step ahead 
in the direction of their ultimate goal, a socialist revolution. The magazine said:  
 
The general landscape delineated here shows how the popular 
movements lacking a proletarian political direction are depending on the 
political path drawn by the interest of those in power. That is how we 
understand the political debate that is taking place in the owners’ guilds and in 
the left’s political groups. 
But at the end of the year, this landscape has cleared. The expectations 
of an agrarian reform, massive salaries adjustments, the three-party 
commission, union strengthening, etc., have vanished. There is no room for 
vacillations anymore. The rise in the cost of living has burned all the worker’s 
conquests, the consolidation of the big landowners and countryside capitalists 
is on the march, and with the foreign loan of one billion dollars ($30,000 
million pesos) that Congress just authorized, López will try to contain the 
popular struggles by putting in march his SET (Spanish initials for Health, 
Education, Shelter) policies. The positions are set for the battle of 75.85  
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The panorama for the peasants’ movement, the agrarian question, and ANUC 
was also agitated. Agrarian reform, an aspiration in the minds of hundreds of 
thousands of peasants hard hit by the land grabbing of La Violencia, was all but dead. 
It was killed in a pact between big landowners, agribusiness and the Pastrana 
government. The best lands of the country were already in the hands of agribusiness 
companies and cattle ranchers, used to cultivate crops for export and for cattle 
farming, the latter an activity whose contribution to the economy in terms of labor 
creation was insignificant.  
The candidates from the main parties, Liberal’s López and Conservative’s 
Gómez, according to Alternativa, “committed themselves to the big landowners 
interests, ‘distanced’ themselves, which only hid their inability to propose solutions to 
a social and political phenomena that completely escapes their control.”86 By then, 
just a few weeks before his departure, Pastrana had made a mockery of the promise 
made four years ago of an integral agrarian reform. In fact, the Pastrana government 
not only undid what his predecessor Carlos Lleras had done, but any pretense of an 
agrarian reform was reduced to politicians and government’s demagogic rhetoric.  
These new policies, which favored the concentration of the best lands in fewer 
hands, explained the explosive situation in the countryside. With each passing day, 
there were fewer proprietors and more salaried pawns, about a million, out of a 
population of 14 million people. For them, the alternatives were to go to the cities to 
provide cheap labor for the booming construction industry, or to go to fringe lands 
closer to the jungle to colonize, or to submit to the conditions set by the big 
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landowners and the government under close vigilance by the police and the armed 
forces. 
 ANUC’s First Peasant Mandate, “a political-ideological and action instrument 
for the Colombian peasantry,” issued on August 22, 1971, outlined the policies of the 
organized peasant class. ANUC began to express in an increasingly direct way the 
objective interests of the peasantry and to give a new dynamic to the class struggle in 
the countryside, pitting a minority of 14,000 big landowners, which controlled some 
11 million hectares, against 1.5 million peasant families, tenants and small plot 
owners. 
 Along with the peasant’s growing organization and combativeness, came the 
official repression of the movement manifested in the cancellation of the legal status 
of departmental associations and attempts to divide the movement by offering 
incentives. The police and the armed forces responded against the peasant’s actions 
alongside bands of hired guns employed by big landowners against unarmed laborers. 
ANUC denounced a systematic campaign of murders of peasant leaders, massive 
lockups, and tortures of peasants in at least 10 departments. Finally, the government 
set up a parallel organization in an attempt to find a friendly and willing interlocutor. 
 In issue one, the “Voice of the Base” section, “The peasant in the struggle 
path,” summarized the results of ANUC’s Tenth National Board Meeting, a gathering 
of 3,000 peasants in the city of Popayán, held from January 19-26.87  In seven points 
the meeting characterized the “class character of the state’s agrarian policy,” with a 
government accused of fortifying the big landed states and of “trying to establish 
again a system of exploitation that had been abolished centuries ago by the Spanish 
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Crown”; of channeling credit toward the big landowners and toward mechanized 
agriculture; of leaving the marketing of agricultural products to big capital; of being 
responsible for the rise in the costs of production in the countryside; of the 
ineffectiveness of INCORA, the state entity in charge of agrarian reform; of giving 
the exploitation of natural resources to foreign interests; and of increasing the 
repression against the peasants.  
It was an optimistic moment for the movement, a new peak for independent 
peasant organizations, with the gradual recovery of regional directorates’ control, the 
growing struggles to recover land, the repercussions of the great mobilizations of the 
previous months, and the educational work through courses and training. 
At the time, ANUC defined itself as “a wide and mass organization that 
groups indiscriminately in its fold all day laborers, unskilled laborers, farm hands, 
tenant farmers, small and medium owners and Indians.”88 This definition left out the 
political aspect of the organization in favor of its vindicative character.  
 Peasants’ struggles in several parts of the country were hardly known to 
anybody. It was like another world in which actions by government forces allied with 
the big landowners attacked directly a struggling and overwhelmingly poor section of 
the population. In the Cesar department, three peasants and two policemen on the 
landowner’s payroll died as a results of actions against peasants who had invaded 
lands. In the Sucre department, tired of waiting for the government to give them the 
land promised years before, peasants had occupied 28 haciendas. The magazine 
chronicled presumably a small percentage of instances in which peasants invaded or 
were expelled from the lands and sometimes even jailed or killed.  
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By the time the López government took over, ANUC was preparing its Third  
National Congress, which some 15,000 people were expected to attend, to be held on 
August 31. The peasant movement expected to set its policies and priorities against a 
president invested with a “Clear Mandate” and with a populist reputation. In an 
interview with the Executive Committee of ANUC in Alternativa, the leaders laid out 
their class struggle conceptions and ideas in what was possibly the clearest article on 
the agrarian question published in the magazine thus far. They explained how this 
situation responded to inner and outer circumstances that, among other things, 
prevented the country from being self-sufficient in many crops and criticized the 
government’s plans to set up agro-industrial enterprises as a way “to legalize archaic 
and cave like relationships like servitude.” 89  
The agenda for the Third Congress, published in issue 14 of Alternativa, was 
an all-encompassing and ambitious review of the agrarian question and its context, 
divided in three great themes: 1. The agrarian problem; 2. Analysis of the peasant 
movement; 3. Analysis of the worker’s movement and other popular segments. 
ANUC’s intention went beyond just seeking benefits for its members. From a 
political standpoint they saw themselves as the peasant’s wing of the often glorified 
workers-peasants union in the quest for a revolution. The themes of point one, for, 
example, included land ownership; credit, mortgages, interests, evictions, 
indebtedness and its causes; marketing problems for crops and price speculation in 
the countryside; technical assistance and costs of raw materials; national and foreign 
monopolies in the tobacco trade; settlers’ problems and the situation in the borders 
                                                 




with neighboring countries; national resources, logging, hunting, fishing, parks, 
mining, floods, erosion; community and cooperative enterprises dependent on the 
State; poor artisans, intermediaries and lack of resources.90    
The Congress produced a document “From the peasants to the president,” a 
petition list with their grievances. They asked for land to be given to landless peasants 
and timely credit through the Association’s organisms. On the marketing question, it 
asked IDEMA to buy the products of small and medium farmers. It stated that 
INDERENA, another government entity in charge of technical assistance, was acting 
as a police organization to repress peasants, colonists and Indians all through the 
country; that the National Parks were created to evict thousands of peasants, colonists 
and Indians. As for the legal framework, members expressed their disagreement with 
what was left of the agrarian reform legislation and with a new law proposed in 
Congress regulating the relationship between farm tenants and the owner of the land. 
As for the repression, they denounced the murders, tortures and jailing through the 
agents of the state such as the police, the army and other entities, which were 
supposed to protect the life, honor and property of Colombian citizens. “We strongly 
reject the versions by landowners and reactionaries, capitalists, politicians and the 
yellow press who say that peasants do not need land nor should it be given to us 
because we are not able to produce and develop Colombia’s countryside.”91  
The president talked to the peasants after the Congress about their petitions. 
“According to the news, the president was cordial with the peasants and after 
promising them a speedy and effective solution to their problems, he dared to confess 
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his surprise at the wide knowledge that the peasant leaders had of the national reality 
and of the problems in the countryside.”92 As expected, none of the problems were 
solved or the petitions answered, as coverage by the magazine of the peasant 
movement showed in the years ahead. Meanwhile, the minister of government gave 
strict instructions to governors, mayors, intendants and commissioners to strictly 
enforce the law as they saw fit with the used of police and the military.  
An article in Alternativa’s issue 26 synthesized the counterpart to the 
peasant’s movement, the Sociedad Colombiana de Agricultores  SAC (Colombian 
Agricultural Society, “a social club, created to talk about their world of privileges, 
fashioning national policy the same way they managed their haciendas.”93 Growers of 
coffee, the country’s main crop and export product; sugar-cane growers of Valle del 
Cauca; rice and cotton growers; and most importantly, cattle ranchers, fell under the 
SAC umbrella comprising agribusiness and countryside capitalists, who dictated the 
country’s agricultural policy from their high places in government. This policy 
invariable put at their disposition the resources of the State, including credit, price 
control and manipulation, marketing and export agreements, not to mention the police 
and the army to control the peasant’s unrest. What really united the agricultural guilds 
was their fight against agrarian reform.  
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The students’ movement was quite strong in the cities, fed by millions of 
immigrants from the countryside, and heavily influenced by the political left, which 
controlled it and used it as its main recruiting ground.  
A brief note in “The Voice of the Base” section on issue five summarized how 
Alfonso López, who had just won the elections, found the universities peaceful under 
a straight jacket. The fighting program of the country’s students was the so-called 
Minimum Program of Colombian Students, which sought participation in academic 
and administrative decisions. The students also sought to end foreign intervention and 
financing, especially from American foundations, which tended to dictate academic 
and research priorities. The answer from the government, after a massive 
mobilizations at 33 universities, dozens of students dead, and hundreds jailed, was to 
reinforce the vertical command and militarization, total or partial closings of schools, 
cafeterias, residencies and the expulsion of more that 3,000 students and 600 
teachers.94 Other than some brief notes and an article on the murder of two students 
by the police, the first comprehensive analysis of the university and student 
movement and the state of higher education in the country appeared in Alternativa’s 
issue 9, a cover article with the headline “Social Front: the university destroyed.”95  
 The Minimum Program was the closest the students ever got to a common 
platform. It proposed “co-government,” a concept whereby the university was jointly 
run and administered by its members—students and teachers—and the government. 
The formula was tried and abandoned in the two most important universities in the 
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country, but remained as the best alternative to wrestle, or at least share control of 
higher education institutions.   
President López had appointed Luis Carlos Pérez, an intellectual with a 
Marxist reputation, as the new president of Universidad Nacional, creating 
expectations among teachers and students in the country. Very soon, the new 
president at Universidad Nacional got into a tight situation. Despite his reputation as a 
Marxist, it soon became clear that he was named to do the government’s bidding. 
Several right-wing political sectors were already speaking of the excessive expenses 
created by the public universities. In his own university, Pérez found himself with a 
veiled boycott of his administration and a “coordinated plan directed by the Opus Dei 
and other rightists organizations against Universidad Nacional,”96 including attempts 
to fill positions with right wing characters and religious zealots.   
 The situation blew open, literally, when a tear gas bomb exploded just before 
a recital by famous cellist Mistislav Rostropovich at the Commander Camilo Torres 
auditorium, and the Papal Nuncio was roughed up and his Mercedes Benz car set on 
fire, supposedly by students on another occasion. The reaction from the far right was 
forceful and immediate, presenting the actions as “an attempt against culture” and as 
“an attack on the beliefs of the Colombian people,” all as a logical consequence of 
having named as president of the university an avowed Marxist, Alternativa reported.  
 
The editorials of El Siglo and the commentaries of the television 
gorillas warn almost joyously that all of that was predictable, evoking the 
peace of the coffins of Duque Gómez’ (the previous president) period. It is 
rather obvious, then, the desire by the most reactionary faction of the 
dominant class to again put a gag on the University. And, in this sense, it is 
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working actively to create a more favorable and propitious atmosphere in its 
wish to repress the democratizing experiment at Universidad Nacional.97  
 
A version according to which both incidents were the work of right-wing 
provocateurs began to circulate, based on the characteristics of the attacks. On the 
other hand, many students also condemned the anarchists within the student 
movement, who acted with the sole motive of disrupting and creating unrest in order 
to promote an environment ripe for further confrontation.   
 
The unity of the left 
Out of the four objectives the magazine adopted from the beginning, that of fostering 
the unity of the left was perhaps the hardest to achieve, as the founding members 
found soon enough. Such a variety of groups from the left, in the cities and the 
countryside, in the universities and at the polls, had never been publicized before in 
Colombia. This gave the impression that an army of militants, however divided, was 
willing to make a revolution for which each group had its own formula to combine in 
different proportions the ingredients they had been taken from Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist-Trotskite-Stalinist-Camilist-Anapist-Albanian-Guevarist doctrines.  
While counter informing, doing investigative reports, and divulging the 
struggles of the popular classes were basic journalistic endeavors, to propitiate the 
unity of the left implied assuming an active political role. As we have seen, the 
makers of Alternativa reached the conclusion, after the crisis the led to Fals and his 
group’s ouster, that the necessary condition to achieve this goal was to be neutral and 
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independent from any particular persuasion in the left, while remaining staunchly 
committed and loyal to the Marxist principles that informed its creation. 
The makers of Alternativa truly believed that by opening the pages to all 
expressions of the Marxist opposition they were contributing to the unity of the 
revolutionary movement. The decision was thus to let the leaders of the left speak for 
themselves, sacrificing in the process any opinion of their doctrines or policies. It was 
only in later stages that the magazine began to take a critical position, mostly toward 
the international alignments of the main parties, which proved time and again to be 
one of the main obstacles to the unity of action against the common enemy.   
Generally, the magazine proposed the issues to discuss and asked for 
opinions, which it published unedited, sometimes in the form of interviews with 
leaders to whom Alternativa’s journalists asked questions. No one in the staff claimed 
exclusive control over these issues, or gave opinions for that matter.   
Occasionally the magazine published verbatim statements and communiqués, 
from leftist’s guerrilla and armed movements, which found in its pages a friendly and 
warm welcome. This attitude showed from the very first issue, when it printed the 
opening declaration of the armed guerrilla movement M-19. Contrary to other groups 
on the left, M-19 proved to be media savvy from the very beginning. It adopted the 
tactic of staging spectacular symbolic acts that were impossible to ignore even by the 
big press.  
The communiqué was the first political public statement of the philosophy 
behind M-19, a movement that proposed a Colombian-style socialism, distinguishing 
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itself from others groups of the left which professed allegiance to foreign doctrines. It 
invoked the figure of Bolívar and reclaimed his heritage. 98  
M-19’s first communiqué was published with a caveat: “Alternativa does not 
judge a political phenomenon about which there are not enough elements of 
judgment. We publish then, only in a merely informative basis, the last communiqué 
by M-19 which, along with the picture of Bolivar’s sword, was sent to all information 
media, but which none divulged.”99 The sword was that of national hero Simón 
Bolivar, taken from a museum where it was exhibited. Actually the picture went only 
to Alternativa. 
Darío Villamizar, Jaime Bateman’s biographer, noted the coincidences and 
links between the guerrilla group and the magazine. 
 
M-19 and Alternativa came out almost at the same time, the former in 
January 17, 1974 and Alternativa in February 15. In the first issue Alternativa 
publishes the first known picture of the sword, where there is a guerrilla with 
a machine gun over a map of South America. That picture was sent only to 
Alternativa and did not have major repercussions. I spoke to the person who 
posed for the picture and he told me how they had decided to take the picture 
with the sword, which was then held downtown, and send it to the magazine. 
Alternativa was a point of reference for M-19, ELN, EPl, PLA. All 
communiqués were first sent to Alternativa.100  
 
 
Letting the left give its opinion about pivotal issues seemed very much in 
accordance with the principles of providing an outlet to vent controversies. In this 
sense, the tricky issue of voting or abstaining was as good as any to test the 
publication’s commitment to provide a window for debate, although, on the editorial 
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committee and the staff of the magazine, there was an unmistakable trend for not 
voting.   
 Once the dust settled, after the dismal showing of the left and of ANAPO in 
the elections, the magazine highlighted in an editorial the importance of debating the 
issue “which produced positive results, even if some susceptibilities were hurt.”101 
Certainly, the magazine had not made any effort to convince voters to cast their 
ballots for the candidates of the left, whoever they might have been. The polemic 
receded until issue 12 when the magazine flatly declared that the option between 
“bourgeois legality and tyranny” was false.   
 
In fact, the ‘democratic dictatorship’ of the dominant class is shown 
when, under the heat of ‘popular elections’, hundreds of big landowners, 
proprietors of factories and enterprises, bankers and big businessman that 
make—and not by chance—the overwhelming majority in Congress, are 
elected. The central problem of this ‘democratic dictatorship’ is to find how 
much does a seat cost. Everything else is just ideology.102  
 
  
Because of the importance that ANAPO had in the country’s history, 
especially in the most recent past, Alternativa carried more articles on that 
organization than any other. The magazine chronicled ANAPO’s demise, from a 
powerful populist party that managed to win the 1970’s elections, with victory stolen 
from them it by the ruling parties, to an irrelevant force that had squandered all the 
past gains.  
The history of leftist ideas in Colombia went as far back as the middle of 
nineteenth century, as told in “The Forbidden History” section of Alternativa, when 
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El Alacrán, a provocative socialist-inspired newspaper, saw the light on January 28, 
1848, at the same time Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto was published in 
Europe. The paper promised to publish “the naked truth about the society’s situation” 
and considered the oligarchs of the time as evildoers. The stir the paper created in the 
capital promptly led to efforts to repress it. Its founders, two youths linked to the 
same oligarchy they denounced, were tried and sent to jail, only to be released after 
an amnesty declared by a newly elected president who rose to power with the help of 
socialist, communist inspired artisans cells in the 1850s.  
  At the time of the birth of Alternativa, about the only thing the left agreed was 
on the need to carry out a socialist revolution based on Marxist-Leninist principles. 
Otherwise, each of the different organizations, parties, sects or groups followed 
directions associated with foreign orientations. The Communist Party was a declared 
follower of  Stalinist Soviet Union. The MOIR was Maoist. The Camilist 
Commandoes (PC-ML) followed a more pro-Cuban stance. There were also several 
Trotskyite parties, each with its own shade of agreement with the Fourth Socialist 
International. There was even a party that professed links to socialist Albania and its 
leader Enver Hoxa. As for the guerrilla movements, FARC was very close to  the 
Communist Party, while the EPL was decidedly pro-Cuban. The ERP was a spin-off 
of the PC-ML, also pro-Cuban, while, as seen before, the M-19, a relative newcomer 
to the scene, fought for a Colombian-style socialism and declared itself the heir of 
Bolívar ideals and populist principles associated with ANAPO. Also, several 
anarchist organizations managed to express and act themselves on occasion. The 
influence of the left extended to organizations representing workers, students and 
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peasants, such as unions, student councils or ANUC, either by controlling them 
outright or by influencing their policies. Both the PC and the MOIR had their own 
youth organizations (JUCO and JUPA respectively) anchored in universities 
throughout the country.  
In issue 19, the magazine summoned the leaders of the left to talk about 
López’ government, 100 days after it took power. As expected, the balance was 
overwhelmingly negative. Ricardo Samper, one of the few House Representatives of 
the left, representing MOIR, described perfectly the maneuvers of the López 
government during its first 100 days.  
 
López has made a skilful political maneuver. First, he awakened the 
illusion of many people in the public arena, while in private he kept 
conversations with the economic groups. He filled his speeches with promises 
and offered to lower the cost of living. At the start of the 100 days, however, 
he had to resort to the easy resource of the economic emergency. He had 
people believe that the country was suffering bad crises and therefore he could 
not carry out his promises. Immediately afterwards, he began to hit brutally 
the ruined budget of the working classes. Even Lopistas are perplexed. The 
celebrated government of “hope” ended up being yet another chapter of the 
oligarchic domination.103  
 
The declarations of the leaders of the left, full of formality and misguided 
optimism in the unorganized and uninformed masses, showed their differences to be 
minor. All of them, however, believed they had the truth and the correct path even 
though they never got close to the much-desired revolution or to the unity of the left 
for that matter. By arguing endlessly over the small print of the Marxist classics, 
sometimes they forgot their main objectives, a case of the trees preventing them to 
see the forest, as Lenin used to say.  
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In “Where is the left going?”104 the magazine for the first time adopted a 
critical position. After providing some historical background on the left in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, and comparing it with the current situation, the magazine 
postulated that the left did not seem to find a way to channel popular unrest into a 
coherent and united strategy against the government and the political class due to 
divergences on the political lines. 
 The background of the left’s predicament was dramatic. Everyday some type 
of popular protest or event took place: the reduction of public transportation fares in 
Cali as a result of popular protests; a “war situation” in this and two other cities 
(Palmira and Pasto) when the army invaded the street after student protests; more that 
5,000 peasants sent to the penal justice system by the Conservative governor of the 
Atlantic department for invading land; the invasion by the army of a state high school 
building attended by 4,000 pupils; the blockade by the people of Condoto, a mining 
town in the department of Chocó, of heavy machinery brought by the company; a 
road blockade by neighbors in several southeastern localities in Bogotá; the 
occupation by the army of irrigation districts taken over by striking employees of 
INCORA, a government institution; riots and sacking in downtown Bogotá by 
protesters against high prices and gasoline speculation; the Universidad del Cauca 
being closed after student protests, affecting 5,000.  
The magazine’s sympathies with the armed struggle in the country and abroad 
were undeniable. Since no other media informed the public about both issues to the 
extent that Alternativa did, from an anti-government perspective, the magazine 
became the publication of record regarding these issues. Because of this, Alternativa 
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was also an actor in the background, an intermediary among the diverse armed groups 
in their quest for unity.  
From the point of view of the armed struggle regarding political prisoners, 
torture and confession were treated from issue 2. Two political prisoners, Ricardo 
Lara Parada, a member of the ELP, and Jaime Arenas, had both confessed when 
interrogated, presumably under torture or threat of it. The article had a memorable 
quote, attributed to the lawyer who was the subject of the article-interview: “Before 
teaching a man to handle his rifle, he has to be taught how to handle his tongue. If the 
revolutionary does not know how to handle its weapon he can die alone; but if he 
does not know how to handle his tongue, he can liquidate a whole organization.”105  
  The tenth anniversary of the first shot fired by the ELN as a guerrilla 
movement, when it took the town of Simacota in Santander, was commemorated with 
an interview with its leader Fabio Vásquez Castaño, in  which Alternativa’s readers 
learned first hand about the radical group’s position regarding the armed struggle in 
the road to the revolution. “We live in an unjust society, divided in two antagonistic 
classes: the exploiters and the exploited. They have opposed and irreconcilable 
interests. And, even though the dominant class is willing to satisfy some immediate 
spontaneous aspirations of the working class that does not solve the situation.”106 
Some immediate struggles not political in nature were considered “harmful and 
reactionary,”107 such as unionism which instead of serving the class’s struggle, was 
seen as a vehicle for the penetration of the bourgeois ideology in the proletarian class.  
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In the future, Alternativa would play an essential and irreplaceable role in 
trying to bridge the gap between the armed organizations of the left, or at least in 
getting them to communicate in public about their views of the country. This was no 
small task considering that they worked clandestinely, holed up in the mountains with 
their weapons and their ideology, firmly believing that the revolution had to go 
through them.   
 
The international front 
 
Alternativa’s international information highlighted the struggles of the peoples of the 
word, their revolutions, uprisings and colonial liberation wars and the fight against 
“North American imperialism,” especially the final part of the Vietnam War. This 
coverage was unique and unequaled in the country, different from radio and 
television, inasmuch as the information in mainstream journalism was monopolized 
by major international press agencies. 108 The high quality of Alternativa’s coverage 
was due to its sources, which included highly regarded international publications 
mostly from Europe as well as dispatches from alternative press agencies such as 
Prensa Latina, Tanjung and Inter Press Service.  
During its first stage, however, the magazine’s information emphasis was in Latin 
America, and especially the military dictatorships of the so-called  South Cone. More 
than news brought by press agencies, however, the magazine relied on a network of 
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contacts and de facto correspondents belonging to leftist parties, most of them 
struggling under brutal right wing military dictatorships. Except for Peru, with a 
military, left-oriented regime, and Ecuador, with a stabilizing military government 
considered politically neutral, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil were outright right-
wing dictatorships, while Argentina and Uruguay were slowly drifting toward them.  
The presence of the United States in Latin America was ubiquitous and 
overwhelming. The big power in the north had overseen its neighbors to the south 
throughout all their history, imposing its political and economical will whenever it 
deemed it necessary for its own good. The United States, harbinger of imperialism, 
was unanimously considered by the left as the main enemy of the continent’s peoples 
and as such was portrayed through the pages of the magazine.  
 “Latin America today: promises and results,”109 presented a complete picture of 
the political regimes of 20 countries, accompanied by an info graphic.  
 
Only in four of those 20 countries, we can speak of relatively ‘clean’ 
elections: Argentina, Costa Rica, México and Venezuela. As for the others, there 
is one in which a popular revolution was produced (Cuba), twelve with 
governments born out of coups d’etat, ‘constitutionally’ imposed or empowered 
through outright electoral frauds and three whose regimes rose thanks to more 
‘discreet’ frauds. All forms of populism have failed as political leadership 
methods. 110  
 
The liberal-bourgeois axis, “this world of oligarchic liberalism in which 
democratic formulas are sustained more because of the fear of unchecked violence 
than for their own internal vitality,”111 included México with its agrarian revolution 
and nationalizations, Venezuela with its formal democratization, Colombia, and 
                                                 





Honduras. As for the “nationalistic military regimes” such as Panamá and Perú, they 
were avowed anti-imperialist, it continued.  
And there was Cuba.  
 
Of all this apparently chaotic reality (capitalist development, 
entrepreneurial liberalism, populist redistribution, nationalism without clear 
definitions and with precarious achievements, aristocratic-caudillista 
dictatorships, plain fascism), only one nation can exhibit the complete cycle of 
a social revolution, and authentic national independence and a true economic 
development. It is Cuba. There the ‘democratic’ institutionalization was 
broken, not to be timidly recomposed at the expense of the working masses, 
but to tear to pieces the links of the national subjection with the only force 
capable of doing it: the exploited people.112   
 
  
 Alternativa’s side of the story in the continent’s events presented a crude and 
often brutal reality of which Argentina was a good example. The crises of 
Justicialismo, the movement of president Juan Domingo Perón, provided historical 
context for understanding the workers resistance to successive unpopular 
governments going back to 1968 when there were twelve insurrectional armed 
organizations with clandestine structure.113 In March, 1966, the city of Córdoba was 
taken by thousands of combatants who kept the army in check, an event known as El 
Cordobazo. There were many other strikes against the government and the military 
by groups such as Montoneros, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR 
(Revolutionary armed forces) and the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas, FAP (Peronist 
Armes Forces).  
When the de facto president General Agustín Lanusse proposed a pact in the 
form of a “great encounter of Argentines,” Perón readily accepted, despite the 
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opposition of the party’s left and its armed organizations. The acting president 
Cámpora resigned to give way to new elections in which Perón and his wife were 
candidates. The police, an organization with a well-deserved reputation for  torture, 
acted swiftly. The chief of police of Córdoba fired the governor, accusing him of 
giving weapons to the Marxists rebels. Then a ‘carefully planned’ massacre took 
place in the Ezeiza airport, against several dozen leftists youths chanting ‘Perón, 
Evita, la patria socialista.’ The chain of events led, as Alternativa told it afterwards, 
to the demise of the civilian government after the death of Perón, who was immersed 
in a profound cesspool of corruption, and to the military coup that gave way to a 
succession of some the most brutal military dictatorships in the world. 
 Juan Domingo Perón died on July 1, 1974. As Alternativa said, there was 
nobody to replace the Caudillo, the driving force in the country’s politics since the 
1940s. For the first time in Latin American history power felt in the hands of a 
woman, Vice president María Estela Martínez de Perón. But the past haunted the lady 
president, who had been a cabaret dancer; José López Rega, Perón’s Secretary and 
leader of the far right, had been a police sergeant without any militant past. By 
September 1975, the Social Pact, which kept the country together, was broken, 
turning the situation into a non-declared war between the right and the left within the 
Peronist party and within the country at large. Then came a raging armed conflict, 
with frequent and grave clashes between guerrilla groups and the country’s police and 
armed forces. Given the government’s offensive led by José López Rega against the 
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Peronist left and all the left in the country, the armed groups prepare for the illegality, 
to become clandestine and for a long protracted war.114  
The Cuban revolution that culminated in January 1, 1959, actually began July 
26, 1953, with the attack on the Moncada Garrison by a group of rebels led by a 
young lawyer called Fidel Castro. Twenty-one years later, Alternativa commemorated 
the event with a two-page article celebrating the success of the revolution against 
imperialism and its cronies. At the time of the revolution, the North American 
monopolies had $700 million dollars invested in the island and La Habana was a giant 
bordello for tourists. The phone, electricity, gas, oil, nickel mines, raw materials and 
intermediate goods, textiles, soap, transportation and big commerce companies were 
in the hands of Americans. There were more than 600,000 unemployed. More than 
400,000 agricultural laborers were unemployed eight months of the year. Cuba had 
one million illiterates. Ninety percent of the children in the countryside were being 
devoured by parasites. 115
Against this background, the magazine said, the revolution did things 
unthinkable in any other country in the continent. It included the total socialization of 
the economy with the expropriation of factories and the collectivization of the land. 
Education and health became universal and free. Many diseases and malnutrition 
were eradicated. Everybody had an assured retirement. The production of electricity 
tripled. The professional army was abolished and the popular army created. Misery, 
begging, and unemployment disappeared. To commemorate the Twenty First 
Anniversary of the attack on the Moncada garrison, Fidel Castro gave a speech in 
                                                 




which he called the Organization of American States “a cadaver.”116 That 
organization had expelled Cuba after the revolution and, under the leadership of the 
United States, orchestrated an economic embargo that affected greatly the livelihood 
of all Cuban people.  
One of the few brightest spots for the left in Latin América was Perú, where 
General Juan Velasco Alvarado took over in October 3, 1968 and began one of Latin 
America’s novel experiments of a nationalist nature, with the support of some sectors 
of the left and the opposition of others, along with the reactionary oligarchy.  
 At the head of the government was Velazco Alvarado, the only active general 
in Latin America who reached his grade after being a private soldier. He defined his 
government as a “humanitarian and humanist revolution.” The military put in motion 
important transformations in the economic structure.117 In issue 13, Alternativa 
informed readers of the expropriation of Peru’s dailies, an event that shook the 
continent.  
 
Nobody dared to face the great dailies. The Revolution has done it 
without fear and it will defeat them’ said General Velasco in front of a 
multitude of workers who applauded the expropriation. So far, Velasco said, 
the big press had ‘defended foreign interests, while the popular cause and the 
interests of Peru almost never worried them.’118  
  
Conservative government, from Chile to Miami, denounced the measure and 
the Inter American Press Society held an emergency meeting in the latter city. On the 
other hand, many workers, particularly journalists, praised the measure, from 
Venezuela to Ecuador and Argentina. 
                                                 
116 Alt. 13, 8/5/74, p. 21 
117 Alt. 6, 1/5/74, p. 20 
118 Alt. 13, 5/8/74, p. 21 
 148 
 
After the decision to expropriate the newspapers and give them to the workers 
to publish and administer, President Velasco Alvarado informed the public this was 
part of the Plan Inca, elaborated by the Military Junta since 1968, which stated the 
difference between freedom of the press and freedom of industry. The existence of 
the Inca Plan, like the decision to expropriate the newspapers, took everybody by 
surprise mostly because of its ambitious scope.119 Alternativa published Alvarado’s 
comments: “From the very first moment we proclaimed that the objective of this 
revolution was to liquidate underdevelopment and dependency; that is to say, misery, 
ignorance, exploitation, inequalities, social injustice and the subordination of our 
country to the foreign power.”120  
It is not possible to understand Latin America without analyzing the role of 
the United States as the dominant power in the continent, characterized unanimously 
by all parties from the left, in Colombia and the rest of the countries, as imperialistic. 
This was a universally agreed category encompassing all efforts by the Unite States to 
impose its will over the rest of the continent, with the full cooperation of the local 
political elites, which saw in North America a natural ally against the left. The money 
flew from the north in the form of aid channeled through organizations like the 
Agency for International Development, the Inter American Development Bank and 
others. Quite often, the funds ended up in the pockets of politicians, a sort of 
corruption subsidy for the acquiescence to the policies of the United States, which 
also provided military aid and training, geared mostly toward combating insurgency. 
The aim was to counteract the influence of Cuba and the spread of socialism and 
                                                 




communism, in the context of the Cold War between the western powers, the Soviet 
Union and China. The third aspect of the United States presence in Latin America 
was through foreign investment in key sectors of the economy such as manufacturing 
of consumer goods, agribusiness, mining and cultural products like movies, music 
and television. The United States was the most important trade partner.  
 The presentation in Colombia of State of Siege, a film by the Greek director 
Costa Gavras, was the point of entry for “Police terrorism in Latin América,”121 an 
article, previously published by the North American Council on Latin America, 
NACLA, based on a document sent to a United States Senator by an officer of the 
Agency for International Development, AID. It confirmed the existence in Los 
Fresnos, Texas, of a counterterrorist base, where Latin American policemen were 
trained in the art of making bombs and other incendiary devices. The course, which 
according to the document had been taken by no less that 164 policemen since 1969, 
cost US$1,750 per student, all paid by the United States government. Statistics and a 
separate note accompanied the story on the training of Colombian officers abroad, 
quoting official documents.122  
The unprecedented expropriation of Peru’s dailies as well as the Watergate 
events merited a careful examination of the situation of the press on the American 
continent, from the point of view of the Inter American Press Association, a 
membership guild grouping the more powerful news organizations in the continent. 
Its beginning was mostly an unknown story, until its history was published in 
Alternativa.   
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The first attempts to organize the press operations in the continent took place 
at two conferences held in 1946 in Bogotá and in 1949 in Quito. They “had strongly 
condemned the Yankee intervention in the continent, had noted the misleading 
character of the big North American press agencies, and had proposed the unity of the 
workers of Latin American press against the bosses interests.”123 Under those 
circumstances, a confidential document called “Background of Previous Inter 
American Press Meetings,” written by State Department agents, was used as a guide 
to offset the idea of a workers’ oriented organization. The plan was  
to suppress the international character of the existing organization and impose 
the absolute North American supremacy and to do this it was necessary to 
eliminate from the Conference the leftist journalists; displace the Cuban 
delegation; replace the delegations by countries with delegations by 
companies; reduce to a minority the press workers; and obtain an 
overwhelming majority for the owners of the consortia.124
 
  
 The next conference took place in New York, under the auspices of five of 
the most powerful press organizations of the United States. The Department of State 
gave instructions to its consular offices to deny visas to journalists deemed to be from 
the left. Those who managed to reach New York were detained at the airport and held 
under surveillance, including Cuba’s Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the organization’s 
treasurer. Those who managed to get through to the conference were not admitted or 
recognized. Only the owners of the biggest newspapers and those close to the North 
American press were allowed to participate. Thus, the organization’s statutes were 
never discussed publicly and all protests were erased from the record. Those owners 
included, besides some of the biggest names behind North American news 
                                                 
123 Alt 14, 20/8/74, p. 6 
124 Ibid.  
 151 
 
organizations, a list of who was who in the Latin American printed news business, all 
of them allied in one way or another with the circles of power. The article came with 
a sidebar offering profiles of five consortia that by then controlled the Inter American 
Press Association: Trust McCormack-Patterson, Scripps-Howard consortium, Hearst 
Corporation, Knight Newspapers and Time-Life Inc. 
United States’ policy toward Latin America was channeled in part through the 
Organization of American States, OAS. The common policy of Latin America and the 
United States toward Cuba was in diplomatic instruments such as the Rio Pact, a 
mutual defense treaty that the United States used it to justify acts such as the invasion 
of the Dominican Republic in 1965. As the magazine said,  
 
The clumsy and coarse maneuver by the Unite States—geared toward 
making a unilateral aggression into a ‘collective intervention’ and the United 
States troops into an ‘Inter-American military force’ under the pretext of 
reestablishing the constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, 
constituted a serious threat to the hemispheric security—it was thought that 
OAS and TIAR could hardly be resuscitated. It was extremely impossible to 
restitute the strength of the frustrated principle of the self-determination of the 
peoples because of the aggression against Santo Domingo.125  
 
The activities of the United States against Latin America were mainly 
coordinated by the CIA through open and covert operations, which included 
financing, training and coordination with police and army units in each country, 
among other things. The most comprehensive report on the CIA, its nature and 
activities around the world, was published in issue 18, after the revelations made by 
CIA Director William Colby in the United States Congress, on the activities of the 
organization and the government under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, to oppose 
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and sabotage the government of Salvador Allende in Chile. The magazine said the 
United States spent $8 million dollars between 1970 and 1973 supporting Allende’s 
foes, bribing Chilean congress members, and in ‘destabilizing’ activities such as 
strikes, boycotts and terrorism.126 The plan against Chile was elaborated by the so-
called ‘40’s Committee,’ headed by Henry Kissinger, who also directed personally all 
operations of economic and credit blockade against Allende.  
In Colombia, the CIA was named as having carried out operations on April 9, 
1948, when the popular leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered. Also, Gabriel 
García Márquez interviewed Phillip Agee, the former CIA agent who published 
Inside the company-The diary of the CIA. The book had a list of names and 
organizations, which acted as “employees, agents or collaborators,” in México, 
Uruguay, Ecuador and Argentina. The list included two former presidents and the 
current president of México, the president of Costa Rica, a former president of 
Uruguay and Cuban exiles, among many others as well as organizations such as union 
federations, banks, publications and publishing houses, associations, police corps, 
movements, etc. 127  
The book also implicated Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal, MRL, (Liberal 
Revolutionary Movement), founded by President Alfonso López Michelsen, which 
received money from the CIA. The article announced in a cover banner: “The M.R.L. 
Received Money from the CIA!” 128was an interview between García Márquez and 
Agee with an introduction that somehow exonerated President López. 
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Philip Agee tells me that he doesn’t know if Alfonso López Michelsen 
knew it, that it is possible and probable that he didn’t know, but instead he 
knows for sure that the Liberal Revolutionary Movement was secretly 
financed by the CIA, and that it promoted and paid for a political tour of 
López Michelsen to Ecuador. I have told him, and I believe it without 
reservation, that such fact does not justify the inclusion of the president’s 
name in a list of CIA collaborators, but Agee has answered me that his list 
does not pretend to be condemnatory but revelatory, and that he has put 




García Márquez’ article revealed the extent of CIA’s operations in Latin 
America, with the main purpose of undermining the influence and relations of every 
other country in the continent with Cuba. For ten years, Agee had been a CIA agent 
stationed in Quito, Montevideo and Mexico, so he had first-hand knowledge of the 
agency’s operations in Latin America.  
According to García Márquez, the overriding interest of the United States was 
to neutralize the influence of Cuba, an objective for which they it was willing to go to 
great lengths. “To achieve it they promoted coups, public disorders, paid strikes and 
bloody repression of popular and student protests. They enriched the parties on the 
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Chapter 6:  The second stage 
 
In its second stage, which began with issue 32 in May 1975, the magazine became an 
11” by 8 ½” weekly. The change in periodicity and format, announced in issue 31, 
was motivated both by the financial strain faced by the magazine and the need to be 
more up to date with the country’s events.  
True to the new orientation of Alternativa, we are obliged to get more 
updated by becoming a weekly. We attempt to maintain a journalistic effort 
we understand as a political challenge, trusting our network of collaborators 
and correspondents that from now one will sleep with one eye open, more in 
touch with the present.131  
 
 
The masthead had changed in issue 29, which included the name of Enrique 
Santos Calderón for the first time. The new orientation, which had been outlined in 
García Márquez’ interview in issue 29, was a result of the internal debate which 
followed the crises.  
 
There are always risks to be taken; but those are less if we are more 
independent from the groups, knowing however that we are together in this 
revolutionary process. The independence of Alternativa is in relation to the 
different groups, not in relation to the process. These distances sometimes are 
more fictitious than real, even though from now on we will find ourselves 
embarked in debates in which we have to demonstrate, facing new situations, 
that there can be different and necessary positions inside traditional ones. 
Besides, this is the price of a more professional journalism, more tied to 
current events, because there is where you crash head on against the reality, 
which is more stubborn than all theories taken together.132  
  
The editorial routines changed, with two meetings held every week, on 
Monday and Friday, both of them dedicated to journalistic content rather than 
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conciliations of politically sensitive issues. The cover improved substantially, using 
photomontages and sometimes caricatures and graphics for a more direct impact on 
the reader. The typeface remained mostly at small nine and ten point size, making it 
somewhat hard to read. Graphically, the format was easier to design, more appealing. 
In addition, new more clearly defined sections appeared along old ones. “El Zancudo” 
and “Qué hay de Nuevo en Macondo” remained. 
“El Zancudo” (The Mosquito) was inspired by the words of Colombian writer 
José María Vargas Vila, who once said that was “The only one against which the 
gringo couldn’t do anything,” when the Panama Canal was being built.133 “El 
Zancudo” was the anti-imperialist corner of the magazine. The first installment 
featured an imaginary scenario whereby the Foreign Minister of Colombia, chosen as 
the spokesperson by his Latin American counterparts, met with Henry Kissinger and 
presented him the following petitions: 
 
Hemispheric defense; protection against blackmail, extortion and 
coercion from the big powers; to reform the OAS so it can serve 250 million 
Latin Americans; to give back the Panama zone to Panamanians and present 
apologies to us; to forbid foreign corporations to put, withdraw, rise, lower, 
elect, molest, praise, kill or suicide presidents, constitutional or not; 
worldwide monetary and commercial restructuring; donate technology to 
Latin America to be able to compete as equals; to do a general revision of the 
relations between the United States and Latin America from 1810 til today; 
participation of Latin America in all important decisions on commerce, 
customs, markets and other important issues.134
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At the end, Kissinger receives a call from Nixon, in which he tells him there is 
an “exciting session of tropical optimism,” whereby he orders Kissinger to China. 
 “¿Qué hay de Nuevo en Macondo?” (What’s new in Macondo), took its name 
from García Márquez’ One Hundred years of Solitude mythical town, and presented 
satirical pieces about Colombia. In issue one it featured a fictitious dialog between 
two young executives about selling products that bear names linked to the two main 
political candidates. As a piece of writing, it was confusing and ineffective, but the 
section kept appearing in future issues for the benefit of those seeking humor and 
irony in the magazine. 
Editorially, the magazine gained in coherence. The empty leftist rhetoric, the 
admonitions and proclamations were mostly gone. Instead, the articles were edited 
more carefully with the evident intention to make the writing clearer and briefer and 
to use the space more efficiently. The weekly frequency also allowed the magazine to 
follow up on the news of the week with analysis and interpretation.  
The first editorial “Letter to the Reader” was a 300-word analysis contrasting 
the demonstrations by the left on May 1, with those under President López and 
former President Lleras Restrepo. At the moment the government was under pressure 
from the working class hit by high unemployment and inflation and a series of 
measures in Congress regarding labor stability, the right to strike, cost of living 
adjustments, among others.135  
 The magazine opened with a two-page article on one of the biggest news 
stories of the decade: the final liberation of Vietnam and the unification of the 
                                                 




country, after 30 years of armed struggle, with the obligatory picture of the American 
ambassador leaving Saigon with the folded American flag under his arm.136 It was 
followed by a new section, “Actualidad” (Current events), a one-page analysis of the 
weekly political landscape with an abbreviated analysis of the situation on the left in 
the opposite page. The topics were popular unity, the quest for a unified union 
federation, the workers-peasants alliance, and the international Sino-Soviet conflict, 
plus an interview with two leftist personalities on the new labor measures proposed 
by the government.137 A note on The Autumn of the Patriarch, the new book by 
García Márquez, followed. 138 The book, which followed the universal success of One 
Hundred Years of Solitude, was awaited with great expectations, to the advantage of 
the magazine which now had the writer in its permanent staff. There was also 
information on the students’ struggle at two universities, one of them a private 
institution closed by directives in the face of generalized student’s protests, and the 
other at Universidad Nacional,  with a debate on whether how to hold elections for 
the student’s representatives to its governing body. 139
 In an interview, a peasant narrated how the army once again took an 
opportunity to help big landowners trying to take away peasant families’ land, under 
the pretext of looking for guerrillas.140 The magazine also carried an interview with a 
group of progressive priests, critical of the Catholic Church, at a time when the Papal 
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Nuncio in Colombia was receiving expressions of support after being roughed up at 
Universidad Nacional by a students’ mob.141  
 There was abundant information on the international front. Besides the spread 
on Vietnam on page three, there was news on the workings of the Russell Tribunal, to 
which Márquez belonged,142 on the Baader-Meinhof commando in Germany; on the 
election of Socialist Mario Soares in Portugal; on elections in Argentina; on the tenth 
anniversary of United States’ invasion of the Dominican Republic; plus briefs on 
Guatemala, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico. Finally, the magazine continued with 
“The Forbidden History” section with the first of a two-part series on the political 
power of the Vatican.  
Alternativa and the armed forces 
In the second stage, Alternativa’s struggled to survive while challenging the State 
mired in economic and political crises that affected many people, with heightened 
popular unrest confronted by the government through an emergency legislation that 
allowed it to repress all kinds of protests in the cities and in the countryside.  
The magazine’s intention was to maintain the thrust of its coverage based on 
the four axes of counter-informing, doing investigative reports, letting people know 
about popular struggles and keep working toward the unity of the left, hoping to take 
advantage of the lessons learned in the first stage. This time, however, there was more 
flexibility and variety in editorial content and more space for journalism.  
The circulation, which had reached close to 40,000 copies at its peak, had 
taken a beating after the breakup with Fals and Rosca falling to the 20,000 level and 
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the financial difficulties persisted, although there was supposed to be a plan for the 
future and an infusion of capital.  
No other issue highlighted more the role of Alternativa and its effort to stick 
to its objectives than its permanent coverage of the armed forces. The magazine 
confronted them as sources of information, which the mainstream press very rarely 
did. It investigated them also for the first time, for acts of corruption that began to 
surface as soon as Alternativa dared to go inside an institution that up to its 
publication had been virtually untouchable. It highlighted their repression of the 
people’s protest through the emergency legislation issued under the State of Siege, 
using methods that included, according to testimonies, torture and extrajudicial 
executions. And it defended itself, as part of the opposition to the government, against 
the military’s repeated attempts to curtail the freedom of expression and the press that 
was part of the democratic façade the regiment projected internally and externally.  
While the discussions created by the breakup with slowly receded, the 
magazine kept waging its permanent and unending fight against the system’s press. 
The first crisis inside the magazine somehow muffled the impact of García Márquez’ 
interview with rogue agent Philip Agee in London about the involvement of the 
president’s old political movement, the MRL, with the CIA. The institutional press 
was unanimous in rejecting the accusations against the sitting head of the 
government, confirming the fact that the magazine had become a player in the 
journalistic and political scene, waging attacks such as the one reported in the 




The ‘anti-subversive’ terrorism campaign unleashed by the regime is 
well orchestrated by the big press. To encourage this repressive climate, the 
agitation campaigns come not only from the organs of the Conservative cave 
(El Siglo, El Colombiano, etc.), but also from the very ‘liberal’ El Tiempo and 
El Espectador. 
 The dailies are not happy simply with giving maximum display to any 
declaration by the military, the ministers and governors on the threats to 
public order—the words State of Siege reappear suggestively in all the 
headlines—but they have taken this a step farther. In fact, if the López regime 
seeks to attribute every day the explosive social situation in the country to 
‘subversive plans,’ the system’s press has also wanted to point to the left 
publications as directly responsible. 
 El Tiempo’s editorial on April 3 is explicit enough about it. It claims 
that the state of ‘fiery passion’ that the country lives in, can be attributed to 
the ‘wave of extremist propaganda which, protected by the freedom of 
expression, swamps the country with its ‘political fanaticism’ and its 
subversion calls.’ The editorial invites readers to ‘walk by the newsstands and 
count the amount of extremist publications offered to the gullible reader.’ El 
Tiempo calls for the defense of the democracy to conclude, naturally, with the 
need to ‘take the floor from under those publications.’ And the next day, April 
4, El Espectador echoes those arguments with an editorial titled ‘The hour of 
social defense.’143  
 
While the mainstream press played a propaganda role by quoting official 
sources without confronting them, the majority of leftist alternative media serviced 
the proselytizing and organizing needs of whatever group published them. Ironically, 
it was Alternativa’s goal of reaching the general public and avoiding preaching to the 
converted, which proved to be one of the magazine’s greatest strength and protection 
against the mainstream media, the government, and the armed forces.    
 The magazine answered to the accusations of promoting ‘subversion’ by 
denouncing the role that the intelligence agencies of the armed forces played inside 
the big newspapers, with their approval. It was the first blow in the long, simmering 
quarrel with the military and another punch at the system’s press.  
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Any reader with a two-finger forehead knows that the information 
related to ‘public order’ problems is where the tergiversation of the official 
press reaches its most shameful expression. Behind every news item about 
guerrilla attacks, land recovery, strikes or popular protests, there is a refined 
disinformation apparatus, based in the close coordination between the 
journalist and its sources: the State’s security services.144  
 
These grave accusations were vox populi among the working journalists. 
Santos himself had been privy to the manipulation his magazine now denounced 
while working at El Tiempo. The article talked about how journalists were groomed 
and trained in military installations, received secret and confidential information, 
which they never bothered to question and published without the benefit of a named 
source. Furthermore, the security services especially those working in the afternoon 
tabloids, employed and paid some journalists.  
 
In this sense, the sensationalism imprinted in every information on 
guerrillas, ‘subversive threats,’ ‘terrorist plans,’ etc., is not just a drive to fill 
up printed columns. Behind it, there is a very concrete political interest in 
creating a calculated confusion in relation to the political forces confronting, 
at different levels, the current social order. This information manipulation 
seeks to create—in a systematic way—an atmosphere to justify the application 
of ever more rigid measures of police control over the population. The idea is 
to ‘give atmosphere’ to the progressive militarization of the country, the 
repressive norms, the ‘tricolor operations.’145  
 
 
An example at hand was the purported plots to disrupt the public peace on 
May Day. Another was the incomplete and doctored information on the army’s 
combat casualties with the guerrillas, their intention to explode bombs in the cities 
and even the reports on annihilation of guerrilla forces or the killing of important 
guerrilla commanders, which often proved false or exaggerated.  
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 To drive the point further, a commercial promoting Alternativa on television 
was censored. “The magazine can say that it is leftist, what it cannot say are things 
attacking the government or offending it,”146 was the quote from the head of 
INRAVISIÓN, the official broadcast entity of the government. From then on, the 
magazine was not allowed to be promoted on television as part of the unspoken 
boycott, which included main advertisers, applied against it until it folded in April, 
1980. 
The week after Alternativa reported in a brief note the row between General 
Valencia Tovar, the army commander, and President López,147 the in-depth cover 
article on the armed forces “One step from a coup?,”148  created controversy again. It 
did a thorough analysis of the different scenarios created by the firing of five generals 
and the dismissals of three colonels, all commanders of military divisions in Bogotá. 
The moves stirred coup rumors, which the minister of government quickly dismissed.  
Apparently, it all came down to a skilful maneuver by the President to get rid of an 
uncomfortable group of capable generals. “The Coup was by López,” was the telling 
headline on the story, with the President clearly favoring the hawks over the doves.  
 
The long shadow of corruption 
Seizing upon declarations given to El Tiempo by General Gabriel Puyana, who was 
bypassed for promotion and placed in military limbo by the president, Alternativa 
published a revealing exposé of the cozy relationship between some army officials 
and contraband dealers in the country, all linked to the political class in a complex 
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web of corruption.149 The magazine went further, suggesting that the recent changes 
in the officer’s corps reflected the interest of the minister of defense and his clan, and 
the politicians headed by the president himself, to keep company with people and 
institutions involved in profitable illegal activities.  
 On June 9, the Minister of Defense, General Varón Valencia, fired back. In a 
letter sent to Alternativa, he announced a judicial action against the magazine with the 
aim to “clarify the calumnious content of the publication and for the anonymous 
informants to have the civil courage to present themselves before justice to take 
responsibility for their acts”150 Besides asking the magazine to reveal its sources, the 
General denied all the accusations leveled against him in the article. Again, the 
magazine had managed to generate a reaction that placed it as a real counterweight to 
the mainstream press.  
 In the answer to the minister, published in a “Letter to the Reader,” the 
magazine stated the conception of the freedom of the press that guided its work, 
contrasting it with that of official publications which served as an unconditional 
conduit for the establishment’s institutions such as the armed forces to spread their 
message as part of the government’s strategy to quash dissent and impose its policies 
upon the struggling people. The magazine forcefully vindicated its mission to inform 
and counter-inform, rather than just spread political messages, by placing itself on the 
side of the truth. In a way, this editorial and the confrontation with the military meant 
a new break with Alternativa’s past and was a reaffirmation of the journalistic 
principles that lay at the base of the magazine’s mission.  
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 Because we do it—meaning to inform—a capital daily accuses this 
magazine of having ‘the mischievous intention to demoralize,’ in the same 
way that those who limit themselves to show what is going on behind 
Colombian’s backs are accused of inciting subversion. What happens is that 
the reality of the country, the system’s reality, demoralizes and incites to 
subversion whoever gets to know it closely. And this magazine, without 
‘mischievous intention’ of any kind, has the purpose among other things to 
show it as it is. That is to say, to inform.151  
 
 
Alternativa went farther than denying flatly the request to reveal its sources. It 
published new accusations against the general, revealing other aspects of the network 
of favors and privileges build around the Clan Valencia, which included the minister, 
two of his brothers who were also commanding officers in the army, and several aides 
and politicians. “This bittersweet discovery (rearranging the army’s pieces) leaves a 
bitter flavor, and gives way to a mercenary and unconditional militarism, where a cast 
of Prussian types dwell in customs offices.”152 said the magazine in the follow-up 
article. 
 The impact caused by the controversy generated a profusion of messages sent 
to the “Letters from the Readers” section. One of them, from an anonymous ‘Group 
of Army Officers’ dared to ask ten questions to General Varón on his behavior 
before, during and after the shakeup, as well as questions about his close 
subordinates.153 Another letter denounced the handling of the money deducted from 
officer’s paychecks and supposedly destined to build a vacation facility in Melgar, 
Tolima. There were also letters by people mentioned in the articles, justifying 
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themselves or denying charges leveled against them.154 Other articles followed, 
including a questionnaire contradicting General Varón Valencia and Colonel García 
Gil’s declarations on television, with sixteen pointed and precise questions that 
nobody expected them to answer.155
 Even President López made explicit threats in his Congress installation speech 
on July 20,156 where he referred to the magazine without naming it. It was the most 
important speech of the year and it proved that the publication had touched a nerve in 
the establishment. Blaming the press, according to the magazine, for the death of a 
president at the beginning of the twentieth century,  
 
he launched a warning to ‘columnists, caricaturists, humorists and all kinds of 
quills’ who, undoubtedly, not being able to sign decrees, ‘court collective 
passions.’ Again, he portrayed the independent press as the sacrificial lamb of 
the forms and tensions of a society sick with injustice: the only one exercising 
its freedom to question this social order and the regime that sustains it.157
 
  
What really made the top generals nervous and motivated them to ask the 
politicians to curtail the independent press (Alternativa’s) was the widespread 
corruption that permeated the military. Undoubtedly, this was one of their weakest 
flanks. A series of three articles on contraband, a lucrative illegal business, linked the 
mafia, the political class, the armed forces and customs agents, who reaped huge 
profits out of the fees contrabandists paid to the officers in charge, much of which 
made its way to the top brass.158   
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The State of Siege was renovated with a new decree on August 6, just one 
year after President Lopez’s ascent to power. In its “Letter to the Reader” in issue 49, 
Alternativa reproduced an editorial written and signed by López in 1963, when he 
was the leader of the MRL, regarding the State of Siege. 
  
When citizens begin to be detained not for crimes but for suspicions, 
we are living in a state of emergency for individual liberties even more grave 
that the State of Siege itself. The dilemma is clear: either we live under a 
regime of prevention of liberties, which is fascism, or we live under a 
regime that represses violations to liberties on the part of delinquents, 
which is democracy. In this sense, Colombia does not live under a law 
abiding regime but a police regime. (In bold face in the original).159  
 
  
Now, this same president produced a decree, which according to the 
magazine, “violates the national constitution in almost all its articles.”160 It trampled 
with the principle of double jeopardy, judicial accumulation, the right to strike and 
the freedom of conscience and opinion.  
This decree was requested by the armed forces, in charge of preserving 
national security in the country’s territory, which produced a communiqué at the end 
of September amply criticized in the magazine. It was written by the commanders of 
the three branches (army, navy, air force) plus the chairman of the joint chiefs of 
staff, in solidarity with the defense minister, after the accusations against him leveled 
by the Alternativa. The answer from the magazine clearly stated the position 
regarding the implicit petition to apply authoritarian standards to it and even to close 
it in the name of a press “free but responsible.” The editorial pledged not to reveal its 
sources and noted that there were already laws in place such as the rights of 
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rectification and appeal to the Republic’s tribunals. It also issued a stinging rebuke to 
the system’s press.  
 
All of this, however, results less strange in view of the wave of support 
that the generals’ communiqué has produced among editorial writers of the 
big press editorial and among the traditional parties’ parliamentary fauna. It is 
a hysterical chorus of voices by those who have the pan by the panhandle and 
the country where it is now: immersed in the muck of moral corruption and 
social dissolution created by their own insatiable rapacity. It is significant that 
those voices are the ones that want to hide the reality: remove witnesses, 
destroy proofs, forbid analysis, and replace the legal investigation procedures 
with arbitrary and expedited methods of hiding. To cover up, and cover up 
with total tranquility, due to the fear of decomposition caused by their own 
hands, but which today overwhelms them; fear of the daily, ever more violent 




At closing time, the magazine received and published a response by the 
defense minister to his colleagues, thanking them in the name of the homeland and 
making ominous predictions. As the introduction to the general’s letter noted, he 
never filed the lawsuit he promised. Instead of using the regular channels to vent his 
complaints, the highest military authority in the country asked for legislation to 
silence critics under the State of Siege umbrella. A coalition of journalists’ 
organizations and a group of press writers made a similar point when, in a 
communiqué and a “Letter to Public Opinion,” they expressed their concern about the 
military’s pressures to impose censorship upon the leftist press, namely Alternativa. 
The latter reminded the generals that there were legal channels already in place and it 
was up to the judges of the Republic to issue sentences.162
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The politicians and the big press, unaccustomed to the challenging boldness of 
Alternativa, echoed the threats posed by the military through pronouncements and 
editorials. However, a drive-by shooting at the offices of Voz Proletaria, the 
Communist Party newspaper, and bomb explosions in front of the Soviet Embassy 
and in a downtown playhouse where a festival of Cuban cinema was taking place, 
increased the tension between the establishment and the left.  
 
The first bomb
On November 11, a bomb of regular explosive power went off in the offices of 
Alternativa, opening a big hole in the wall and causing considerable damage. 
Fortunately, the employees had already left and nobody was injured. Unlike the 
pronouncements by the military protesting against the magazine and the letters to the 
president asking for measures to curb its freedom to publish, echoed by politicians 
and the big press, this was an unambiguous direct hit on the publication. The 
government immediately announced an “exhaustive investigation,” a euphemism for 
measures that usually led nowhere. The bomb against Alternativa was followed five 
days later by another one against the installations of El Bogotano, an afternoon daily 
where Alternativa was printed, also critical of the government.  
The magazine took the attack in stride as a further challenge to its work, as 
expressed in the issue 60’s angry editorial, which circulated from November 17 to 24.  
 
To threats from the Minister of Government, the pressure by the 
generals to censor or close us, the permanent incitation of the big press, the 
missing ingredient has been added: the bombs. The chain of facts is clear. 
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That is why we are not surprised by the terrorist attempt against 
Alternativa.163   
 
As a member of the Editorial Committee, García Márquez used his well-
polished style to attribute the attack squarely to the state. Under the hading “Official 
terrorism,” he wrote: 
 
Our only enemy is the reaction, and that lives very well inside the 
system, and especially inside the high command of the armed forces, whose 
Supreme Commander, according to the Constitution, is the President of the 
Republic.  
This leads to thinking that the attempt against Alternativa is the work 
of professional dynamite handlers, whose mentality was revealed by the 
commanders of the three corps when they asked in a public and solemn 
document for the closing of this magazine, and whose doctrine was exposed 
by General Camacho Leyva in the gorilla witches Sabbath of Montevideo [a 
meeting of the continent’s top generals]. 
Only such specialists in the repressive science have the technical 
mastery, the political imbecility to honor us with a bomb of such high 
consecrating power. We know, of course, that inside the armed forces, there 
are other different tendencies, although devoid of hierarchic representation 
and of channels of public expression, and that only when they achieve their 
right to take initiatives and internal decision will it be possible to expect some 
relief in this climate of military barbarism.  
Meanwhile, our duty is to warn the public opinion in the sense that this 
attempt will not be the last, that there will be others against us and against our 
leftist organs and popular organizations, and that those attempts must be 
considered as simply acts of official terrorism.164
 
The magazine also printed several foreign messages, including one by then 
Secretary General of the French Socialist Party Francois Mitterand to President 
López:  
 
Mr. President. We just heard that the offices of the Colombian 
magazine Alternativa, whose director is Gabriel García Márquez, universally 
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admired author of “One Hundred Years of Solitude” has just been attacked 
with a bomb by an extreme right commando. Worried by the development of 
terrorism and violence, willing for the permanence of the basic rights of 
expression and cultural creation anywhere in the world, we call upon you with 
the hope that you wish to intervene to protect the existence of democratic 
freedoms and save the international prestige of your country.165
 
Mitterand and other foreign personalities’ letters signaled Gabriel García 
Márquez’ prestige and his presence on the magazine’s Editorial Board, as factors 
protecting its existence, although these could not stop terrorists from carrying out 
carefully planned bomb attacks destined to intimidate the staff. The article on page 
two hypothesized on who could have done such an act, and the conclusion was that 
the most probable culprits were paramilitary units, whose existence had been denied a 
few weeks before by General Jose Joaquín Matallana, the rising star of the military 
hierarchy. The magazine remarked that if  “There are no right-wing armed 
paramilitary commandos, elements able to execute such acts are only found within 
the State’s own secret services”.166  
This was the first time Alternativa mentioned paramilitaries, the scourge that 
plagued the country for the following decades. These paramilitary armies, which had 
always existed in one way or another at the service of right wing politicians, were the 
creation of drug dealers, landowners, cattle ranchers, politicians and the state’s secret 
services, and reached their maximum peak in the 1990s and in the first five years of 
the twenty-first century. In a premonitory paragraph, the magazine detailed the logic 
behind their creation in the Latin American context.  
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It is possible, as General Matallana affirms, that there are no right 
wing paramilitary groups in the country. How is it possible then that they are 
coming out now, or even acting in the shadows, without vindicating publicly 
their acts of fascist violence? In any of these eventualities, its is clear that this 
type of intimidating terrorism represents a call from the right to constitute 
action groups against the advancement of socialist thought and influence. And 
the growing, tragic Latin American experience in this regard (Argentinean 
“Triple A,” Guatemalan “White Hand,” Brazilian “Death Squads”) 
demonstrate to the utmost that these paramilitary or para-police commandoes 
operate in direct coordination with the official secret services.167
 
The following issue further elaborated on the role of the state’s secret 
services, in an insightful article analyzing their accountability to no one. The story 
called “Bombs and attempts. ¿Who controls the secret services?”168 did an inventory 
of the several secret bodies attached to the armed forces, the police and the 
government’s secret Service known as DAS. The article mentioned a rough 
communiqué printed by mimeograph, issued by Acción Antocomunista Colombiana 
(Colombian Anticommunist Action), which the magazine did not hesitate to call a 
“smoke screen that seeks to divert attention from the real authors of these attacks, and 
those responsible must be sought inside the State’s secret services”.169 By far the most 
secretive and powerful of those organizations was the Brigada de Inteligencia y 
Contrainteligencia, BINCI (Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade), attached 
to the army.   
The description of those secret organizations appeared in booklets given to 
journalists who were trained as “military correspondents by the armed forces.”170 The 
members of these units, unknown even to their fellow service members, trained for 
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years overseas, usually in the United States or in its bases in Panama. They were 
“hated and feared,” for one of their missions was to watch over their own people. 
They infiltrated organizations and could lay dormant for years before they became 
active. Because of their clandestine nature, they acted as loose canons, accountable to 
no authority and out of control. They watched not only those in the left but also 
politicians, who, from the President on down, had learned to be very careful when 
speaking on the phone. As to how sinister the role they played, “Hardly a week goes 
by when in any corner of the country a popular leader falls, a peasant is eliminated or 
detained under suspicion of being a ‘subversive liaison,’ an activist worker or a 
student leader falls.”171
 
Military justice: the Rincón Quiñones case.
While covert terrorist acts were taking place, the military was undergoing a transition, 
with the Minister of Defense and his entourage up for retirement. Rumors were flying 
as to how and when the change of guard was going to take place for a new batch of 
hawks.172) Army commander General Camacho Leyva, was campaigning for the job 
of Minister of Defense, which he eventually got.173
The responsibility entrusted on the armed forces by the politicians to enforce 
the laws and decrees issued under the State of Siege not only included combating 
insurgents in the field but also arresting and trying them it in a court martial called 
Verbal War Councils. At any given time, during the López government, several of 
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those were under way, always presided over by the military under their peculiar ideal 
of justice.  
 An egregious example among many, of this particular role, was the 
investigation and trial for the murder of General Ramón Arturo Rincon Quiñones on 
September 8, carried out by the ELN, a fact not known at the time and only revealed 
several years later. The military, in its quest for the culprits of the murder, arrested 
and accused three people who turned out to be innocent. One was a dentist, Germán 
Villamil García, of whom General Landazábal Reyes, the commander of the Military 
Institutes Brigade was said to have called “widely recognized as one of the four men 
who carried out the attempt against General Rincón…We have evidence about his 
participation.”174 As it turned out, however, at the time of the murder, Villamil had 
been under treatment at a psychiatric clinic, a fact corroborated by the physicians who 
attended him and the clinic personnel, 42 people, whose testimony the military 
tribunal judge refused to hear. Besides, there was physical evidence that the accused 
had been tortured while being interrogated in the military barracks and that the people 
in charge of trying him were obstructing some procedures.175  
 The military kept producing new suspects and adorning the process with new 
facts and theories. One of those theories was that the authors of the murder were 
common criminals hired by the ELN for $10,000 pesos each to execute the general. 
This theory was ridiculed in the magazine. “On the other hand, is hard to imagine that 
common criminals, who already have enough problems with DAS and F-2, are going 
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to kill a general of the Republic for the amount of $10,000. This is perfectly 
ludicrous.”176
The trial of those accused of the murder of General Rincón Quiñones became 
a showcase of how the armed forces administered justice under the State of Siege. 
“Actual authors that become conspirators, arrested people who confess, recant and 
confess again, suicide attempts that become escape attempts, bribes to witnesses, are 
some of the numerous irregularities that have characterized this singular process”.177
In this stage of the process, the magazine predicted that the suit against the 
men would be dismissed. But the magazine was wrong. In a verdict pronounced on 
January 23, 1976, four of the accused were found guilty. This was shocking for the 
defense of the accused simply had demolished the accusers and their witnesses in the 
stands.  
 
Presuming that ordinary justice will be in charge of amending the 
unbelievable aberrations of this process, the Olympic disregard by the military 
penal justice of the most elementary norms of the law, seems both significant 
and illustrative. Its capacity to condemn coolly, deliberately and consciously, 
people who have nothing to do with the crimes they are accused of. People 
who could be common delinquents, con artists or gamblers—as some of the 
condemned seem to be—but who according to the objective development of 
the process had no relation whatsoever with the attempt against General 
Rincón Quiñones. Those against whom the most fantastic spider web of 
accusations was fabricated were just sacrificial lambs with the only purpose of 
justifying the arbitrariness of an investigation and of a trial that never should 




The remarkable aspect of the whole situation, after the detailed description of 
witnesses and the accused, the enormous gaps in the testimonies and the baseless 
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accusations, was to hold up military justice at its worst in broad daylight for 
everybody to see. After the attempt against the magazine, the changes taking place in 
the armed forces and pressures to censure Alternativa, the account of the trial placed 
the magazine not only on the side of the truth, but of justice as well.  
Three of the accused were sentenced to 24 years in prison and one of them to 
28 years, to be served in the notoriously harsh penitentiary of La Gorgona, a small 
island located several hundred miles off Colombia’s Pacific coast. One month later, 
the ELN, through a communiqué published in Alternativa, acknowledged that it had 
executed the General for past war crimes committed against the people, and declared 
that all those condemned by the crime were innocent.  
In the final chapter in the case, one year after the murder of the General, a 
prosecutor in a Circuit Court in Bogotá demolished the case in a 61-page argument. 
He recommended that the sentences be revoked considering that none of them were 
adjusted to reality of the process, due to the way in which the testimonies were 
manipulated and the most elementary norms of penal procedures were violated. Other 
trials held under military authorities were annulled, including the so-called “Century 
War Council” where more that 200 people accused of belonging to ELN were tried 
and convicted in a legislative charade similar to the one that tried those accused of the 
murder of General Quiñones.  
While the spectacle of the military tribunals under the State of Siege was 
underway, another scandal hit the armed forces. In its “Letter to the Reader” the 
magazine reminded its readers of the context of the information that it carried in its 




The commanders in chief of the three branches went with martial step 
to demand from the President the closing of this magazine. The President did 
not do it but since then he does not stop repeating in a complaining tone that 
honor tribunals for journalists be invented so those things do not happen 
again. Then bombs began to explode at our doorstep. General Rincón 
Quiñones, exercising its role as Inspector General, started an investigation of 
the rotten things that existed among some members of the armed forces. He 
died. The papers in his files disappeared like an act of magic. The Verbal 
Council that sent four innocents to La Gorgona for one hundred years in total, 
began. And to those who denounced the inequity in that process, the 
commander in chief of the army answered that the institution did not need to 
resort to novelistic or comedy methods to eliminate its enemies.179  
 
 
 An investigation revealed in the United States Congress showed some $22 
million dollars in bribes had been spread by the multinational Lockheed Corporation 
in many countries, including Colombia. The issue went back to 1968 when the Fuerza 
Aérea Colombiana, FAC (Colombian Air Force) bought several Hercules planes. 
According to documents published in the Mexican daily Excelsior and in The New 
York Times, the equipment bought under special “needs of internal security,” 
bypassed the regulation for such purchases with only a quick technical study. The 
magazine quoted a letter sent by representatives of Lockheed in Colombia. “(A 
general) has decided to reach an agreement with us for this year for his own benefit. 
To this end, he asked a Colonel to revise the study so (the Colonel) can add some 
points to prove the need to buy more products.”180 The general in question was then 
Commander of FAC, Major General Armando Urrego Bernal, whose name figured in 
the documents revealed in the U.S. Congress. As expected, he denied any 
misconduct, arguing that his conversations and deals were strictly “technical” in 
nature.  
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 The next commander in the FAC, General José Ramón Calderón Molano, also 
appeared in the correspondence between Washington and Bogotá regarding the 
Loockheed business, as well as the Defense Minister in the Pastrana administration, 
General Hernando Currea Cubides. Alternativa quoted The New York Times: “A letter 
partly coded from the Lockheed agents in Colombia, Impex Ltda., shows what the 
members of the subcommittee feared. That is, that in some cases military from other 
countries bought North American equipment even though it wasn’t needed in their 
countries in order to pocket the commission.”181
 As usual, the President ordered an “exhaustive investigation on the issue,” not 
without defending the honor of the armed forces first. Alternativa, however, did not 
let go and was able to report in future issues on the impunity which the scandal 
enjoyed in Colombia, while in other countries it toppled governments and led to 
prosecutions. Similar situations were presumed to have happened with juicy 
acquisitions such as the purchase of eight French Mirage planes, German submarines 
and G-3 rifles, “all negotiations surrounded by tons of ‘sugar’ (a name used by the 
Lockheed agents to mean bribes).”182  
 A further analysis noted how the issue had been handled very carefully given 
the less than flattering image the armed forces was projecting at the time. “Even 
though just one sector is implicated, it has been presented as if ‘civilians’ have 
conspired to demerit the armed institution, causing it ‘to close ranks’ against the 
                                                 




external attacks and diluting in solidarity of corps, the needed investigations and 
depurations to which the revealed irregularities should lead.”183  
 In this crises management endeavor, the system’s press collaborated by 
relegating the issues to the inner pages and, as Alternativa said, “their information 
about the issue contains more absolutory articles than real journalistic 
investigations.”184 It seemed that in this case, whatever actions were taken happened 
because of the pressure exerted from abroad, particularly from the United States 
Congress, bent on investigating the issues and seeing action in the corresponding 
countries. On the same token, most of the information on the issues was generated in 
foreign media, particularly in The New York Times and in Time, which reported on a 
similar case about the purchase of defective German rifles.   
 In July, six months after the scandal broke out, the magazine went back to 
Lockheed, if only to remind its readers that nothing had happened, despite 
overwhelming indications of wrongdoing and the President’s promise of an 
exhaustive investigation. It also pointed out that the current commander of the Air 
Force, General Federico Rincón Puentes, was mentioned in the original documents 
sent from the United States and filtered to the journalists of El Espectador, which 
revealed it. Other details of the scandal began to trickle down, thanks mainly to 
publications in the international press. It seems that the irregularities went back as far 
as 1964, when other technical and scientific equipment was acquired. In any case, 
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whatever the crimes committed, any legal action was no longer possible according to 
the law, by the time of the revelations.185  
The final installment on the corruption inside the Air Force came in issue 110. 
The report noted how the armed forces had become “a loose canon” inside the 
government, doing what they pleased without much interference from the head of the 
executive power and the nominal commander. The lack of progress in the Lockheed 
investigation, fully nine months after the scandal broke out, was the confirmation of 
Alternativa’s pessimism on the outcome. The clearest indication that nothing would 
happen was the appointment of General Alfonso Rodríguez Rubiano, as the new 
commander of the Air Force. As it turned out, Alternativa published in the same issue 
a letter sent by the lawyers of the defendants in the Rincón Quiñones case to a 
magistrate reviewing the case, which reached the president’s desk. In the letter, the 
lawyers made grave accusations against Rodríguez Rubiano, serious enough to order 
yet another “exhaustive investigation” on the issue, exactly on the same day the 
president signed the decree promoting the alleged culprit to the top job at the Air 
Force. He had ignored serious charges that went from taking a cut in the purchase of 
Mirage and  Hercules planes, to setting up a phantom firm for the overhaul of the said 
Hercules planes, with $1.000,000 dollars “lost” in the transaction, and the purchase of 
four AVRO planes and a presidential plane, which ended up costing much more than 
expected, among other irregularities.186 It was General Rodríguez Rubiano who 
entered the office of General Rincón after he was murdered and withdrew documents 
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and papers related to the officer’s investigations, including shady deals of the Air 
Force through its procurement office in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.   
 As for an explanation of the President’s lenient behavior, the magazine 
advanced the hypotheses that he too knew what was going on but didn’t care to press 
the issue under the pretext of the tradition that let the military “suggest” their own 
course of affairs. Instead of being questioned for the issues such as human rights 
abuses or the corruption in their midst, it said, the armed forces kept receiving the 
support of the government. This in a way fueled again rumors of a coup, given the 
boldness of the military to act by themselves, hardly bothering to consult the 
President in issues such as the invasion of Universidad Nacional, an order given by 
General Camacho Leyva, apparently without the president’s knowledge.  
 
The truth is that the coup has been staged little by little from a few 
months ago. The military began by taking over the administration of justice, 
with the pretext to pursue the mafias. From there they jumped into the terrain 
of labor conflicts, which today are solved by verbal War Councils. They 
invaded then the field of education by occupying the university and proposing, 
magnanimously, the creation of another to replace it, military of course, 
giving access to those students evicted from their own schools by force of 
arms. They occupied the Public Ministry by burying the investigations on the 
Lockheed bribes, in which (according to the gringo Senate) some of our 
generals are implicated. For a moment, they even had in their hands the Civil 
Aeronautics, which they let go by the carelessness of General Matallana. But 
that was just an unimportant glitch in a triumphal campaign.187  
 
 
The second crises 
Unlike the first crises in Alternativa, which blew open and became a public affair for 
everyone to see, the second one, by design of its own participants, remained strictly in 
house. The first salvo of the crisis in the magazine appeared as a clarification note, 
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which surprised more than one, in issue 78. It was called “About an introduction”188 
in the lower page of an in-house ad announcing the publication of the third in the 
series Cuadernos de Alternativa (Alternativa Notebooks), written by Cristina de la 
Torre, Bernardo García’s companion and a member of the Editorial Board. The note 
said:  
 
The undersigners,  members of Alternativa’s Editorial Commitee, 
manifest not to be in agreement with the content of the introduction to 
Notebook No. 3 of Alternativa (“In the Liberal Conservative Crises: Colombia 
in the path to socialism”) which just appeared.  
We particularly disagree with calling the Union Revolucionaria 
Socialista, URS  (Socialist Revolutionary Union) one of the “three main 
forces” in the revolutionary camp and the classification made of this group as 
“the most ideologically solid organization facing national problems and the 
one with the greatest political initiative within the new Colombian left.” 
These affirmations must be understood as the personal opinion of the 
person who wrote and signed such an introduction to the Notebook, the 
comrade Bernardo García, but in no case as the position of this magazine, nor 
that of the majority of the Editorial Committee. 189
 
The note was signed by Caballero, Kataraín, Melo,  Restrepo, M. T. de 
Santos,  Santos Calderón and Segura, that is, all the members of the Editorial 
Committee except García and de la Torre, and García Márquez who was out of the 
country.  
Both the note and the clarification illustrated differences within the magazine 
since the bitter times of the rupture with La Rosca. It showed a prominent member of 
the Editorial Committee adopting an openly partisan political position and using one 
publication printed under the magazine’s name to espouse it. This was an open break 
with the traditional independency and neutrality of the magazine toward the left, and 
                                                 




with the principles invoked against La Rosca and the attempt to co-opt the magazine 
for a particular political movement.   
The writers expressed disagreement with the political premises that the 
introduction to the Notebook presented. Even though the Notebook carried articles 
from some the main exponents of the left (voices of Socialist Block, Proletarian Line, 
MOIR, Communist Party, Tendencia ML and Union R.S.) the introduction openly 
sided with the latter, a small Trotskyite party which, according to García, represented 
nothing less that the vanguard of the so-called New Left in Colombia.  
While at the time all the members of the Editorial Committee, with the noted 
exceptions, signed the note, eventually two distinct and irreconcilable camps began to 
form. On one side were those who wanted the magazine to be more open in 
expressing divergent points of view within the Editorial Committee. They included, 
besides García, Kataraín, Segura and de la Torre. In the other camp were those who 
wanted the magazine to remain neutral and independent, conserving one unified 
position for the readers and the rest of the left. They were headed by Santos Calderón 
and included his wife María Teresa, Caballero and Restrepo. Héctor Melo withdrew 
from the magazine and the Editorial Committee. The big unknown, and the one 
partner and member of the Editorial Committee who could not be sidelined, however 
distant, was García Márquez, who at the time was traveling abroad. At the end, as in 
the first crises, both sides ended up appealing to him to decide the issue. 
In the following issue, under the same clarification note that appeared in the 
previous one, García explained his thoughts on the new realities of the country in a 
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signed note called “The New Left.”190 After arguing his points, he endorsed the three 
political strategies of the Socialist Revolutionary Union: 1. A unitary union 
federation; 2. Creation of a party nucleus by calling upon several organizations of the 
left to meet and discuss their policies; 3. A call for a unity of action to confront the 
regime’s repression. The note ended with a defense of his point of view regarding the 
magazine.  
 
The practical conclusion is that obviously, what was signed in the 
magazine—such as this commentary—does not have to commit its whole 
editorial team. But it also is evident, that what many of our readers call 
“lurches” or “incongruence” by Alternativa are nothing more that the true 
reflection of the discrepancies (without responsible signature) which have 
existed forever within us. Our will to lend a positive service to the 
revolutionary cause, based on the four programmatic points with which the 
magazine was born, discarded beforehand the possibility to create a political 
group. But Alternativa keeps being an example of unity of action.191
 
This was the first time a member of the Editorial Committee, other than 
García Márquez, had explained his position on a political issue regarding the 
magazine, supported by his own signature. It was also the official inauguration of the 
opinion section in the magazine, thus far only expressed through the monolithic 
“Letter to the Reader.” Eventually, the opinion space led to contributions by noted 
leftist intellectuals with their own signed columns in the third part of the magazine’s 
history. At the heart of Garcia’s position was what he believed to be the need for the 
magazine to open up its pages to individual opinions, including his own and those of 
the Editorial Committee members. 
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On the following issue, García drove the point further, writing again under his 
own name an article analyzing how the political left identified with foreign parties 
had its hands tied by following doctrines and dogmas that had little to do with the 
reality of the country. “Neither in the terrain of abstention, nor in the elections, nor in 
the grouping of union organizations, nor in the cohesion of an intellectual front and 
much less in the articulation of revolutionary forces, can the Colombian left deceive 
itself.” 192  
His sympathy for the Colombian way to socialism was well known by 
everybody, since the polemic aired in the magazine about García Márquez’ militancy 
in Venezuela’s MAS. What the other group did not agree with was turning the 
magazine into the advocate of such an interpretation, thus renouncing the bigger role 
of propitiating the unity of the left. Nor did they agree with the idea of having the 
members of the Editorial Committee using the magazine to promote their own ideas 
and those of the political groups they identified with. 
By pressing the issue and writing two opinion pieces in a row, under his own 
name, García forced a confrontation that would inevitably lead to yet another breakup 
in the magazine’s team. While both the note by the Editorial Committee and García’s 
opinion pieces offered the readers a rare glimpse of the argument in the pages of the 
magazine, the real confrontation was taking place internally, in the partners’ meetings 
and in the newsroom. 
The minutes of those meetings tell how the acrid confrontation inside the 
group concerned the same issue discussed during the first weeks of the magazine, 
when Fals Borda’s team was still on board, on the question of left’s participation in 
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the elections and whether to vote or not to vote. While the discussion by itself did not 
lead to the breakup, if helped to define the two camps into which the magazine would 
divide itself in the near future. 
On the position of the magazine regarding the participation in the upcoming 
mid-term elections to be held in April, 1976, all the members of the Editorial 
Committee expressed their opinions. The issue of the bylines in the articles was 
brought forth for the first time at the October 20, 1975 meeting. To sign or not to sign 
would be the main point of contention in the discussions held in April and May of the 
next year. According to the minutes,  
 
 
After a lengthy discussion, the policy of not signing articles is 
reaffirmed. In special cases, the possibility to sign and to disagree will be 
discussed. If the majority of the committee agrees with the analysis of the 
article, it is not necessary to sign it. After this point, García left the meeting.193
 
  
During the meeting held on January 17, 1976 the election’s issue was treated 
again in extenso. New clarifications were made as to the magazine’s position 
regarding the upcoming elections.  Those in attendance agreed that certain themes in 
the magazine would be carefully discussed and evaluated before publication. They 
included the hot topics of the military and the mafia, as well as the issues of ANUC 
and ANAPO. Regarding the editorial policy, the discussion, as relied in the minutes, 
was poignant for it showed that the disagreement existing inside the Committee had a 
deep political undertone. Finally, it agreed to publish both positions regarding the 
elections, one for participating (García’s group) and the other for abstaining (Santos’ 
                                                 
193 Seventh Minute. Partner’s Board Meeting. October 20, 1975. Handwritten. Personal file. 
 186 
 
group) in a “Letter to the Reader” containing three elements: points of agreement, 
points of disagreement, and a statement on the information policy of the magazine. 194  
 The crises blew open on May 4, 1976. After proposing a closer relationship 
between Daniel Samper and Juan Fernando Cobo Borda with the magazine, and 
turning the economy section into snippets, García formally introduced his proposal, 
after publishing the two signed articles mentioned above, plus the introduction to the 
Notebooks that merited the disclaimer by the majority of the Editorial Board. The 
minutes of the board said:  
 
Bernardo García proposes to discuss the editorial policy of the 
magazine with groups from the left in Monday’s newsroom council and to air 
their points of view in signed opinion columns. He is willing to open the 
pages of the magazine to progressive Liberalism sectors and even 
Conservatives (revise point 4 of the magazine’s statute).195
 
 
 There was a difference between discussing current issues with personalities 
from the left for journalistic purposes, which the magazine did from the beginning, 
and inviting people, including progressive Liberals and Conservatives, to talk about 
the magazine itself, thus opening its editorial policy to more or less anybody who 
cared, and was in a position, to express an opinion. To call upon representatives of the 
bourgeois parties to come into the magazine was especially problematic given the 
discussions held before on the participation in elections, which showed the deep 
distrust in the system’s parties.  The minutes continued: 
 
In general the proposal (Garcia’s) will be the following:  
a) To open the pages of the magazine to Liberal and Conservative sectors 
to help with the unity of the left. 
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b) Open opinion columns for both the members of the Editorial 
Committee and for people from outside the magazine.196 
 
It was then up to Santos, the seasoned journalist in the group, to lead the 
opposition to García’s proposals. He did not agree on opening columns for members 
of the Editorial Committee, nor to progressive Liberals and Conservatives who 
already had the big press’ support.  
At the end, as with the issue of the magazine’s position toward voting or not, 
there was no agreement on columns for Editorial Committee members, although 
columns for contributors from the left were not out of the question. Finally, Caballero 
proposed to freeze the issue pending a discussion with García Márquez and to consult 
the readers through a questionnaire.   
Once García made his proposals at the Editorial Committee, which that 
particular day met for six hours, all the cards were on the table. The next round of 
discussions was on May 17, when the members of the editorial committee finally 
agreed on having a “civilized breakup” of the magazine, while at the same time 
consulting the absent García Márquez on the issue. After considering Héctor Melo’s 
request for a leave of absence, the group moved to read the letters sent by each group 
to the other, detailing their positions on the issue. 
The first letter addressed to Caballero, Restrepo, Santos, was sent by García, 
de la Torre, Kataraín and Segura on May 6, after the consideration of any decision 
had been postponed. It basically repeated their arguments and again explained in 
detail the group’s position.197  
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Several conclusions could be drawn from this letter. B. García and his partners 
knew that there were political discrepancies among those working on the magazine 
although it was not apparent from his letter or from the pronouncements of the other 
members of the Editorial Committee what those differences with the other group 
were. The only recorded discrepancies had to do with the discussions on the issue of 
voting or abstaining, but it wasn’t clear from them which people sided with one group 
or the other. He was obviously concerned that those political differences would be 
expressed in the choice of editorial content in the magazine and biased its point of 
view. His idea was that in such a case it was better if the magazine became an all-out 
opinion publication, perhaps giving up the pretense of informing and counter 
informing as it had been doing with such effectiveness about the armed forces and 
right-wing politicians who at the time were calling for laws to control the publication 
or close it. The idea that it was possible to inform more objectively when there was 
the chance to express personal opinions, was certainly a novel one, which not only 
contradicted the whole ideal of objective journalism, but also proposed a new 
threshold for analysis and interpretation, which the magazine had been doing from the 
beginning from a leftist perspective. Finally, the group genuinely believed, based on 
their interpretation of the current reality, that the magazine was being called on to 
play a more important role in the dynamic generated by the URS in terms of the 
consolidation of a party nucleus to lead a revolutionary movement based on an 
indigenous-based socialist ideal by  connecting the magazine more closely with the 
left and energizing the political debate. 
 




The undated answer, in the form of a letter directed to the signers of the 
previous communication, left little room for compromise. The Santos’ group letter,198 
written by Santos himself, demolished all the arguments on the other side, and 
unmasked the true motive behind the rebellion: to espouse a particular point of view 
from the left, and one that had no widespread acceptance to boot. It also attacked two 
of the main points of the other side’s position: to write individual opinion columns 
and to open the magazine pages to progressive Liberals and Conservatives, a posture 
that was anathema in many leftist political circles. In this regard, Santos’ position was 
based on the same principles with which the magazine had forced the La Rosca group 
out: to maintain the neutrality and independence toward the left, while pounding at 
the right and the establishment without remorse or mercy.  
This was the journalistic posture dictated by the need to survive at a time 
when the magazine was in the midst of a bitter struggle with the military and the 
establishment and was just recovering from two bomb attempts, one against the 
magazine itself and another one placed at Santos’ house. A slackening on its 
principles would only weaken it at the time when it needed to be stronger.  
Both letters were read at the Partner’s Board Meeting, which, for all practical 
purposes, was the Editorial Committee, and it was decided to publish them as part of 
the consultation mechanism with the readers. The argument continued, with García 
accusing the other side of Mccarthyism. Finally, after a long debate, Kataraín offered 
a final diagnostic to the effect that the problems were too deep to resolve and that is 
was time to begin preparing the breakup. “He affirms that he, as the legal 
representative of the Foundation, will advise a civilized breakup and an amicable 
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liquidation and in case of a public fight he will not take sides for any of the 
groups.”199
Two things everybody agreed on was not to repeat the bitter, public fighting 
experience with La Rosa, which had its defining moment exactly one year and six 
months before to the day; and that the breakup was inevitable. Kataraín also 
suggested several ways to solve the problem including some impractical solutions 
such as to divide each issue in two 16-page parts, for each side to publish its own 
articles or to alternate magazines every week.  
Two more board meetings were held afterwards (there are no more minutes) 
without mentioning the issue of the breakup again nor was it mentioned in the pages 
of the magazine. And in the issue 103, exactly two years after the breakup with La 
Rosa and Fals Borda, the names of the researchers and intellectuals who had made up 
one of the three currents that founded the magazine, disappeared from the masthead. 
The parting agreement left García, Kataraín and his group with El Zancudo 
distributor and Editorial Oveja Negra, the book publisher. To sweeten the deal, 
García Márquez threw in the exclusive rights to Oveja Negra for the publication of 
his works in Colombia, a juicy contribution since his works sold by the hundreds of 
thousands and even more when he was awarded the Nobel Price in 1982. 
In a six-page letter to García Márquez, dated May 23, 1976, Enrique Santos 
explained to the final arbiter his own interpretation of the matter. The letter was by 
itself a primer of Santos’ thoughts on the nature of the type of journalism Alternativa 
was doing and its envisioned role in Colombia’s society. According to him, the leit 
                                                 





motiv of the dispute was the pretended imposition by García of opinion columns, 
which in his mind would change “the whole spirit of Alternativa.”200   
 
We (Antonio, Jorge, Melo, María Teresa and I) know that in the 
current conditions of internal tension and face-offs it is tough to continue 
working together, but we oppose emphatically any attempt to liquidate 
Alternativa. They want control and imposition of their points of view, or 
liquidation. We oppose any dissolution of the magazine and any ‘tyranny of 
the minority.’201  
 
Santos believed that the original ideas the inspired Alternativa were still in full 
force, especially in the political context of the country. He told García Márquez how, 
behind the idea of opening up the magazine to personal opinions, was the promotion 
of the particular point of view of the URS.  
 
It is about giving an opinion and impulse in a progressive and 
determined political line. They, especially Cristina and Bernardo, are clearly 
inside a specific political project, which they call the “new left” and which is 
nothing less that URS. It is not necessarily a matter of militancy, or having or 
not having an ID card. The issue is the political identification with that 
group—which is perfectly respectable—whose line and analysis of the 
nation’s reality they seek to impose at all costs in the magazine, which is 
perfectly unacceptable.202
 
At the end, Santos argued anew against the liquidation of the magazine, 
outlining his view of the role it was playing in Colombia’s political landscape at the 
time. Finally, Santos acknowledged García Márquez’ determining role in the crises 
junctures of the magazine.  
 
You seem destined to preside on the high moments of the successive 
crises of Alternativa. We know, however, that this one will have a different 
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development and outcome. In any case, we don’t have to see it only in the 
perspective that all that divides is bad, but that it also reflects a process of 
inevitable qualification and differentiation in work groups which, for diverse 
circumstances, do nor see fit to continue together.203
 
A pause to reflect 
In December, 1976, the makers of the magazine, now without García and his group, 
decided that a new period of reflection and reorganization was at hand. The last 14 
months, with a run of 79 weekly issues, had been journalistically, politically and 
financially trying. The reasons for the pause were given in a “Latter to the Reader” in 
issue 111, the last of the second stage. 204
These political, journalistic and economic issues formed the triad of 
circumstances that forced the magazine to stop publishing for four long months, until 
April of 1977, when it reappeared with a new and younger journalistic team. The 
magazine did not go out without a bang, however. The last issue of 1976 was a 40-
page publication, an unheard of number of pages. It was a review issue of the 
country’s political landscape in which the magazine had played a substantial role and 
made a sizeable impact on its readers and in the country as a whole, judging by the 
agitated confrontations with the government and the armed forces narrated here. It 
also provided the context to understand the circumstances of the pause. 
The magazine spoke out against the López administration that had unleashed 
repression against the popular struggles, expressed in two successive declarations of 
the State of Siege, the country’s equivalent of martial law. All of this came while the 
country was immersed in an unstoppable orgy of corruption , with the hands of the 
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political class and the military tied to those of the nascent mafias of the cocaine and 
marijuana traffic, and the old ones of contraband and the sacking of the public 
treasure, among others. Particularly glaring were the scandals surrounding the armed 
forces and the police, with the Lockheed bribes taking center stage. No less 
important, was the dance of millions at the Coffee Federation, which Alternativa 
treated extensively in a series of reports that showed, as never before, how that 
political class allied with exporters and financiers used the government as a cash 
machine. Corruption touched practically everybody in power, including the Catholic 
Church and Congress, while the big press did little to uncover the events in what 
Alternativa called “A stinking year.”205  
The State of Siege marked the popular struggle through decrees issued by the 
government to repress the popular movements and by legislation created to favor big 
capital. The workers mobilized for better salaries, to force the companies to fulfill 
their obligations and commitments and to support other movements. The continued 
rise in the cost of living forced many unions to fight just to keep up with inflation. 
The peak of the worker’s movement took place before April midterm elections but 
decreased afterwards. In some strikes such as those of Riopaila, Vanytex and the bank 
clerks, they were defeated, not just by the government, by also by improvisation and 
mistakes made by their leaders and the appalling lack of solidarity from the left, 
whose political organizations seem to have been too busy talking about the unity of 
the working class to take action. Also noticeable was the reduction in the activities of 
the peasants and their organizations, showing the effectiveness of the harsh repression 
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orchestrated by the minister of government with the help of the military and the 
police.206  
Such was the panorama when Alternativa let the scene at the end of 1976.  
 
                                                 




Chapter 7: The left and the third stage 
 
My personal experience with Alternativa began while working at El Zancudo, part of 
the chain of bookstores that Alternativa had created in order to distribute leftist books 
and publications.  El Zancudo and Editorial Oveja Negra had the exclusive rights to 
distribute and publish García Márquez books in Colombia. I was also taking 
communication and journalism classes as part of my undergraduate studies at 
Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. 
 My first contact in the magazine was with Antonio Caballero, who asked me 
to write “something,” to be able to assess my reporting and writing abilities. I did a 
research paper on Chingaza, a big water project built to bring drinking water to 
Bogotá, which was a city of three million people at the time. As was the case with 
most government infrastructure projects, this one was rife with delays, corruption and 
irregularities. Upon returning the paper, Caballero told me I had good writing abilities 
and asked me to write another one, this time on an international subject. When I 
returned to Alternativa with the second paper, Caballero was out and I was received 
by Jorge Restrepo, third in command, who dismissed me with the customary “we will 
call you.” As I was leaving I met Hernando Corral, a former union leader at Banco 
Popular when I had worked there, and with whom I had participated actively in the 
strike at the end of 1974 (which we won, by the way). Corral introduced me to 
Enrique Santos, who right there and then invited me to come to the next “writers’ 
council” as the newsroom’s planning meetings were called. Only later, I realized I 
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had been hired, albeit on a trial basis, to work for the hottest magazine in the country, 
to write under the editorship of Antonio Caballero of the international section. 
Caballero, who was born in Bogotá in 1945, had lived in Spain, England, 
Italy, Greece and France where he had studied Political Sciences. He came into the 
magazine at the end of 1979, after the breakup with Fals and La Rosca. One of 
Caballero’s greatest talents was his work as a caricaturist, and many of his cartoons 
made their way into the magazine, including those featuring El Señor Agente (Mr. 
policeman) character, a comic strip which appeared regularly in the pages of the 
magazine during the second and first stages. 
 Like Caballero, Corral had arrived at the magazine “by sheer chance,” as he 
put it, after the breakup with Fals and Rosca. He had been an ELN sympathizer, part 
of the urban network of people close to the guerrilla movement, and had already spent 
six months in jail for his political activities in 1970. Corral met Santos for the first 
time when he went as the union representative to the Solidarity Committee with 
Political Prisoners in 1973, and had no idea he was to become a journalist, much less 
a staff member of Alternativa. Corral was fired from the bank in 1976, after a failed 
strike, and when he came to Alternativa, Santos proposed that he write for the 
magazine covering working unions, peasants and Indian’s issues. Corral’s only 
experience at the time had been writing for the union paper La Verdad (The truth). 
  
The version we had of the breakup with La Rosca was that M-19 
wanted to take over the magazine. One day we met Enrique Santos, who at the 
time was cooperating with an ELN network as a sympathizer, and he told us 
how one day, after he was leaving the magazine, his car was intercepted by a 
jeep with armed people inside who threatened him because he had not 
accepted M-19 pretensions. One of our comrades at ELN, a network 
coordinator, spoke to M-19 about it and told them Santos was our friend and 
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not to mess with him and the threats stopped. I came to Alternativa, more than 
a journalist, which I wasn’t, as an ELN quota at the time. I understood my job 
there as a political one.207
  
 
In this, the last chapter of its life, the magazine adopted an openly critical 
position toward the left while remaining committed to a leftist interpretation of reality 
and to its journalistic identity. Gradually the publication pressed the issue of the unity 
against the State, abandoning for all practical purposes its past abstention position and 
identifying with a particular formula for achieving lasting change in the country. This 
included the creation of a wide movement bent on achieving power at least in the 
electoral field where the left had suffered so many defeats, based on Colombian-style 
socialism with definite nationalistic undertones.  And when the pressure to have one 
single candidate from the left to face the candidates from the main political parties did 
not bear fruit, due to the stubborn position of the main groups which professed 
allegiance with foreign doctrines, the magazine definitely abandoned its neutrality 
and independence and created its own political movement. In this way, the magazine 
remained committed to the unity of the left, but now from its own political standpoint, 
rather than by just opening the pages of the publication to the opinions of the 
opposition leaders.  
Thus, the magazine abandoned the formula that had brought it to this point. 
Furthermore, during the third stage, Santos’ group and a reorganized staff excelled in 
counter informing, doing investigation, analysis and interpretation, and divulging the 
struggles of the left. It was in fact, the golden age of Alternativa’s journalism, with a 
definite style and a profusion of themes treated by a dedicated and unified journalistic 
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staff. Only, after its own movement was born, the presence of the rest of leftist ideas 
in the pages of the magazine became marginal and kept to a minimum, referred to 
only when they had to do with the strategies and objectives of Alternativa’s political 
creation.   
 What follows is an account of the final relationship of the magazine with the 
left, legal and armed, which eventually led to the publication’s demise. 
 
The criticism of the left 
When Alternativa appeared again in May 2 1976, its tone was different. The upbeat 
assessments on the imminence of a general uprising in Colombia, the war-like 
declarations over the socialist revolution based on a proletarian party, the dogmatic 
appeals to the great thinkers such as Marx, Lenin, Mao and Ché Guevara, were gone. 
Now the tone regarding the left was more pessimistic, reflecting the assessment made 
by the staff during the four months it stopped publishing. In its first “Letter to the 
Reader,” the magazine expressed its preoccupation over the impotence of the left to 
take advantage of the explosive situation of the country, which implicitly 
acknowledged its own failure to carry out one of its stated goals, and one of the four 
reasons given for its existence. 
 
 This apparent incapacity of the left to take advantage of junctures such 
as the current one—that usually take it by surprise—to win space and political 
credibility, overcoming incomprehensible discrepancies for the big 
conglomerate of Colombians, is an issue that must provoke a deep uneasiness 
and which Alternativa intends to address in a permanent way in this new 
stage. 208  
 
                                                 




 This new critical posture toward the left, and the promise to keep it up in the 
magazine, would be the key to its development, both as a journalistic enterprise and 
as a political actor in the country, throughout its last stage. Just as in the first two 
crises, the position toward the left was the determining factor that led the magazine to 
evolve and change.   
 In an inside article, the leadership of the magazine went over the route already 
traveled, affirming its principles but also vindicating the furnishing of information as 
its main contribution to the process of social change in Colombia. It implicitly 
reaffirmed confidence in the power of the truth to instill in the political left the 
wherewithal needed to carry out social change. This was the magazine’s clearest 
mission and goal statement after critical and self-critical assessments following the 
breakup with Rosca. On balance, it gave itself credit for raising the political 
consciousness of a segment of the population through information on the regime and 
its handling of the country; by helping the left assume positions on concrete problems 
of the immediate political struggle; and by contributing to the debate among the left 
while avoiding traditional dogmatism and sectarianism.209 Finally, while 
demonstrating that a truly alternative, leftist and mass-oriented press was possible, it 
recognized the true goal, revolutionary power, was still far away, mainly due to the 
incapacity of the left to overcome its dispersion.  
The operating word, however, was “critical,” the term the magazine decided 
to emphasize in its new stage by adopting a tougher posture toward the left, most 
probably influenced by its experience with the two groups of partners who left after 
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attempting to impose or propose their own brand of revolutionary truth. To be sure, 
the magazine restated its principles by condensing them in two objectives. 
 
Within this perspective, the first objective of Alternativa is to inform 
(in bold in the original) based on more realistic and rigorous sources and 
documents and with the indispensable journalistic criteria to reach the largest 
possible number of people. To win ever more readers for this magazine is a 
vital need. Our main contribution is the detailed information, the juncture’s 
analysis, showing the purposes of the different parties, denouncing the 
maneuvers of the oligarchic groups, unveiling the diverse forms of 
imperialism penetration and trying to explain how the economic tendencies 
affect the living conditions of popular masses. Here we join the diffusion of its 




 The pledge “to inform,” as the main goal of the magazine, using journalistic 
criteria based on a more rigorous treatment of documents and sources and the 
commitment to what it thought to be objective analysis of the country, was an 
improvement over the almost casual way the magazine had handled its content. By 
uniting the investigative, interpretive and analytical aspects, the magazine recognized 
that it no longer was enough if the participants were workers or leftist militants, still 
there had to be a measure of facts involved in the information, more important than 
the political content or message of the struggle itself.  
 The second objective signaled that despite becoming more journalistic, the 
magazine did not give up its place and role inside the left, nor its political ideology 
and allegiances.  
 
The information—so treated—links us to our second goal, which has 
been shown to be infinitely more complex, to contribute to the unity of the 
left (in bold in the original) around proposals answering to the real needs of 
the Colombian people. This presupposes, among other things, to reject 
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traditional dogmatism by contributing an objective analysis of the country, as 
well as to oppose sectarianism the open debate as referred to the national 
reality, the country as it is. In this way, Alternativa aspires to contribute to 
channel the debate on the left around concrete problems in each juncture, as 
well as strategic needs such as a unitary liberation front; to differentiate 
positions with all individual and anarchized groups; and to spread Marxist 
theory and socialism, contributing criteria and information to popular 
leaders.211
 
From now on, the magazine would use its own criteria in informing about the 
left, instead of relying exclusively on interviews and articles where representatives of 
groups and unions stated their positions without being criticized about them. This 
reaffirmed the magazine’s independence and its commitment to its objectives rather 
than to the protagonists of the debate. The article ended with a pledge about the 
general direction the magazine was taking. “Finally, we intend to do all of this by 
using a simple and clear language, accessible to everybody, without the need to be a 
specialist. In short, journalistic.”212
If anybody knew about journalistic language in the magazine, it was García 
Márquez himself, who, as in the first crises, was throwing the full weight of his 
prestige, his money and his writing, behind the renovated Alternativa. He stated his 
position in a signed column, the first one written exclusively for the magazine, with 
his byline, his picture and his own signature at the bottom. He was, along with other 
prominent intellectuals, one of the new columnists the magazine decided to feature, 
following the disagreement with the García group. At the time, one of the points 
agreed on was to open the pages of the magazine to a more solid opinion field, in 
order to express the diversity on the left and to provide a platform for people and 
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ideas of value, which had no other outlet to reach the public. This was as far as 
Santos, the new head of the magazine, was willing to go in terms of signed columns.  
Until then, García Márquez had been the only member of the Editorial Board 
to have his own column in recognition of his worldwide prestige but also as a 
delicately crafted, intelligent and high quality prose gift to the readers. The first of his 
columns was titled “My two reasons against this magazine.” 
 
So here is Alternativa again. It comes back after a recess of almost 
four months, which of course helped us to work less, to lose less money and 
perhaps to be less mistaken, but also to reflect, as the priests did in other 
times, on the destiny of our souls. However, we come out again as a weekly, 
this time worth $20. Which means that the spiritual retreat helped us to solve 
many problems except two, which in my way of seeing are the disgrace of this 
magazine: frequency and price. 
Those of us who wanted Alternativa to be a daily still believe that to 
be right. So do those who maintained a contrary opinion. They win, for the 
heavy weight reason that neither of us, nor we all together, have the money 
needed to make a daily. That is to say, there are no bells. It was there, of 
course, where we should have started. 
Magazines have been an unfortunate genre in Colombia. All of them, 
no matter what kind, have had the destiny of the summer loves and education 
ministers: intense and fleeting. The only one that had endured for more than 
sixty years through barbershop hazards and the mortal strokes of the change of 
owners, seems more like God’s warning against the naïve and reckless. 
Perhaps we Colombians do not know how to make magazines. Perhaps it is 
because we don’t know how to read. But perhaps it is because an eight-day 
interval is a huge challenge for the historic memory of Colombians: when 
Saturday comes the readers have already forgotten what was their favorite 
magazine the previous Saturday, so each week it has to captivate a new 
clientele which does not even remember to have been the same furtive 
clientele of the previous week. It is sad but true: each week we buy a different 
magazine with the same ephemeral and unrepeatable illusion with which 
every four years we elect a President of the Republic. Thus, it is very difficult 
to implant a weekly, and to retain the interest of a numerous and 
understanding public, and also be sensitive to a different political proposal, 
while it is not possible to compete every day and in similar conditions with 
opinion organs which have in their hands all the strings of power. Saturday’s 
fights—we drunkards know it well—are only but cantina quarrels.  
The other essential problem is price. Without big advertisement—
which we don’t want and, besides, nobody will give us—without a political 
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party to sustain us, nor a world power center to support us, nor a central 
intelligence agency to subsidize us so it can say so later, this magazine orphan 
from mother and father can not be sold for a lesser price and the bitter truth, 
no matter whom it hurts, is that the readers with the possibility of spending 
$20 in a magazine are not the ones we are more interested in. So we want to 
reach one public and truly we reach another. We make a magazine for the 
poor, which many poor cannot buy. We try to create a popular consciousness, 
but our more accessible clientele is less interested in social justice than in 
vacations in Miami. 
Despite this, with the professional and political temerity that 
distinguishes us from other happier mortals, here is Alternativa again. I 
continue being in it as always since that casual September, now remote, of its 
foundation, because I believe that despite its two major problems, it is an 
indispensable organ in the current conditions on the country and of the leftist 
press. The only new thing is that I not always will be in all the magazines, but 
every two weeks, $20 at a time, I will be within the four walls of this personal 
column, to say whatever I want on my own account. Today, unfortunately, I 
had not much time to say it.213  
 
Besides García Márquez, new columnists included Daniel Samper; lawyer 
Eduardo Umaña, who had already written under his name in the magazine; human 
rights activist and politician Diego Montaña; writer and journalist Beatriz de Vieco; 
Salomon Kalamovitz, an economist and a member of the Trotskyite Socialist Bloc; 
philosopher Ramón Pérez Mantilla; and politician and writer Ramiro de la Espriella. 
Nowhere else in the country, including the dailies and other magazines, was there 
such a qualified opinion lineup, a factor that sustained the magazine through its 
flirtations with the legal and armed political left.    
The political class’ failures on which the left was unable to capitalize included 
grave accusations leveled against the President himself and his family for 
questionable investments in land and the use of public banks and institutions to secure 
loans and other privileges. Even though the proofs against the López family were 
more than convincing, the Accusations Commission in Congress absolved it of any 
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wrongdoing. “All of this should have been capitalized by the left. However, either it 
does not know how, or it cannot or does not want to do it. It is of little importance if 
the Colombian left is right in everything it says. The truth is that it has not been able 
to tell it in a way that the masses believe it.”214  
 The division of the left was highlighted by the May Day demonstration, a 
traditional show of strength in which the left took pains to march united through the 
streets of the country’s major cities. This time, however, there were five different acts 
planned, including a government-sponsored gathering, which never took place. The 
division showed the pervasive influence that leftist organizations, particularly the pro- 
Soviet Communist Party and the pro-Chinese MOIR, exerted on the workers 
organizations, particularly the unions grouped in confederations. The differences 
included electoral alignments and the parties’ allegiances to foreign directorates, 
which conditioned their alliances and prevented their flexibility, exactly the situation 
the magazine criticized in its articles, including the Letter to the Reader in issue 113. 
“The international themes pierce and determine, without any meaningful constructive 
effect, all the discussion on the political and electoral unity of the Colombian people 
against the evident main enemies. While in front of our noses they keep Colombia, 
we discuss over who should keep Zaire.”215  
The constant barrage of editorials, articles and columnists’ opinions in the first 
issues of the new stage set the magazine on a course that would lead it to promote a 
movement to force a unity candidate to run in the elections, and later, to create, with 
other groups, its own coalition on the left, thus immersing itself in the political fray, 
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something it had pledged not do. It ended up participating in a political front, the last 
attempt to unite the left before the onslaught of narco-traffic and para-militaries in the 
1980s. It also led to the closer identification of the magazine with M-19, the armed 
guerrilla movement with populist undertones that proposed the establishment of a 
Colombian-style socialism.   
 On May 29, issue 116, Alternativa published for the first time, the call made 
by Festrac, a union federation affiliated with CSTC, for a National Civic Strike, a 
great challenge to the government, with the potential to unite most forces on the left 
represented by the unions and political parties. The demands proposed by the unions 
included a 50 percent rise in salaries across the board and a revision of the labor 
agreements to this end; a price freeze on essential articles and measures against 
hoarding and speculation; rejection to the tariffs on public utilities and a freeze in fees 
and tax increases. 216  
The National Civic Strike was an opportunity to test in the field of action the 
possibilities of a unitary movement, using it to challenge the dire conditions of most 
workers because of government policies. Most unions, even those aligned with the 
traditional parties, as well as practically all parties on the left, were for the Civic 
Strike, a locally tested form of protest that had already taken place in cities and 
regions of the country. Besides the unions’ protest, the topic of unity was framed in 
the dynamics of the upcoming Presidential and legislative elections, which were nine 
months away, without serious steps being taken by the left on that direction.217 Then, 
for the first time, the magazine advanced an idea of “a third force to express mainly 
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the interests of the great majority of Colombians, whom only secondarily are affected 
by the conflict between the two titans of socialism.”218 The magazine asked poignant 
questions as to why, if in the union field the unity was taking shape, if wasn’t so in 
the political terrain.   
At the Second Forum of the Revolutionary and Popular Opposition, MOIR, 
ANAPO, MAC and the Popular and Democratic Committees gathered to proclaim the 
Presidential candidacy of ANAPO’s Jaime Piedrahita Cardona and to formulate a 
platform for the electoral campaign and to make official the creation of People’s 
Unity Front.219 The event, held in the middle of July, made official the formation of a 
coalition apart from the Communist Party and its allies and others sectors such as the 
Trotskyites.  
In its editorial of July 18, issue 123, the magazine announced the existence of 
a letter signed by a group of “independent personalities,” calling again for the unity of 
the left. No names were given as to who signed the letter, but the ambitious document 
amounted almost to a manifest, synthesizing the main ideas that were to serve as the 
basis for future coalitions that attempted to bypass the poles in which the left was 
divided.  It called for the creation of a front based on a minimal program accepted by 
all formations on the left, which should then establish the necessary bases for the 
conformation of a national liberation front and a real power strategy for the people. 
The condition for the creation of the front was to respect the positions of the 
revolutionary parties and socialist countries of the world, adopting a policy of non-
alignment and international neutrality. “We need to strengthen the unitary process 
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with a clear perspective of taking over power. To unify efforts in all fields, in all 
aspects related to the revolutionary struggle, including the electoral aspect.”220 The 
latter coincided with an M-19’s Bulletin 25, which made similar appeals on the need 
of the revolutionary unity in the context of the electoral process, calling the electoral 
unity “a revolutionary need.” The document by M-19 affirmed that the participation 
in the elections could be an advance “as long as that participation mean a step ahead 
in part of the process we live in our country.” According to the movement, “the 
participation in an electoral campaign of a revolutionary character will help to agitate 
the banners of socialism, of anti-imperialism and the National Liberation 
revolution.”221 Coincidental or not, the position of the magazine, the unnamed sources 
that wrote the letter, M-19, and some of the columnists all coincided in the need to 
unite around a common program and to participate in the elections as a step in the 
ultimate goal of taking power.  
Instead of allying themselves with any of the coalitions and running the risk of 
being disappointed again, the Socialist Block chose to field its own candidate, union 
leader Socorro Ramírez. Its proclamation coincided with the formal foundation of the 
Socialist Workers Party, out of the Socialist Block, affiliated with the Torskyite 
Fourth International headed from Europe by Ernest Mandel.   
In “Elections for a Hara-Kiri,” the editorial in issue 125, the magazine again 
pounded strenuously on the election, noting how everybody spoke of unity but none 
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of them believed in it, advancing exactly in the opposite direction, something the 
magazine called grotesque. (125, 8/1/77, p. 1)  However, despite the division and 
Alternativa’s known position at this time regarding the unity of the left, the magazine 
provided complete information on the parties’ positions, their meetings, congresses 
and documents as well as interviews with the three candidates, allowing them to 
express their points of view in the pages of the magazine.  
Parallel to the information on the self-defeating strategy of the left, the 
magazine began a series of articles on preparations for the national protest proposed 
by the union confederations, which sought to unite the workers through a concrete 
action against the government, looking also for a meaningful step to go united to the 
polls. On August 2 the unions notified the government of the demands, which were 
all but assured to be rejected. The demands were a synthesis of the people’s 
grievances at the political and economic level, and could have perfectly constituted 
the backbone of an electoral program had the left chosen to have a unified one. The 
petitions sent to the President included a wages’ rise of 50 percent; freezing prices of 
essential articles and public services; lifting the State of Siege and granting political 
and union freedoms; reopening and demilitarizing the universities and giving them 
adequate budgets to function; abolishing administrative reform norms that affected 
the rights of association, contracting and strike by government workers; immediate 
transfer to the peasants of the lands intervened in by Incora; and an eight-hour 
working day and basic salaries for transportation workers, plus a freeze on the 
transport industry’s price of parts and materials.222  
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Finally, UTC and CTC signed an agreement on August 20, “to commit in its 
preparation and to participate actively, in the assurance that, with a solid and with 
disciplined unity, we will fulfill successfully the mission to defend the interests of the 
workers and of the people of our country”223 They agreed to participate in the protest 
after a non-committal answer by the President to their demands, and to call for 
putting into practice a 1959 law that guaranteed a bonus, the immediate installment of 
the National Salaries Council and the modification of a law on the protection of 
children included in the demands.  
On September 1, at a huge rally in Bogotá, and after a series of assemblies 
nationwide, the National Civic Strike was set for September 14. It was the first such 
protest in more than twenty years, with a potential participation of close to 2 million 
unionized workers. The government issued decrees punishing with 30 to 180 days in 
jail those arrested for participating in labor protests, and prohibiting radio and 
television stations from informing about the strike.  
The National Civil Strike was carefully and consciously prepared. The 
direction of the movement was centralized in the four labor confederations, and 
hundreds of factory, neighborhood, and town committees were established all over 
the country. This was the opportunity for the establishment of a long-lasting unity of 
action after the strike.  
According to the magazine and the organizers, the National Civic Strike was a 
resounding success while the government denied that anything meaningful had 
happened.  
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The President’s long-winded speech on Wednesday night was made of 
lies, cynicism and insults. He denied a strike had taken place when all 
Colombians had just seen it with their own eyes; he thanked the workers for 
the multitudinous support toward his government, as if marginalized and 
unemployed workers along with children and housewives, had not throw 
themselves into the streets in an unprecedented movement in the country to 
manifest their aggressive rejection of the government. And he ended up 
showing in his shaky fist the assassin weapons of the professionals of 
subversion: a few roadside tacks.224  
 
What took place across the country was almost a general uprising, with the 
entire population, more than the workers, as the true protagonists. Alternativa 
published the pictures of neighborhood streets littered with stones and of riot police 
facing the population. After the dust settled, the bodies of twenty people confirmed 
dead by gunshot wounds spoke for themselves. Estimates spoke of as many as 50 
people killed in the country plus dozens wounded. The president declared a curfew 
from 8 at night to 5 in the morning to try to control the situation created by a strike 
that, according to him, had not taken place.  
As the magazine predicted, the most important results of the protest were not 
the concessions, which the government never made, but the unity of the four big labor 
confederations in one protest, despite government actions to try to prevent it. While 
the government seemed taken aback by the magnitude of the protests, the mood in the 
union confederations was upbeat, despite the lack of interest from the government to 
negotiate. The unions conditioned their willingness to attend the National Salaries 
Council on several points: freeing all those arrested, the restitution of the jobs of fired 
workers and the wide discussion of all the demands made before September 14. Later, 
on September 20, CSTC communicated to the other members of the National 
                                                 




Command its intention not to assist in the dialog with the government.225 A similar 
upbeat mood came from the parties on the left, which insisted, despite their electoral 
differences, that unity of action was the most important result of the strike, despite 
MOIR’s filling the city with posters commemorating Chairman Mao’s birthday 
instead of promoting the protest.  
Conspicuously absent from the government’s spokespersons comments was a 
coherent response about those killed during the protest, calculated to be 33 
throughout the country, 23 of them in Bogotá alone, most of them by gunshots. In the 
same city, 3,800 arrests were reported, of which at least 74 people remained in 
custody. Many were sentenced to serve between from 60 to 80 days in jail.  
A consequence of the strike was the creation of a National Union Council, 
with representatives of the four union confederations, which kept pressing for the 
demands formulated before the strike, maintaining the heat at the López 
administration on its way out. A silent march planned for October 28, protesting 
murders, detentions, and sanctions in the aftermath of September 14 protest and 
solidarity with the workers in conflict, was postponed until November 18 due to a 
government delay in issuing the necessary permits and a request by both pro-
government confederations for more time to organize it.  
 
The coming elections 
Alternativa renewed its call the leaders of the left to a dialog in its pages in order to 
capitalize the National Strike. The implicit question was what good was it to have the 
unions working together if their support for fellow workers such as those in USO, 
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who had to give up the fight for lack of resources and bargaining potential, did not 
come through.  
The November 18 march was a show of force, following the September 14 
movement, albeit only in Bogotá and few other cities. MOIR was barred from 
participating by the hegemonic Communist Party, which exerted a great deal of 
control over the march. The participation of the pro-government confederations also 
aroused the suspicions of many participants and non participants from the left; it was 
seen as an opportunistic tactic to use the struggle for their own particular ends. 226
Meanwhile, the left’s campaigns wound up for the year with tactical moves to 
get new allies and with manifestations and acts where the issue of unity was 
becoming moot before the facts created by the actions of the three candidates and 
coalitions. The FUR, the MOIR-headed coalition supporting the candidacy of Jaime 
Piedrahita, ended the year with a well-organized demonstration in Bogotá on 
December 2, which included a one-hour march through the streets of downtown. The 
UNO coalition received in its ranks Senator Jose I. Giraldo, another ANAPO stalwart 
who decided to abandon the official wing of the party and its leader María Eugenia 
Rojas. This was a bold move since the senator guaranteed a sizeable amount of votes 
in his zone of influence. Also UNIOS, a coalition formed to support Socorro Ramírez 
was announced. It included, besides the PST, the URS, Ruptura and a sector of LCR. 
There were persistent rumors, however, of an internal power struggle and even the 
announcement of the candidate’s expulsion from her own party, which were denied.  
Now it was up to February’s legislative elections results to determine the 
outlook for May’s presidential elections. “As things stand, the left’s electoral 
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perspective depends on the results of the February elections. There is a possibility that 
after counting the forces the three groups will consider the possibility of a unique 
candidate.” 227
In the last, double issue of the year, Alternativa made a thorough evaluation of 
a year of missing opportunities under favorable conditions such as the vertiginous 
loss of prestige of the López government, internal disputes within the traditional 
parties and the citizen’s reaction against the wave of corruption and insecurity. In 
these conditions, the unity of the left was precluded because of the Sino-Soviet 
divergence and the way it was reflected in the rivalry between the two main parties of 
Colombia’s left: the PC and MOIR.  
To drive the point of the left’s fragmentation further, the magazine published 
a sidebar with a list, probably incomplete, of 35 political groups of all shades, parties, 
sects, tendencies and fractions. All had in common their Marxist inspiration and their 
belief of the need for a socialist revolution in Colombia. Otherwise, their differences 
and sheer numbers showed the idea of a united left as a utopian revolutionary far 
away dream, against only two parties in the right that monopolized the government 
and the state apparatus.   
The guerrilla groups, meanwhile, communicated through the magazine their 
disposition to forge a unity of action. In a FARC year-end pronouncement through its 
Resistencia bulletin, the leader of the group Manuel Marulanda Vélez expressed the 
organization’s commitment to unitary action by all the guerrilla movements in their 
quest for a unified revolutionary army, a rare pronouncement by one who usually 
stayed in the sidelines and did not write a lot.  
                                                 





Despite the left’s hopes for the February’s election, by the beginning of 1978 the 
quest for a united candidacy was going nowhere. In its first article on the issue, the 
magazine began to float again the idea of an encounter of forces looking for unity, 
after concluding that a proposal made by ANAPO Socialista of a great encounter to 
find a candidate was unrealistic.  
True to its nature, Alternativa made a complete rundown of the left’s 
participation one week from the coming elections.228 This time the magazine 
presented a brief bibliography of the three main candidates, a synopsis of the main 
coalitions’ political and economic programs with their similarities and differences, as 
well as a description of their doctrinaire makeup. It was noted, for example, how the 
Communist Party considered that Colombia’s capitalism wasn’t ready for a revolution 
just yet and called for alliances with middle class and petit bourgeoisie sectors in 
order to create a front against imperialism, its main enemy. The Maoists considered 
the peasants the driving force behind the proposed revolution, while the Trotskyites 
though that capitalism in Colombia was fully developed, which permitted the creation 
of a workers party to lead the revolution. These and other details, however, were 
overshadowed by the international alignments. The Maoists, for example, considered 
the Soviet Union an expansionist state, spearheaded by Cuba in Latin America. This 
idea of Cuba as an enemy was intolerable for the Communists, who always put as a 
condition the acceptance of the Castro regime.  
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The non-abstention position of Alternativa was a 180-degree turn since the 
days when the magazine did not ask people to vote, or endorsed any candidate for that 
matter. Issue 152 had a cover with the headline “Vote for the left”229 in big white 
letters on a red background. Inside, the magazine qualified the issue of whether to 
vote or not to vote by explaining how voting had become a matter of principle for 
those who put the revolutionary organizations on the same level with an oligarchic 
party and harbored the secret hope to reach power through the electoral way. To 
others, participation in the elections was just a form of political struggle, depending 
on how the election campaigns were used, such as providing an opportunity for 
candidates to expose ideas before an interested audience, to attack the dominant class 
and denounce its methods. It was a chance for the left to be seen and heard, come out 
of anonymity and propose solutions to the people’s problems other than the broken 
promises of the representatives of the system. In this case, however, the left presented 
itself as divided, creating confusion by the transplantation of contradictions among 
revolutionaries who already had made their revolutions in their countries, but whose 
ideas were neither fundamental nor immediately relevant in Colombia’s. 
“Nevertheless it leaves benefits. That is why in any case we have to vote for the left. 
For one or the other now that it is not possible to do it for all,” the magazine said.230  
Those who for many reasons abstained from voting were between 65 percent 
to 70 percent of the total electorate, or 7 million out of 12 million potential voters. 
Added to this was the fact that the left parties usually opted for supporting a candidate 
not of their own ranks, one of whom was the current President Alfonso López who 
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had once pretended to be a revolutionary, and now was the architect of the policies 
that caused the people so many troubles. Only two times had the left had fielded 
presidential candidates from their own ranks and one of them was Socorro Ramírez.  
Speaking of Ramírez, the troubles in her party were finally confirmed. The 
paper El Socialista announced that she had been separated from the party, even 
though it still supported her candidacy. Socorro herself denied the rumors, but the 
damage was done. She finally ended up breaking with the PST and forming another 
party, although she remained the official Presidential candidate of her coalition. This 
was yet a further blow to the unity of the left, so badly needed and so far away. 
 When the votes were counted after the February elections, the defeat of the 
left was complete. The great winners were the liberal pre-candidate Julio César 
Turbay, and abstention, which surpassed 70 percent. The left did not advance at all, 
even adding the votes of all the groups, nor made a dent in abstention. The defeat was 
extensive even to ANAPO Socialista, a group that concentrated all its efforts in 
Santander. The dismal results of the three coalitions showed that the popular protests 
did not translate automatically into votes, that the alliances among the different 
groups did not work as an electoral tool, perhaps because they were mostly a matter 
of convenience, and that great masses disenchanted with the government preferred 
not to vote than vote for the left, whose message did not reach them. The elections’ 
result reinforced the need to go united to the Presidential elections June 4.  
Against all evidence, the parties of the left showed an optimistic face, still 
unwilling to give up their candidates, according to their declarations immediately 
 217 
 
after the elections.231 The unwarranted optimism confirmed, in the eyes of the 
magazine, the myopic perspective and lack of connection with the reality of the 
country. As expected, the magazine called upon the candidates from the left to resign 
unconditionally for their aspirations as a down payment for the unity and to prevent 
another electoral debacle. 
 
Alternativa FIRMES and M-19 
In the next issue, columnist Guillermo Fergusson, along with important independent 
leaders on the left, expressed his willingness to consider the idea of starting a 
plebiscite in order to force the existing coalitions to withdraw their candidates in 
favor of a unitary candidacy in June.  
 
A true opinion plebiscite is being proposed in political and union 
sectors and by independent personalities, around the need of the opposition 
forces to go unified to the Presidential elections in June. A brief survey made 
by this magazine confirmed that a unique candidacy by the left is a collective 
wish among all those progressive forces and personalities that saw with 
preoccupation the weak electoral results in the last parliamentarian 
elections.232  
  
This was the first time the magazine put the idea of a plebiscite in print. In the 
course of the following two years, it was to take a life of its own, creating in the 
process one of the most promising unitary movements in Colombia’s left and 
influencing in a decisive way the future of the magazine. From this moment on, 
Alternativa began to publish endorsements to the idea of the plebiscite from many 
quarters. It came from M-19, in its bulletin No. 30.  
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M-19 proposes to make a stop and face the facts with an auto-critical 
spirit. To examine the mistakes with a generous spirit, leaving aside group 
interests. To see the resigning of the candidates from the left to facilitate a 
common discussion and new solutions. And, finally, to look, along with other 
forces and other currents, for another program, wide, national and popular, 
and a unique candidate that symbolizes that purpose.233  
 
  
  Finally, in issue 159, which began circulating on April 17, the magazine 
launched the proposal to collect 500,000 signatures as a plebiscite to force the left to 
present a united candidate for June’s presidential elections. The 500,000 signature 
figure was calculated to show a voting potential far greater that the one achieved by 
the combined left in the previous parliamentary elections of February. The editorial 
“For a left with its own voice,”234 and the official proclamation of the plebiscite, 
explained that the magazine had decided to go beyond its own neutrality because of  
the undeniable crises of the left, which, despite the agitation in the streets, was not 
believed, heard or even understood by the great majority of Colombians whose 
indifference was a reminder of the uselessness of its dogmatisms, orthodoxies, 
alliances and candidates. The half a million signatures was a way to show the left that 
there were enough people out there looking for a true change, way beyond the scant 
numbers shown at the polls. From the beginning, the magazine recognized the 
symbolic character of the plebiscite as a way to show the will for change, clarifying 
they did not intend to divide in five what was already divided in four, counting those 
who abstain, but to create a vast opinion movement not diluted in an abstention 
boredom, electoral frustration of passive inconformity.235  The same points were in 
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the official proclamation of the plebiscite on page 6, over a coupon to be filled with 
name, signature and identification.  
The movement had been proposed by “more than a hundred known 
intellectuals, union leaders, artists and television and sports personalities.”236 A 
committee was formed to promote the idea, one of whose members was Alternativa’s 
Editor Enrique Santos Calderón. Other included the ubiquitous García Márquez, Luis 
Carlos Pérez, Gerardo Molina, Pepe Sánchez and Daniel Samper, as well as several 
unions and the theater group La Mama.  
 At one time, the top three editors of the magazine were drawn into the 
movement in different capacities. One notorious consequence of that commitment 
was the severe reduction on information from the left related to existing coalitions’ 
participation in the elections. From now on, the magazine’s efforts to seek unity in the 
opposition forces to the government would be concentrated in its own movement, 
practically abandoning the idea of serving as an independent forum for the left on the 
assumption that by venting the differences unity was being fostered. The plebiscite 
and the incipient political movement build around it became the point of reference for 
all Alternativa’s information on the political left. 
 By identifying with the plebiscite the magazine put all is strength on the line. 
At the time, the circulation hovered around 15,000 copies, with a readership 
estimated at more than 50,000 in the country. By then the magazine was also the best 
known Colombian publication outside of the country, with an enviable subscription 
list of hundreds of names, mainly in Europe. 




 One week after the announcement, the cover was the official logo of the 
movement, the handwritten work Firme! (Sign), in bright yellow over a black 
background.237 One week after the idea was launched, 32,000 signatures had arrived 
at the magazine by several means, including those based on photocopies of the 
coupon or gathered at theater functions. Two weeks later, the magazine claimed to 
have received 100,000 signatures. Alternativa published the names of 28 prominent 
personalities, included journalists, painters, film directors and critics, sculptors, 
writers, and union leaders, many of whom praised the benefit of the idea to have a 
candidate representing the unity of the left. 
While the ostensible purpose of the plebiscite was to gather signatures for a 
unique candidate, the aim behind the idea was to detect a sector of the population 
receptive to a socialist, democratic and nationalistic proposal for concrete solutions to 
the needs of millions of Colombians. In the editorial on issue 161, the magazine 
insisted in the plebiscite as a prelude to something bigger. Behind the collections of 
500,000 signatures was a design to create a political movement with a popular 
mandate, solid enough to merit a strategy for the future.  The magazine’s commitment 
to this its purpose made it the de facto official organ of the movement, ending its 
neutrality toward the left.   
In addition, it made a prediction that proved to be true in the country’s next 
decades. “The disjunctive is simple: the decrepitude of the men, ideas and governing 
methods is opening a vertiginous political vacuum; if the people do not fill it in its 
own name, it will be filled, in the name of order, by the reaction.” 238A few years 
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later, a vast paramilitary apparatus created by the far right, drug traffickers, the 
politicians and the military, ravaged the country throughout the 1990s. 
 As a corollary to its call, the magazine took pains to clarify what system it was 
talking about in an extensive article describing its characteristics under an ominous 
subhead: “The ‘system’ is a whole group of economic and political forces which, if 
Colombians don’t unite to destroy it, will end up destroying Colombia.”239 It 
described most of the aspects in which the government and the political class were 
failing its people: health, employment, security, justices, public services, education 
and repression.  
 Unity Committees had been created in at least fourteen cities by the first day 
of May, with “hundreds of union leaders from all over the country,” plus many well-
known personalities such as sportsmen, artists and intellectuals and at least five 
political movements, joining in. Right in front of Alternativa’s very own eyes, a 
whole movement was taking shape. To fulfill its goals, the magazine announced a 
grand manifestation on May 20, two weeks before the presidential elections, to 
deliver the 500,000 signatures and the drafting of an open letter to the three 
candidates.  
 On May Day, while the open letter and the presentation and delivery were 
being prepared, the four main labor confederations united in demonstrations 
throughout the country, for the first time ever in the traditional worker’s day. The 
celebration represented an advance in the union’s process toward unity, even though 
there were a few hostile acts such as the harassment by the Communist youth 
organization, JUCO, of some URS militants that were trying to collect signatures.  
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 By the fourth week of the plebiscite, 300,000 signatures had been gathered all 
over the country, while the Unity Committees now numbered 25. The main ceremony 
to deliver the signatures was now set for May 25 at the Capitol’s main chamber. As to 
whether to vote or not, knowing that none of the candidates was going to resign, the 
movement let people decide by themselves whether to vote or not. It was also decided 
to schedule another national congress, this time in July, to give continuity to the 
plebiscite and to launch a national movement.  
 In a meeting between García Márquez and Santos Calderón in Havana the 
writer expressed his total agreement with the movement to gather the 500,000 
signatures. With his customary prudence, García Márquez warned Santos about 
falling into traps set up by the parties with candidates as well as to promote any other 
candidate. He also ratified his decision not to accept the candidacy offered to him for 
purely personal reasons and offered a diagnostic on the situation: “What the [present 
government] is losing more and more every day is credibility; there is a crisis of 
originality. At the bottom, it gives the impression that they are falling way behind the 
country, that reality is overcoming them, which presents very favorable conditions for 
the left.” 240
 The Open Letter to the three presidential candidates clarified where things 
stood right before the elections, when the signatures were going to be delivered in a 
public meeting as a petition for the presentation of one candidate for June 4’s 
election. Both September 14’s National Civic Strike and the demonstrations of May 4 
offered proof that the workers wanted unity and the 500,000 signatures were just the 
beginning of a new unitary political movement to defend the interests and needs of 
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the Colombian people. The letter asked the candidates to resign and invited them to a 
meeting “with the purpose of establishing there and then viable criteria and concrete 
mechanisms to chose a unique candidate of the Colombian people against the 
system.”241 A candidate epitomizing the feeling of unity that the plebiscite has 
garnered, would be supported by the movement. The letter suggested that the 
petitions presented by the united labor federations be adopted as the program. The 
letter was signed by Gabriel García Márquez, Gerardo Molina, Eduardo Vanegas 
(UNIMAR), Héctor Molina (FETRACUN), actor Pepe Sánchez, soccer placer 
Alejandro Brand, Enrique Santos Calderón (Alternativa), Daniel Samper and Eddy 
Armando (Teatro La Mama).    
This was a last ditch effort to fulfill the objective of the movement. The 
candidates answered each in his or her own way. Pernía, the UNO candidate, said it 
was too late now but he was open to working together in the future. Piedrahita, the 
FUP candidate, said he was not interested in a meeting because he wasn’t planning on 
resigning. Socorro Ramírez decided to keep going her own way and remain in the 
race, with the help of PST, which at the end decided to quit the Firme! effort to 
support her.  
As it turned out, after the second breakup of Alternativa’s team and thanks to 
the deep personal friendships between the leaders of M-19 and Alternativa, the 
former group returned to the magazine. For some people such as García, the return 
took place after his group left, a fact proven by the infusion of money that changed 
the conditions in which the magazine had operated so far, including a new 
headquerters, a printing machine and a renovated, paid staff.   




Santos acknowledged the renovated relationship with the urban guerrilla 
movement after the initial attempt to take control of the magazine.  
At one point Bateman came back in a very self-critical mood. What he 
had was that he was very intelligent and flexible. He said ‘we blew it, you 
were right, we can help, we know you have economic problems, we are not 
going to bother you anymore.’ At one point we accepted their help. There 
were people inside the magazine which continued with them.242 
 
According to Enrique Santos, the heads of M-19 and Alternativa conceived 
the creation of FIRMES on a weekend meeting at a resort in a tourist town near 
Bogotá. 
 We ended up doing something we said we were not going to do but 
which was the product of an inevitable evolution. After fighting so hard for 
the unity of the left, we arrived at that juncture in 1978, when there were three 
candidates of the left, something grotesque. That was the moment when M-19 
came back. May be it was a coincidence, maybe not. We said Alternativa has 
to go all out if we want to be true to the goal of the critical unity of the left, we 
have to propose and exit, let us do something. We had this idea with Antonio 
to start a signatures collection campaign, to transcend the little groups and get 
people in the streets to sign if they agreed with having only one candidate, 
which was the Firme! campaign. This had a great success, we collected more 
than 400,000 signatures. At that moment Alternativa became what we never 
wanted to be, which was an organ or vehicle for a political movement. We 
invented FIRMES at an encounter in a weekend meeting between Antonio 
Caballero, Jorge Restrepo, myself, and (M-19 leaders Bateman and Fayad). 
They said ‘What are you going to do with such a successful campaign, why 
don’t we turn this into a political movement so it doesn’t stop there.’ We were 
confined for a whole weekend at an unknown resort in Tocaima. Then we 
agreed to turn the signatures’ campaign into a movement.243  
  
   
On May 25, as promised, 400 delegates from all over the country met at the 
National Capitol’s Elliptic Room, in what turned out to be a multitudinous 
enthusiastic event, full of triumphal speeches and declarations. Throughout the six 
                                                 





hours the meeting lasted, there was a profusion of messages, speeches, close to 30, 
the document was read and discussed, and even La Mama performed a political 
parody, right before the presentation of the 432,000 signatures. New tasks, along the 
lines of those proposed in the main document, were scheduled and a new date, August 
26, was set for the next meeting where the process started by the collections of firms 
would presumably end in the proclamation of the new group. 
 The closing speech was given by Enrique Santos Calderón, the main architect 
of the movement, who synthesized the event in the name of the National Committee, 
and as representative of Alternativa as an organization. The main document 
announced the creation of the movement’s official paper. When it came out several 
months later, its director was Antonio Caballero, second to Santos in the editorial 
staff of Alternativa.  
 In June 4 elections, the electoral balance for the left was a disaster. The 
performance was reviewed in the magazine, in a we-told-you-so tone.  
 
In absolute terms, the fall at the polls had the following proportions: 
the UNO-ANAPO-MIL that supported Pernía felt 32 percent (from 130,000 to 
88,000); the FUP with Piedrahita felt 55 percent (from 54,000 to 24,000) and 
Socorro Ramírez from the UNIOS coalition fell 44 percent (from 10,000 to 
6,600). The left just had 2.5 percent of the votes—against 4.7 percent just 
three months ago—and the total of 120,000 votes achieved represent less than 
one in one thousand of the electoral potential in the country (calculated as 
12.6 million).244  
 
By contrast, the parties of the establishment draw close to 4.659,000 votes, 
including those of the general. This time the Liberal candidate Julio César Turbay 
Ayala, the epitome of the professional politician, a mediocre man by all standards, 
                                                 




won the presidency against the Conservative candidate Belisario Betancur by just 
92,000 votes. Abstention however, was of 62.4 percent, meaning the new President 
was elected with just fewer than 20 percent of the potential votes.   
 
A period of darkness 
Turbay’s period as President signaled one of the darkest times in the history of 
Colombia in terms of human rights, bringing back memories of the times of La 
Violencia and evoking the South Cone dictatorships in its brutality and arbitrariness. 
His presidency, as it was expected from the biggest Liberal cacique and boss, only 
stimulated the new corruption orgy based on drug trafficking and other illegal 
activities in which the political class and the armed forces were deeply involved. 
Alternativa was the only medium to openly keep the fight during this period, going 
beyond its own pages and journalism to combat the regime, including its own 
political movement forged in a close alliance with M-19. Other publications such as 
the tabloid El Bogotano and the daily El Espectador had a critical posture toward the 
government, but they did from an institutional, non-political perspective. 
The Firme! campaign and its logo was designed by Carlos Duque, a noted 
creative publicist. It morphed into FIRMES, a full-fledged new movement, (which 
can be translated into English as firm, steadfast, staunch, steadily or to stand firm). It 
appeared for the first time in a headline in issue 167, where the birth of the 
movement’s paper, to be launched tentatively on June 26, was also announced.245 The 
logo, very similar to Firme! was introduced in issue 168.246 This new party of the left 
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from then on monopolized the information about the leftist opposition in the 
magazine. Other movements, now deprived of the tribune they had enjoyed up to the 
time of the June 4 elections, were barely mentioned afterwards.  
Alternativa informed about the construction of the political movement from 
scratch: the formation of the 25 regional and city committees, meetings, reunions and 
assemblies, the participation in protests and strikes, new partners and adherents, the 
preparations for the August meeting, it was all FIRMES. There were working 
commissions on unions, students, culture, journalism, entertainment-sports and 
intellectuals-professional as well as permanent commissions on finances, press, 
propaganda and an executive committee in charge of coordinating all the tasks.  
FIRMES was also the name of a bimonthly, eight-page tabloid, which began 
publication on July 7, a Friday. As described in the magazine, “FIRMES has 
information on activities and orientation of the movement and commentaries on 
current political issues and the popular struggles.”247 One of the ironies was spawning 
a partisan, organizing and openly proselytizing paper, which was the creation of the 
staff of Alternativa, who wrote and made the first issue. The paper, all 10,000 copies 
of it, as the magazine announced later, sold out its first edition in five days of 
circulation. Alternativa remained as a general interest magazine within the left, and 
although openly known as one of FIRMES’ creators, it maintained its identity of 
separate content, dedicating a small portion to informing on FIRMES activities. By 
creating a paper, the leaders of FIRMES and the staff of Alternativa maintained the 
magazine’s role as a publication geared toward the general population. One 
consequence of this decision was to leave the magazine by itself, allowing it to keep 
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its journalistic identity to the end, maintaining the usual mix of analysis and 
interpretation on the political life of the country, featuring international affairs, 
columnists, popular struggles and culture, among other topics.  
The preparations for the August 26 encounter continued at an accelerated 
pace, including the drafting of a document setting the basis for a full-fledged political 
movement. A peasant encounter of more than 150 peasant leaders from twelve 
departments met in Tolima to discuss the organization and policies of FIRMES. A 
National Peasant Commission was created, after delegates listened to reports from all 
over the country. The main delegate from the National Committee was Santos 
Calderón, in his role as a political organizer.  
Two of the most recognized national leaders of MOIR, Rafael Pardo and 
Carlos Bula, left their movement to adhere to FIRMES and there were conversations 
with left-leaning Liberal personalities as well, such as Luis Villar Borda and Apolinar 
Días Callejas. As the information made public through the pages of Alternativa 
showed, a grand national movement was taking shape, picking up many people who 
saw in the new political entity a way to channel their energies and aspirations for a 
new country. News from people and organizations kept pouring in from different 
places and regions, many of them reporting about regional meetings and conventions 
in preparation for the big event. In the editorial on the issue that circulated the week 
the event was going to take place, the magazine expressed its optimism on the 
political venture, confident that such a political undertaking had all the conditions to 





This national encounter must advance in the definition of what 
FIRMES means, in the concrete form of some immediate political tasks and 
minimum organizational criteria. But, above all, in the ratification before the 
country of a massive, popular and belligerent movement that represents a new 
alternative and which has before it a future full of possibilities.248  
 
The official declaration of FIRMES to be read and discussed at the launching 
convention was published in draft form in the pages of the magazine.249 It repeated 
the points made previously, this time as a full declaration of the objectives and nature 
of the new political movement. Both documents had been written by Santos Calderón 
and Antonio Caballero, with some input from other members of the Central 
Committee, a sign of the conceptual leadership of Alternativa in the creation of the 
movement.  
Few times before in the history of the magazine, and very few times in the 
entire history of Colombia’s left, had there had been such a through analysis of the 
circumstances that led to the birth of a political movement. It was not only a 
declaration of principles, but also a grand vision of where the country should go, 
proposed by the same people who had espoused those principles from the pages of the 
magazine for more than four years. It was also a testimony to the political clarity of 
Santos and Caballero, and of their commitment and belief in the cause of building a 
Colombian-style socialism. For them, it was perhaps the last hope of realizing the 
dream of thousands of leftist militants for a lasting change in the face of a decadent, 
corrupt and inept system of government.  
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The launching event of FIRMES was multitudinous, repeating and 
augmenting the May 25 act by filling up the Jorge Eliécer Gaitán theater in downtown 
Bogotá. The previous day, 300 delegates gathered to discuss the political orientation, 
the immediate task, and the organizing criteria of the new movement, as well as the 
political declaration read the following day. This time, Alternativa just published 
information on the event instead of the whole dossier of documents, which were left 
for the movement’s paper to divulge. Once again, there were dozens of speakers and 
the reading of many messages. It was up to Enrique Santos to make a brief 
presentation of the political declaration, read in its entirety by theater director and 
actor Eddy Armando and Alternativa’s production manager Rubén Carvajalino, both 
M-19 clandestine militants, who, as several others, were part of FIRMES, 
unbeknownst to most of the movement’s leadership. Keeping with an exigency of the 
movement, Humberto Molina, the leader of URS, announced his movement’s 
dissolution into FIRMES, as did several other groups in the country, including 
ANAPO Socialista and ANAPO Independiente. The closing speech was given by 
Gerardo Molina, one of the most respected old revolutionaries in the country. The 
magazine reported, 
 
The Gaitán encounter stood out because of its unitary spirit, because of 
the belligerence and enthusiasm of those attending and the coincidence of all 
orators in the rejection to sectarianism, schematics and the international 
struggles division that so much harm has caused the Colombian left. The 
public launching of FIRMES was, in synthesis, a convincing ratification 
before the entire country of the wide, popular and democratic character of a 
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The first test for the new movement came on occasion of the first anniversary 
of the September 14’s National Strike marked by demonstrations throughout the 
country. It was a hostile climate created by the recently elected government of Julio 
César Turbay Ayala, who issued the infamous Security Statute under the power of the 
State of Siege. The statute increased the penalties for bearing arms against the 
government (8 to 14 years) and for perturbation of public order (20 years). Occupying 
places to pressure decisions,  distributing propaganda deemed subversive or placing 
offending or subversive writing, using ‘unjustifiable objects such as fire arms, knives, 
steel rods, even stones, carried a one year non-commutable arrest.’ The objective, as 
Alternativa noted, was not to fight common criminals but to attack popular protests 
such as strikes and demonstrations. 251  
One year after the national strike, not only the petitions had not been 
answered, much less granted, but with the new government, the situation was even 
worse. FIRMES’ Central Committee decided to commemorate the previous year’s 
strike as well as participate in the activities marking the anniversaries of the coup 
against Salvador Allende, and the struggle for the independence of the Nicaraguan 
people, who at the time was in the process of ousting dictator Anastasio Somoza. It 
also expressed its support for the petitions by the four union confederations.  
Adding to the tension in what promised to be an agitated political period for 
the new President Turbay was the assassination by a small group called Autodefensa 
Obrera (Workers Self Defense) of former Minister Rafael Pardo Buelvas on 
September 13. Three weeks before the group had taken over Alternativa’s 
headquarters, posing with their heavy arms and painting slogans in the walls. 
                                                 
251 Alt. 179, 11/9/78, p. 3.     
 232 
 
Previously it had carried out small terrorist actions such as an attempt on the life of a 
bullfighter, taking over a health center and an office of Telecom and robbing a bank. 
According to a communiqué, the group has committed the murder to avenge the 
deaths of close to 30 people during the strike of 1977 at the hands of government 
forces. Although practically all parties on the left and even the M-19 movement 
condemned the murder, the damage was done. The government immediately banned 
the September 14 demonstrations and justified the use of the Security Statute.   
From then on, other than organizing and growing, the focus of FIRMES’ 
activities, and of Alternativa’s coverage for that matter, was to assume an active role 
in opposing the Security Statute by organizing a wide front against it. Contacts began 
in order to organize a great act of protest and Luis Carlos Pérez began drafting a 
document to “orient the denunciation of the Statute before popular organizations.” 252
It was clear the government did not intend to treat the opposition with kid 
gloves, given the declarations by the new Minister of Defense, General Camacho 
Leyva, an ambitious man and a notorious hawk, who said clearly and loudly that 
terrorists would be answered with their same weapons. That is how the magazine 
interpreted the brutal tortures and murder of José Manuel Martínez Quiroz, 
committed, according to all indications, by the government’s secret services.253 There 
were in other similar instances and places, ominous signs of the onslaught that 
followed: murders of an ANAPO Socialista militant in Bucaramanga,  a student in 
Cali, a school teacher in Montería and another student in Riohacha; a bacteriologist 
kidnapped by police detectives in Barranquilla, and never found; tortures inflicted 
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upon an EPL militant by F-2 agents. In all cases, investigations were stalled, or not 
carried out, by the office of the Attorney General, nor were there any protests from 
the mainstream press. Alternativa interpreted these cases as a deliberate decision to 
apply the death penalty, without trial and accompanied by torture of those who 
dissented politically from the social, economic and political regime existing in 
Colombia. 
 The body of José Manuel Martínez Quiroz was found in a garbage dump close 
to Bogotá on September 29, with evident signs of torture, which included torn 
fingernails, crushed face and burned feet. He had been followed closely by the 
security services of the government and, as the editorial says, his death was explained 
by confusing information. Quiroz had been a founding member of the ELN, and his 
murder may have been retaliation for the crime of the ex-minister. Quiroz’ 
assassination was the beginning of the dirty war that characterized Turbay’s 
government under the direction of his minister of defense who had implied that the 
government fully intended to counter the perceived left wing terrorism with its own 
terrorism of state. And, even though during the López government, there were some 
suspicions and some indications of the birth of paramilitary squads associated with 
the armed forces, such as the ones that bombed Alternativa, this time those obscure 
elements were acting permanently and with impunity, as shown by the complete lack 
of results on the “exhaustive investigations” promised by the authorities. According 
to the magazine, to the consternation of many in the country, the Supreme Court 
declared constitutional most of the Security Statute, although some measures such as 
those related to “the distribution of subversive propaganda and fixing writings or 
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drawings exhorting the citizenry to subversion,” or those punishing “printing, storing, 
holding or distributing subversive propaganda” were thrown out.254 
The analysis of the Security Statute by Luis Carlos Perez went as far back as 
the nineteenth century to demonstrate that the measures contained in the law were 
unprecedented in Colombia for their disregard of justice. They not only violated 
Colombian’s Constitution, but international treaties as well, to which Colombia were 
a signatory. Perez characterized the law not as a judicial corpus but as a political 
instrument. He reviewed the sections declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 
showing how the government pretended to include within the definition of subversion 
almost all human activities.  
 
Many other criticisms can be leveled against the Security Statute. 
Those already exposed are the most pronouncedly destructive of the freedoms 
it pretends to guard. They aim at what is the most valuable in men, such as 
their application to their jobs without vigilance, hindrances or condemnations. 
Nobody feels calm anymore. Not those who aspire to a revolutionary change 
in Colombia, not those who seek to better life conditions in tune with 
evolutionary undulations. The threat is against all those who think about a 
better future, even under the system of private appropriation. Dignity and 
culture are also in danger, whatever their depth and amplitude. It is not about a 




 Security forces against political prisoners used torture systematically. Despite 
some attempts to hide the facts, press reports produced numerous testimonies of 
people who had been tortured in the country’s jails. The Minister of Defense’s 
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explanation was that the accusations were “a smoke curtain out by the subversion.”256 
However, that smoke curtain prompted pronouncements by the Senate, the House of 
Representatives, several journalist and editorial writers, and the Catholic Church, 
among others. FIRMES managed to create a wide front against the Statute, a rare 
occasion where most parties on the left came together. The Committee Against the 
Statute included the UNO coalition with the Communist Party, ANAPO and the 
Liberal Popular Party; FUP and MOIR, the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Socorro 
Ramírez, plus leftist Liberals and the Communards Movement.  
This time the Committee decided to launch another plebiscite, with the goal of 
gathering one million signatures. The new drive had three specific goals:  1. To 
prevent norms of Decree 1923, 1978, or the ‘Security Statute’ from becoming law of 
the Republic, and to eliminate such a decree because it acted against democratic 
freedoms and human rights; 2. To eliminate the application of military penal justice to 
civilians; 3. To lift the State of Siege and affect the reestablishment of democratic 
freedoms in the country.257 The campaign was set to start at the manifestations 
programmed for December 5 all over the country, in celebration of the Fiftieth 
anniversary of the Masacre de las Bananera (Banana Fields Massacre).  
 In an editorial titled “The ‘Triple A’ in Colombia,” the magazine confirmed 
its principled position rejecting terrorism from the left and from the right.  
 
Terrorism is a symptom of social pathology: it arises when a society is 
sick. Terrorism from the left is produced by desperation, when the normal 
channels—that is to say, political—are closed to express dissatisfaction and to 
protest and there is no other road in sight than to act upon social reality 
through individual violence. It lacks political efficacy but on the other hand, it 
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can have very grave political consequences. The first one is that is a pretext 
and justification for right wing terrorism. Which, in a country like Colombia 
governed by the right, it becomes a political instrument. Furthermore, it is a 
way of governing.258  
  
  The Triple A, (American Anticommunist Alliance) had the same name of the 
terrorist right wing organization that in Argentina murdered hundreds of people, and 
was linked to the armed forces and police in that country. Lawyers such as a Supreme 
Court magistrate and other who spoke against the Security Statute, and defenders of 
political prisoners, personalities and journalists such as Alternativa’s director Enrique 
Santos Calderón, received anonymous threats against their lives. The editorial ended 
with a warning.  
 
This escalation between the left’s desperation and the right’s 
intimidation, between terrorism as expression of political impotence and 
terrorism as expression of government’s policy, closes the field to politics. 
Only war is left. A war among secret, clandestine apparatuses whose victims 
are the public heads in both camps. And such a war, all the society, except the 
murderers, is bound to loose. 259
 
 
 The communiqué by AAA was followed by a bomb explosion at the 
Communist Party headquarters in Bogotá and shots fired at the Communist Youth’s 
house. In addition, an Indian councilman was murdered in Cauca and a student leader 
was killed from by a gunshot in Medellín. The AAA also painted slogans around the 
Santa María bullfighting ring the night before the manifestation of December 5 was 
going to take place, despite the heavy military presence in the area.  
Such acts committed by unknown persons, were hardly investigated by the 
authorities, despite the growing public pressure to do so. In its end of the year issue, 
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the magazine printed in chronological order a list of 35 popular, student and union 
leaders’ assassinations during 1978, none of which was solved satisfactorily. Sixteen 
of those murders took place in the first four months of the Turbay government.  
 A national reunion held on December 8 and 9 in Bogotá established FIRMES’ 
agenda for 1979, published in the magazine. The main points of the campaign were 
the fight against the Security Statute; a national political tour by the National 
Committee to further explain the political platform, which also included the fight 
against the high cost of living, the defense of worker’s rights with a general salary 
raise, and the realization of a national convention in July.260 The movement also 
decided to explain the political platform and to start preparing a renewed program, 
proposed statutes, and a policy of electoral agreements and alliances.  
On January 3, 1979, the country learned with stupefaction of the boldest coup 
of M-19 against the armed forces. On the night of New Year’s eve, while people 
celebrated the coming of 1978, M-19 militants took between 5,000 and 7,000 
weapons from an armory in Cantón Norte, one of the biggest military bases in 
Bogotá, through a tunnel dug from a house across the street. Coming at a time when 
the country was experiencing the rigors of the Security Statute and the onslaught of 
the armed forces against the popular protest and the left organizations, the spectacular 
coup marked the beginning of the hardest period for human rights the country had 
seen since the times of La Violencia in the 1950s.  
When Alternativa reappeared after a one-month pause in January 22, the 
counter offensive by the armed forces had discovered several people’s jails, in one of 
which a kidnapped executive of Texas Petroleum Company was found and killed 
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along with his captors in the operation. The army recovered most of the weapons. 
Also, the government resorted to article 28 of the Constitutions, suspending in effect 
habeas corpus.261 The reaction against such a blow by the armed forces almost 
crushed M-19. Many of the organization’s cadres were among hundreds of people 
arrested under article 28 of the Constitution, which allowed the authorities to hold 
people for up to 10 days without charges or explanations. Many, if not most of them, 
were tortured at places like the infamous Cavalry School’s stables.  
Alternativa asked a few questions about M-19: “What kind of a movement is 
this? What was the purpose of stealing the weapons? How badly hit was it after the 
recovery of the weapons, the detentions, the discovery and location of the houses, 
hiding places and printing presses?”262 The truth of the matter is that M-19 facilitated 
the job of the armed forces’ secret services by making grievous mistakes such as 
identifying several of its militants, including one of its national leaders, former 
ANAPO Socialista leader Carlos Toledo Plata, and a man called Arteaga, who rented 
the house from which the tunnel that led to the armory inside the compound started. 
One day after the recovery of part of the arsenal, the magazine quoted El Espectador, 
which  affirmed in an editorial that the army operation “was facilitated after 
numerous clues left” and because “those responsible, some of them owners of 
incredible vanity and megalomania, did not resist the desire to subscribe 
communiqués and send defiant photographs to the news media.”263  
Despite the close relationship with M-19 and its sympathies for other 
clandestine guerrilla groups, Alternativa held a principled attitude against terrorist 
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acts such as the Cantón Norte arms robbery. The reason was a principled position 
from the beginning, sufficiently explained in the pages of the magazine, which had 
itself been victim of bomb attempts by right wing paramilitary squads with the 
possible help of the government’s and the armed forces’ secret services.  
Another consequence of the weapons theft and the ensuing reaction by the 
government and the armed forces was a crippling effect on the efforts by FIRMES 
and the independent left against the Security Statute. The one million signatures 
plebiscite was immediately abandoned and leftist groups and militants now dedicated 
most of their energies to damage control, to staying out of jail and the torture 
chambers, and to trying to defend as best as they can the few freedoms left in the 
country as well as those political prisoners unfortunate enough to have fallen into the 
hands of the armed forces’ security services. The detentions did not stop one single 
day and more than 300 people were arrested, held in total isolation, blindfolded for 
days at a time and subject to sophisticated interrogations.264
 The analysis Alternativa made of the situation after the M-19 action was dire. 
Not only had the government and the armed forces, which were given free reign by 
the President and the political class to handle the situation, gained the upper hand, but 
the army came out of it more fortified by its new role. It did not seem accountable to 
anyone and had gradually replaced many instances previously reserved for civilians, 
particularly in the area of the administration of justice, control and administration of 
many towns, investigations and other functions previously reserved for the police. 
According to Alternativa, the military went farther than even the harsh laws of the 
State of Siege allowed them. They violated the penal code denying the right of 
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defense of the detainees, tortured them, detained family members, and even attacked 
defense lawyers, sometimes signaling them as accomplices. Those arrested under 
Article 28 had to be on a list approved by the Minister’s Council, but it seemed that 
such list did not exist so any person was liable to held incommunicado for ten days, 
violating the said article 28. Public defenders were military lawyers and erected all 
types of barriers for regular lawyers to represent the accused. For example, they had 
to sign a power of attorney but could not do it because they were incommunicado, or 
the lawyers had limited time in the military premises where the detainees were held. 
Military judges did not order coroner exams to prove tortures against the detainees 
and gave blank authorizations for search of premises.265  
Under these circumstances, the M-19 coup was highly counterproductive, 
especially for FIRMES, who lost most of the momentum gathered through the 
previous year, from the 500,000 signatures plebiscite to the August convention and 
launching of the party, to the new proposed campaign to collect one million 
signatures against the Security Statute. Not to mention the rest of the left and the 
union confederations, which now had their hands tied to organize protests such as 
strikes against companies and government. In fact, it is quite possible that the M-19 
coup crippled the high hopes the FIRMES movement had of becoming a real power 
alternative in Colombia’s charged political scene.   
The magazine regularly printed testimonies of people who had been tortured 
in the military brigs. Among those detained under suspicion of belonging to M-19 
were Carlos Duplat and sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, who were part of founding 
                                                 




group of Alternativa. The torture against Duplat, a member of M-19 at the time and 
one of the conspirators in the Cantón Norte coup, were particularly gruesome.  
 
Family members of theater director Carlos Duplat Sanjuán informed 
Alternativa that on the day of his detention he was conducted to a place the 
military called “The Sacromonte Caves,” where he was covered with a hood 
and submerged in water until almost drowned. Also, he was brutally beaten, 
especially in the legs and testicles; hung with ropes from hands and feet, 
causing wounds in the wrists and ankles, to the point of loosing his sensibility 
in the hands. (198, 5/2/79, p. 6)   
 
 
Daniel Samper, who now was the magazine’s most important columnist, 
described the situation in a column originally written for El Tiempo and vetoed by 
that paper. The ways in which human rights were systemically violated included 
“discreet disappearances” of people arrested with nobody knowing where they were 
until much later; “judicial non assistance” by denying counsel to the detainees and on 
occasion detaining their lawyers; “retroactive application of the law,” by suspending 
habeas corpus for violations committed before article 28 was invoked and applied; 
“groundless detentions,” for any or whatever reason by the armed forces; “the crime 
of being a foreigner,” mostly against refugees from the South Cone, because of their 
political ideas; “robberies to the detainees,” while their houses were being searched; 
“search of premises,” carried out by men in civilian clothes armed with machine guns 
without any consideration for property or the well being of the neighbors; “tortures,” 
such as those denounced in Alternativa.266
After a lengthy silence, the M-19 finally answered some of the questions left 
after its experience with the assault on Cantón Norte in an interview with Carlos 
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Toledo Plata, the only national leader recognized by his own name.267 The former 
ANAPO Socialista militants recognized that they took more weapons they could hold 
or handle, overestimated their own forces and underestimated those of the enemy. 
Toledo Plata also acknowledged that the objectives of the assault on the military 
garrison had been achieved, such as showing the lack of democracy in Colombia 
where all power had been bestowed on the military, which prevented any initiative to 
better Colombians’ standard of living. The interview was complemented by a 
communiqué by M-19, reproduced whole in Alternativa, about the arms operation, 
signed by the three members of the Superior Command.  
So it came to pass that after five years and 200 issues, it was up to Alternativa, 
a 32-page weekly, to lead almost completely alone, the fight in the arena of public 
opinion against the reactionary forces, an effort the magazine carried out relentlessly. 
On that occasion, the magazine reminded its readers that it had gone through three 
administrations and of its successes and setbacks in a hostile environment, without 
the advantages of the big press.  
 
We persist in the task of presenting the other face of reality that does 
not appear in the big press, in reflecting the problems, struggles, aspirations of 
so many layers of the population—peasants, workers, students, indians—
which don’t have access or place in the official-prone information media, and 
in contributing to the search for new political alternatives that lead to a fairer 
and more just homeland for all.268
 
 
 Conspicuously absent from this evaluation was Alternativa’s participation in 
the creation of FIRMES and its almost symbiotic identification with such political 
movement. Also absent were the references to the socialist, armed revolution and the 
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role the magazine was supposed to play in the unity of the left. The change of course 
of the magazine was evident, as the note said, in the editorial content, which gained in 
variety, especially in the international field, whereas the events of the South Cone had 
much less prominence than in previous years and the rest of the world acquired a 
richer dimension.  
 Now the defense of human rights had replaced the unity of the left as the main 
focus, judging by the amount of editorial space given to each issue after the creation 
of FIRMES, the enactment of the Security Statute and especially after the assault on 
the military garrison and the weapons theft by M-19. The actions of Turbay’s 
government and the armed forces, which began to call the attention of international 
observers, were covered in great detail.  
 In this regard, a curious exchange of letters took place. According to 
Alternativa, the mainstream press published a letter sent by Minister of Defense 
Camacho Leyva, on February 22, to sociology Professor Paul Hochstin of Central 
Connecticut State College where, “in a sarcastic tone,” he invited him to come to 
Colombia to verify the situation of human rights in the country. Alternativa contacted 
Profesor Hochstin, who confirmed that he never received the letter form the Minister 
of Defense and declared his surprise at the fuss.  “I have nor received any letter from 
Colombia, much less from the Minister of Defense and I ignore completely all the 
fuss which, according to you, has caused my message to the President of your 
country.”269 Gabriel García Márquez in turn sent a letter to President Turbay in the 
name of the recently constituted Habeas Foundation, asking him to extend the never 
delivered invitation to Professor Hochstin to three journalists, representatives from 
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the New York Times, Le Nouvelle Observateur and L’Observatore Romano, in order 
to verify the situation of human rights in Colombia, given the official denials that 
gross violations, such as those printed in Alternativa ever existed.  
A big National Forum on the state of human rights in the country was 
scheduled for March 30, 31 and April 1 in Bogotá with the attendance of a wide range 
of personalities, including Liberals and Conservatives, as well as many artists and 
intellectuals. The themes included “The situation of human rights in Colombia,” 
“Military penal proceedings in the State of Siege,” and “The reform to the Penal 
Proceeding Code and Human Rights.” Also planned were reports on “Tortures and 
bad treatment to political prisoners,” “Restriction of union’s public freedoms,” and 
“The crime of opinion and the censorship to the communication media.”270
 The pressure on the magazine kept growing from the far right. In an editorial 
in the Conservative daily El Siglo on March 2, director Alvaro Gómez accused 
Alternativa of being the “unarmed arm of M-19,” after a search of a printing facility 
where M-19 and FIRMES’ proclamations were seized. Alternativa accused the army 
of planting the evidence against it and reminded Gómez of his past, when as a young 
Conservative politician and the son of former President Laureno Gómez, he had 
masterminded the murder of hundreds of thousands of people during La Violencia, 
the greatest genocide the country had ever seen.  
 However, the accusations touched a nerve. In an article in the New York 
Times, dated March 11, correspondent Juan de Onis repeated the charges without 
attribution or further explanation, calling FIRMES “the legal arm of M-19.” Gómez 
dutifully translated the whole New York Times article, most of it dealing with the 
                                                 
270 Ibid.  
 245 
 
charges leveled against the armed forces and the government, which they denied 
despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.   
 In issue 203, Alternativa published a picture of Enrique Santos, Antonio 
Caballero, Jorge Restrepo, Hernando Corral and General Manager Gerardo Quevedo 
at a meeting with President Turbay. According to the photo caption, the meeting had 
the ostensible purpose of Turbay receiving a questionnaire that he promised to answer 
after he came back from a trip to Venezuela. The reason for the meeting, however, 
was different. A few days before, staff member Hernando Corral, received through 
reliable sources the information that the Minister of Defense General Camacho 
Leyva, had asked the President and the Minister’s Council for authorization to arrest 
the editorial staff of Alternativa, accusing them of being part of the conspiracy against 
the government spearheaded by M-19. According to the source, only one of the 
ministers, the late Gilberto Echeverry Mejía, objected to the measure and proposed 
that the minister of defense present proof of his assertions before the Minister’s 
Council approved it. In the following days, through one of Corral’s contacts in the 
Senate, a meeting between the President and the staff of Alternativa was hastily 
arranged. In the encounter, which lasted about an hour, the President, in a paternal 
tone, advised the members of the editorial staff to be careful with infiltrations from 
the extreme left, which was prone to penetrate institutions such as theirs. At the end, 
the President excused himself by saying he had a dinner appointment with Enrique 
Santos Castillo, the chief editor of El Tiempo, and father of Enrique Santos, the editor 
of Alternativa, who was sitting next to him in the left.  
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 Word of the audience granted by the President filtered to Alvaro Gómez, who 
referred to it in his paper in a sarcastic tone, saying, “The Chief of State always 
concedes audiences with generosity, especially to the opposition.” The meeting 
diffused the situation and put Gómez on the spot after the accusations he had leveled 
against the magazine.  
The energies of Alternativa and FIRMES now were focused in the first 
Human Rights Forum, an event that gathered an impressive array of guests, including 
many Liberals, some Conservatives, the top echelons of the Catholic Church 
represented by seven bishops, and the top brass of the union movement as well. One 
of the main objectives of the Forum was to unmask the government’s permanent 
denials that such violations were taking place against an overwhelming body of 
evidence. Behind the Forum, however, was also the goal of starting to fashion a wide 
front against the political class and to organize a wider opposition movement.  
 According to Alternativa, more than 2,000 people had solicited credentials to 
attend the Forum, surpassing all expectations. Many more mainstream politicians and 
personalities added their names to the long list of those attending or supporting the 
event. There were also numerous international guests representing human rights 
organizations.  
 While preparations were taking place, the government did not stop the long 
chain of arrests of activists and militants from the left, students and workers. In just 
one week, the Brigade of Military Institutes recognized that 85 people had been 
arrested, accused of “subversive activities.” Meanwhile, to try to counteract the effect 
that the Human Rights Forum could have, the government tried, with mixed success, 
 247 
 
to elicit declarations of support for its activities and denials among the traditional 
parties and the big press.  
 As incontrovertible proof of the tortures, Alternativa published the results of 
one of the few investigations started by the office of the Attorney General. The report 
confirmed that at least 18 students, most of them from Universidad Nacional, 
presented signs of torture. The magazine published photographs taken by the office of 
the Coroner, which showed the marks of torture that the government and the military 
were denying.   
 Nevertheless, the verdict by the military judge who investigated the torture 
inflicted upon the students, supported by Attorney General Guillermo González 
Charry, did not found any fault in the military. An article written by Daniel Samper 
Pizano analyzed the verdict and the absurdity of its arguments to absolve the accused. 
“The Vice Admiral, advised by two majors, declared two captains innocent, based on 
the testimonies of five colonels, one major and six military doctors.” They proved, as 
the verdict say, that the testimony of the tortured was not credible because they were 
“suspects of partiality or personal interest in the results of a process.”271   
 The Forum was an act of solidarity and denunciation that filled all the 
expectations of its organizers. The accusations against the government along with the 
documental and testimonial proofs, were repeated before an audience that filled 
completely the Jorge Eliécer Gaitan theater, the biggest in Bogotá. In attendance was 
a wide representation of the political sectors in the country, presided over by Alfredo 
Vasquez Carrizosa, a former Foreign Minister and the man whom, from the 
mainstream, became the main promoter of human rights in Colombia. The Forum 
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created a Permanent National Commission for the Defense of Human Rights, made of 
forty seven people from all shades of the political spectrum.  
 Once again, as in many other activities, Alternativa became the medium of 
record for purposes of covering the event. This time, however, the magazine was not 
alone and other publications such as the daily El Espectador and the magazines 
Nueva Frontera (New Frontier) and Encuentro Liberal (Liberal Encounter) carried 
editorials and commentaries about the Forum. Both El Tiempo and El Espectador 
published the Central Declaration, which the audience acclaimed at the closing of the 
three-day event.  
 Hundreds of people were arrested every day, mostly all of them accused of 
being members of a leftist party, a union, a university. Alternativa printed a list of 
those people, as complete as possible, every week. In one case the magazine informed 
readers of a search of premises in Cali’s Experimental Theater and the arrest of one of 
his members, the search of another house to arrest a woman and the detention of an 
artist. Four workers in the Anchicayá Dam under construction were kept 
incommunicado and the workers of the National Statistics Department protested the 
arrest of three of their workmates. In Bogotá, two students of Universidad Nacional 
were arrested, accused of possessing explosives on May Day. A worker of SENA in 
Cali was arrested and taken to an infirmary where he remained for 18 days, three of 
those unconscious, because of the tortures inflicted on him. (212, 5/10/79, p. 25) Even 
two Jesuit priests, belonging to a progressive think tank sponsored by that religious 
community, were put under arrest, accused of employing one of those implicated in 
the Pardo Buelvas case.  
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 Among the tactics used by the military was arresting family members of 
people under suspicion or wanted by the police or the army. They included parents, 
spouses and even small children, many of whom were taken into custody, 
interrogated and, on occasion, held for days at a time, as in the case of lawyer and 
Professor Alberto Montenegro, whose wife and three children were arrested and 
interrogated. Or, as in the case of veterinarian Luis Ulloa and his wife, who were 
arrested and whose whereabouts were unknown, leaving abandoned their three 
children of five, three years and a three-months old baby.272  
Meanwhile, military justice was getting quite busy. There were five mega-
Verbal War Councils soon to be under way, four of them in Bogotá and one in 
Medellín, where more than 350 people would be on trial before military judges. In the 
later, 69 people accused of belonging to FARC were to be tried collectively. Others 
on trial included those accused of murdering former minister Pardo Buelvas; those 
accused of belonging to the Pedro León Arboleda organization; about 100 people 
charged with belonging to M-19; and finally about 50 people accused of belonging to 
the ELN.273  
Lacking the unity of the Colombia’s legal left, the unity of action of the 
guerrilla movements was for most militants a highly desirable outcome. Alternativa 
began to play a role in that goal, not just through its pages, but also through backroom 
channels, thus becoming an actor in the political poker at the time. By doing so, the 
magazine began a slow drift toward committing to specific causes, both legal and 
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armed, a decision that was to play a decisive role in its development and eventual 
demise. 
Because of his former contacts with the left, and especially with ELN, 
Hernado Corral was privy to the story of Alternativa’s relationship with armed 
groups, yet another story inside the story of magazine. 
 
Alternativa was very respected by ELN because it always gave it 
special treatment. In 1976, Fabio Vásquez Castaño, ELN’s supreme leader, 
left for Cuba for medical treatment and never came back. His place was taken 
by Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, a.k.a. Gabino, who allowed all the criticism of 
inside ELN to surface, especially from urban guerrillas, professionals, 
students in the mountains and from many urban networks, which did not dare 
to bring them forward before for fear of being executed by firing squad. Many 
of them, very valuable people, had been executed by their own comrades, put 
to trial and accused of being petit bourgeois, of lacking proletarian 
consciousness, or because they could not carry the same weight as the 
peasants or walk at the same rhythm. Then Gabino came to Bogotá and he 
wanted to know the people of Alternativa. He had a very good opinion of the 
role the magazine was playing and of Enrique Santos, Antonio Caballero, 
Jorge Restrepo. We had a meeting at my house with them and other ELN 
militants. It was a very interesting meeting because all those who were there 
talked to him about the need to give a political treatment to all the criticism 
and to justify their validity and he was very receptive. At one point, it was 
recommended that he meet Jaime Bateman which he did. When he came back, 
he was very happy with the meeting and told us about the conversation. 
Bateman had told him to go easy with the people of Replanteamiento, to treat 
the issue politically.  According to Gabino, Bateman proponed that should 
ELN abandon its rigid militaristic posture, M-19 and ELN could create one 
single organization and that M-19 would renounce its name if necessary. But 
Gabino said he had to talk to Váquez Castaño again. They organized an 
encounter in Czechoslovakia through the Cubans and Gabino was “poisoned” 
again, came back through a different route and went into the mountains. Later 
we know that it was M-19 who had gotten him out of the country.274
  
 Alternativa fueled the debate on the unity of the armed struggle by 
reproducing a communiqué by ELN in which that organization recognized, just as 
FARC and M-19 were doing in their own publications also reproduced in the 
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magazine, the need for unity among the armed groups fighting the government. The 
document called for common examinations of the causes for the distance among the 
movements, itself proclaiming a self-critical position. The new self-critical position of 
the ELN presumably included its own Replanteamiento nuclei, which had questioned 
the conduct of the organization by the old leadership that was now been bypassed by 
new cadres.  
Information on the guerrilla movements came into the magazine through 
direct channels and contacts inside and outside the magazine. ELN denounced the 
murder of peasants and activists by the armed forces as well as its own armed actions, 
denying the claim made by the government and the mainstream press that the 
organization was all but liquidated. FARC’s Fifth Front issued a statement in the 
mimeographed paper Insurrección (Insurrection) whereby the organization demanded 
from landowners and agribusiness a salary rise for the peasants and the fulfillment of 
legal commitments in the Urabá region, a strategic enclave in the northwest corner of 
the country and one of the guerilla’s strongholds. Finally, M-19, in its own Bulletin 
23, asked for support and solidarity with the before mentioned guerrilla movements, 
mentioning attacks in several departments, including its own armed takeover of the 
town of Tello, Huila.275  
The call for solidarity became a call for unity by M-19 in Bulletin 24 where 
under the headline “The people demands the guerrilla unity” the movement 
acknowledged that “the winds of unity are blowing among the guerrilla columns,” 
adding that “these unitary manifestations mean a total change in the relations of the 
guerrilla movement, creating the conditions for the longed for and necessary 
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revolutionary unity, even though it all begins only with an exchange of ideas.”276 The 
report of the magazine on the ideas in the bulletin was remarkable because it 
represented almost complete agreement with the ideas it had presented from the time 
it began publishing again, mostly through its “Letter to the Reader” editorials.  
 
M-19 insists that the revolution must be one of anti imperialist national 
liberation, popular, with the participation of the majority of the people under 
the direction of the working class, and of prolonged war  in which all efforts 
and forms of struggle should be put together. For that, the communiqué says, 
it is necessary that there be the conformation of a Front of political , unions, 
religious groups and revolutionary armed forces, and it is “there where, along 
with the comrades of FARC, ELN and EPL, all efforts must be directed.” 
Such Front must as Camilo used to say, look for the things that united us and 
discard those that divide us. Nobody can be discriminated against because it 




News about the guerrilla unity appeared when FIRMES was being built. 
Bulletin 32 of M-19 reproduced in Alternativa, expressed some criteria, which, 
according to the movement, were common ground to build a unified military against 
the government. They included “the development of national liberation strategy, the 
military war as an expression of the masses’ struggle, respect for CSTC, support to 
the National Union Council and the defense of the Cuban Revolution.”278 The 
movement was ready to meet with FARC and ELN to start discussing a “plan of 
operative coordination and elements of unitary strategy and tactics.”279 It also floated 
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the idea of a National Liberation Front, and their intentions “to get to the bottom, as 
long as it does not mean absorption, or hegemony or short term criteria.”280
The answer by FARC was that, even though they shared points in common, 
they were not talking about political, ideological, tactical or strategic unity, but a 
unity of action “in a practical immediate sense.”281 As for other aspects of the 
political discussions, “there are superior political organs which have to solve 
questions that are not proper of a form of struggle such as FARC’s.”282 These 
“superior organs,” presumably included the Communist Party directorate, which had 
shown its lack of disposition to compromise on anything that challenged their 
intentions to be the hegemonic force on the left.  
 
The security statute and the political scene 
 
One year after Julio César Turbay Ayala became President of Colombia, the political 
situation of the left had changed drastically. The main instrument of his policy, the 
Security Statute, has been applied so broadly that the whole debate in the left, 
whether to unite around one single candidate or not, was undermined. In the pages of 
the magazine, reports on the left other than FIRMES, practically disappeared. Gone 
were the lengthy interviews on doctrinaire and juncture issues in which leaders were 
asked their opinions as if they really mattered, mostly on the electoral participation 
and the unity of the left. The truth of the matter is that the people of Alternativa 
matriculated themselves in their own political conception of how the changes in 
Colombia had to be affected, through a wide front that could include leftist Liberals, 






some of whom were beginning to get closer to the movement. Progressively, the 
coverage changed toward progressive Liberal characters such as Apolinar Días 
Callejas, Luis Villar Borda, and even old stalwart Hernando Agudelo Villa. Their 
opinions now seemed to matter more than those of the leaders of the legal left, 
defeated and divided after February and June elections.  
However, the magazine kept up its coverage of the popular struggles to the 
end, such as the effort by the union confederations to achieve a unity of action against 
the government and news of strikes and worker’s mobilizations. The coverage had 
also become more urban, leaving the fight for land recovery by peasants to the deep 
background of the magazine.  
For the FIRMES movement, born with the sizeable impulse of 432,000 
signatures in August of 1978, and auspicious augurs in terms of organization, the 
picture changed drastically after that New Year’s eve night, when M-19 hit the 
government by stealing confiscated weapons from an army depot. Then the whole 
energies of the left, along with those of many left-leaning Liberals and even some 
conservatives, were dedicated mainly to the defense of Human Rights in Colombia. In 
fact, the issue of Human Rights had been brought to the forefront of the debate by 
Alternativa through the relentless and audacious coverage of its violations by the 
agents of the State, especially the army. It should be remembered that Human Rights 
was the motive for the creation of the Committee for the Defense of Political 
Prisoners, back in 1974, and that such committee was a point of encounter of the 
people who founded Alternativa.  
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Now all the opposition to the government, from the left and from progressive 
Liberal and Conservatives, was gathered in the first Forum for Human Rights, which 
achieved the notorious feat of uniting such a wide sector of people in a single cause. 
Whether that unity could be transformed into an authentic political force behind 
FIRMES was the issue that the leaders of the movement had to confront. In that 
sense, they kept organizing, under threat from the government and its goons, creating 
and installing committees, programming and carrying out reunions and meetings and 
speaking as much as possible on the issues of the day, using it to their advantage as an 
aggregate factor for their militancy and the rest of the progressive sectors in 
Colombia.  
Alternativa also kept providing context in terms of analysis and interpretations 
of the political scene, both national and international. On the home front, the 
magazine kept the heat on the Turbay government, in all its relevant aspects, as well 
as on the armed forces. In that sense, the coverage of a the disastrous presidential trip 
was an occasion to call attention, not only to the Human Rights situation in the 
country, but also to the management style of a government that reneged on all the 
promises it had made on election time. Turbay was not only criticized, he was frankly 
ridiculed, along with his ministers, creating an aura of mediocrity around them for the 
magazine readers. At this time, the magazine’s circulation had fallen to 8,000 copies 
On the international front, the dominant issue was Nicaragua’s Sandinista 
revolution, with far-reaching consequences for Latin America and a reminder to the 
Colombian left that revolutions by the people were still possible in the continent. 
With its affinity to the ideals of the revolution and its privileged access to the main 
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actors of the conflict, Alternativa became the medium of reference for information on 
this tectonic movement in the political front.  
The magazine also grew richer in other content, thanks to its having 
augmented its pages to 40. The international section, which I wrote along with 
Antonio Caballero, touched on almost every relevant aspect of the world scene that 
deserved the attention of its readers. The predominance of the situation of South 
America’s South Cone of previous years gave way to in-depth and well-informed 
reports on the United States, Europe, Africa, and issues such as the New International 
Information and Economic Order and the disarmament talks in one of the coldest 
moments of the Cold War. Unlike many other publications, Alternativa had a rich 
throve of international contacts and sources of information as a result of exchange 
agreements with publications all over the world.  
With issue 219 (June 28-July 4), however, the magazine dropped back to 36 
pages and issue 225 went back to 32 pages, thus ending a period that started with the 
first issue of 1979, when 40 pages were printed. (The last magazine of 1978 had been 
a double issue, with 48 pages, the biggest in its history). The reason behind the drop 
was undoubtedly the economic situation of the magazine, which kept getting worse. 
Besides, it was now obvious that “obscure forces” were affecting the distribution of 
the magazine in the country and overseas. The magazine stopped reaching its 
numerous subscribers abroad, precisely when the first denunciations of torture in 
military prisons began to be printed, and during President Turbay’s trip abroad, 
“where the diffusion of this type of news could give the President’s welcome a far 
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different characteristic than the apotheosis he expects.”283 All throughout its existence 
Alternativa had a rich list of subscribers, especially in Europe, where it was required 
reading for those wishing to know what was going on in Latin America and 
Colombia. As Santos recalled, they were close to 450 at the highest point.  
In August,  FIRMES formulated its agenda for the rest of the year, as it 
appeared in Alternativa. At a three-day reunion of the National Committee in July, 
the movement issued a call for the creation of a Democratic Front based on “the 
struggle for democracy and national independence, against the monopolies and the 
opposition to the government of Turbay Ayala.”284 A National Convention was 
announced for September, to discuss a program than proposed “the nationalization of 
the big national and foreign monopolies, the expropriation without compensation of 
the great territorial property and its transfer to peasants and concrete policies on 
health, education and housing.”285  
According to Alternativa, the idea of a wide Democratic Front, looking into 
the following year elections, was taking hold. It was the last incarnation of the drive 
to unite the legal left against the traditional parties and the establishment. Several 
personalities expressed their interest in the idea, including left-wing Liberals, 
communists and independent personalities.286
Meanwhile, FIRMES continued preparing its National Convention, now set 
for November 9, 10 and 11, where important decisions had to be made regarding the 
midterm elections in February of the following year. The movement was now 
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working as an organized entity, with defined protocols as to the participation of 
delegates, the reports from regional committees and processes for deliberations. 
Several commissions worked on specific issues such as the creation of a National 
Debate Executive. At the Convention, the points set for discussion included: 
programmatic basis, tactics, organizational system; policies for the masses; FIRMES’ 
position on different national problems, and election of the new national directorate. 
The idea of the Democratic Front was wholly supported and given a new impulse by 
the 50 members of FIRMES’ Political Council. Communications were coming from 
the Liberal left, showing interest but asking to wait until the next elections where the 
real weight of the political forces could be known.287
Minister of Justice Hugo Escobar Sierra, who had become the staunchest 
spokesperson for the government, again made an issue of the existence of Alternativa 
by speaking of “the unarmed subversion that many exercise criticizing the authorities, 
censoring them, destroying the image of the legitimate authority, and in that manner 
contributing to the insecurity and stimulating subversive groups.”288 This was a new 
judicial concept in the opinion of the magazine, according to which criticizing the 
government had become a form of subversion, in which case it contended the 
growing chorus of critics of the government from industry and the establishment 
should be measured with the same stick.  
While most of the attention was placed on the application of the Security 
Statute against militants from the left, another aspect was the permanent abuse against 
workers and their organizations, with sanctions and layoffs in many State entities 
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since the workers were nor allowed to protest. Despite the government’s actions to 
discourage the worker’s protest, on September 14, the second anniversary of the Civic 
Strike, the union confederations held a demonstration in downtown Bogotá. 
In La Picota jail, M-19 detainees threatened a hunger strike because their trial 
by a military tribunal had been repeatedly postponed. The War Council was set to 
judge 180 prisoners, plus 60 in absentia. A decision by Bogotá’s Supreme Tribunal 
on a petition by a group of lawyers could throw away the whole proceedings because 
of the irregularities committed by the military, including interrogation of the prisoners 
without the presence of their lawyers. There was also a rumor that the trial was going 
to be conducted in the jail, which, if done so, would be unprecedented.289 Other 
mega-War Councils were waiting to be staged, including one against 160 people 
accused of belonging to FARC, while the trial against 15 supposed members of the 
Pedro León Arboleda group was denounced because the files of the case were denied 
to the defense lawyers.  
To complicate the situation, the government further limited the rights of the 
accused to effective legal representation by issuing new decrees. 290
Finally, at the end of October was formalized the long aspiration of 
Alternativa and its ally M-19 for the creation of a unitary movement of the left to face 
the February elections. The agreement where spokespersons of the main different 
organizations of Colombia’s left manifested their purpose to unite in one single 
opposition front, was reached on the night of October 30 at the FIRMES 
headquarters. It included the basis for a joint electoral campaign and projection of a 
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democratic opposition front in the long run. Present at the meeting were leaders of the 
Communist Party, MOIR, ANAPO-UNO, ANAPO-FUP, FIRMES and Movimiento 
de Izquierda Liberal, MIL (Liberal Left Movement). Opposition spokespersons 
delegated to FIRMES the writing of joint declaration draft, which would be revised 
by a commission of all movements and published the following week. The points of 
agreement were the defense of human rights, lifting the State of Siege and the 
derogation of the Security Statute; a need for salary raises and fight against the 
economic monopolies; decisive opposition to Turbay Ayala’s government; struggle 
against all forms of foreign domination, and national independence and solidarity 
with all the peoples that fight for their liberation.Undoubtedly, one of the stimuli for a 
united front was the continued onslaught of the government and the armed forces 
against the opposition, while the government kept denying, against overwhelming 
evidence that abuses, mistreatment and tortures were taking place. 
On the press side, Consuelo de Montejo, the editor of El Bogotano, an 
independent afternoon tabloid and Alternativa’s ally in many polemics with the 
government, was arrested and charged with illegal weapon’s possession. The 
accusation was obviously far fetched and the punishment harsh.291
By arresting de Montejo, the first newspaper editor jailed in the country in 
many years, the armed forces were putting Alternativa on notice they were closely 
following its steps. As the magazine said, this was a calculated move to intimidate the 
press and bring it into submission. El Bogotano, besides carrying the editorials of its 
director and information of the abuses in the armed forces, was otherwise a 
sensationalist tabloid not particularly strong on information. However, for the 
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government and the military, it was also a political weapon, a thorn in the side of the 
freewheeling armed forces. 
FIRMES’ National Convention, held as planned between November 9 and 11, 
became again the focus point of the coming electoral campaign, where some 500 
delegates heard speeches, cheered and debated. The central table included 13 people 
representing most of the parties that agreed to be part of the coalition, plus 
organization such as the Human Rights Committee, the unions CSTC and CGT, and 
the Cauca Regional Indian Council, CRIC, among others. Many messages, including 
one by Gabriel García Márquez, arrived and were dutifully read. Coming just one 
year after its formation, the FIRMES Convention represented a huge success, for it 
achieved the main goal of getting the majority of the left to unite in a single front.  
The cover of issue 140 was dedicated to the theme of press freedom because 
of the arrest and the harsh penalty of Consuelo de Montejo. The magazine was 
reacting  against pressures on independent media and journalists, which included the 
suspension of the working license of the Associated Press, the asylum in the 
Ecuadorian embassy of two journalists from El Bogotano, the search of two leftist 
newspapers, the confiscation of an edition of Voz Proletaria, the Communist Party 
paper in the town of Puerto Berrío, and the threats against the President of the 
National Journalists College and three other journalists, including three from a 
mainstream radio station arrested on Journalist’s day. Also, one journalist was killed 
in Cali while in custody of the army and another was killed by policemen in Cúcuta, 
who were cleared at a Martial Court. Already the military were on record asking for 
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the President to take actions against the magazine and the independent press, such as 
preventive detention for the crimes of injury and libel.  
 
Everything that has been said configures an uneasy climate of 
persecution against the free press. That is to say, against the critical press, 
because as former President Echandía explained recently, the freedom is 
needed to criticize, not to praise. It is a climate, which at any moment can 
result in pure and simple censorship, if that is what the government wants, as 
it exists for radio and television, and which has served to suspend twice the 
Todelar newscast, under cover of the Security Statute. The President then 
could say that he is not doing anything else but to apply the Constitution, 
which says that “the press is free in times of peace.” But not in times of war. 
And according to General Camacho Leyva’s declarations before the House of 
Representatives two weeks ago (again General Camacho), in Colombia we are 
at war.292  
  
To support its assessment that each day there were less freedom of the press, 
the magazine quoted the opinions of several noted journalists, included top editors of 
the most important papers and other mainstream journalists. The idea was to create a 
consensus for defending the freedom of the press, now that it was even more 
threatened than before.  
 Meanwhile, the seventh mega-War Council convened to try 219 people 
accused of belonging to M-19 was begun at a chapel located right in the center of La 
Picota jail. It was the largest trial and gathering of accused people ever held in the 
country. The military tribunal was convened despite the fact that the Supreme Court 
had not issued its verdict on the constitutionality of Decree 2482, which set limits to 
the rights of the defendants. Precisely one of the dispositions of the Decree was to 
avoid reading the files in which many an accused denounced torture and 
mistreatment.  
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 The beginning of the trial became an emotional act of protest against the 
military. While waiting in the sides of the chapel, the supporters of the accused 
chanted revolutionary songs and once inside all of them rose and sang the National 
Anthem while the military remained seated. A particular poignant moment was the 
entrance of 19-year old Maria Etty Marín, a factory worker in Cali, who had sent a 
letter to Alternativa describing her tortures, rape and mistreatment at the hands of the 
same people who were now putting her on trial. She had to be helped in because one 
of her legs had been shattered by her captors. Screaming at the top of her lungs, she 
thrust one of her crutches in the air crying out that torturers were not fit to judge 
anybody. 293
 The defendants received some relief from the Supreme Court which finally 
declared unconstitutional Decree 2482. For the M-19 trial, which was just starting, 
this meant that all the voluminous files of the 216 accused were to be read in court, 
which could take up to one year. The government counterattacked by proposing new 
reforms dealing with justice and the Penal Code. One of them included the possibility 
of incorporating military personnel as part of the judicial police investigating teams, 
thus giving the armed forces law enforcement duties in the country. It also proposed 
to make permanent the increase in jail time established by the Security Statute, 
including that for injury and libel, which potentially affected journalists directly.  
Now 1979 was ending and so was the end of the seventies decade. The 
occasion called for several reviews, the last ones the magazine printed in its six years 
of existence. In its year-end issue, it published a list of the ten most important news 
stories of the year. It was a useful reminder to the readers that the magazine, despite 
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its forays into the political arena as part of a political movement, still kept its identity 
and firepower.  
 As reviews were called for, the magazine made a synopsis of what the year 
had brought in terms of repression, with the telling headline of “The Year of Torture.” 
 
‘We are in a state of war,’ recently declared the Minister of Defense 
General Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva in Congress. And there is nothing better 
than that sentence to summarize what has happened this year in the country. 
The predominant note in reviewing all the events regarding the actions of the 
army corps and security organisms, are thousands of searches and raids, 
massive detentions, denunciations of tortures that could send chills to 
anybody, trials where the military impose their own law from beginning to 
end, harassment to progressive sectors of the church, dozens of deaths due to 
army actions in the countryside. It is all like in the war. 294
 
 
    The magazine remembered the wave of repression that came after M-19 stole 
more than 5,000 weapons from the military garrison in Bogotá on New Year’s eve, 
prompting the government to make use of Article 28 of the Constitution, suspending 
habeas corpus by giving the military power to detain anybody for ten days without 
even telling anybody about it. “Three months after the arms robbery, 936 people had 
been arrested, of which 616 were released (El Siglo, April 7) because, despite all the 
arbitrariness of military justice, no crime could be proven against them.”295 However, 
the government kept denying that torture existed, despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, from the House of Representatives, to the Coroner’s office, to the 
Catholic bishops, to Bogotá’s City Council, among many others.   
 Despite the opposition to human rights violations, FIRMES and Alternativa 
managed to organize the Human Rights Forum, an event that achieved the important 
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feat of reuniting the fragmented left around a cause, along with many mainstream 
politicians from the Liberal and Conservative parties. The Forum became the starting 
point of the movement’s convention and the creation of a Democratic Front, a goal 
long sought by the independent left.  
 As for the left, there were reasons for optimism, as the magazine put it. After 
the first months of the year, where the government’s repression created havoc in all 
fronts, the left began to control its own agenda by defending democratic freedoms 
against human rights abuses and by working on a unitary movement to face the 
establishment parties, a proposal put forth by FIRMES. Unlike the past, on this 
occasion the unitary proposal was well received and ended up in an agreement in 
which most of the movements of the left, allied with some progressive Liberal 
groups, coincided in a Democratic Front.   
   In the first issue of 1980, Alternativa published the Declaration for Unity 
issued by the newly formed Democratic Front. The document repeated the five 
minimal points agreed by the signers:  
 
1. To fight for the defense of Human Rights and democratic freedoms, 
against the peak of militarism expressed in the permanence of the State of 
Siege, the Security Statute and the institutionalization of torture. For the 
freedom of political and union prisoners.  
2. Against the monopolistic concentration of wealth and the rise in the cost 
of living.  
3. Decisive opposition to the regime currently headed by Turbay Ayala and 
the reactionary path that he has taken with ever increasing force, 
accentuating the militarization that falls upon wide sectors of the people. 
4. Support for the struggle for a general salaries’ raise and support for the 
unitary process of the union movement expressed in the National Union 
Council. 
5. Effective solidarity with all the peoples of the world struggling for their 
national self-determination and independence. 296  
                                                 





The document was signed by FIRMES, ANAPO, the Communist Party, the 
Liberal Independent Movement and the National Opposition Union. Maoist MOIR 
and its coalition FUP were conspicuously absent, along with the Trotskyite groups.  
By the end of January, the lack of agreement in the making of electoral lists 
was already creating tension among the partners, especially between FIRMES and the 
Communist party with its policy of hegemonic control. There was even talk of 
postponing the Democratic Front itself for a later stage, giving the impasse.297 The 
saving formula was to present independent lists wherever an agreement was not 
possible for the elections to be held March 9. In Bogotá, FIRMES created its own 
lists for the City Council. In the second line, after the name of Gerardo Molina, the 
acknowledged leader of the movement was Enrique Santos Calderón, Alternativa’s 
editor in chief.   
For Santos, this was the first time ever he ran for office and the last as well. 
The magazine had just celebrated its sixth anniversary with a laconic “Letter to the 
Reader” where, after hailing its own survival against all odds, including the boycott 
of advertising, it tried to justify yet another price increase from $40 pesos to $50 
pesos. It was a painful move, but necessary for the magazine’s hypothetical survival. 
The note ended in an ominous tone:  “It was to raise the price or die. And the new 
increase hurts us more than any reader because we know it is not a definitive solution 
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either. And even though this lines are not intended as an economic SOS, they are 
written amid black clouds covering the road ahead.”298  
 
M-19 strikes again 
On Wednesday February 27, thirteen days before the midterm legislative elections, 
M-19 struck again. This time the urban guerrilla movement planned and executed to 
perfection the takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy, where a diplomatic 
reception was taking place. The guerilla commandos had been playing soccer the 
whole morning in a lawn right in front of the embassy and their activity made them 
familiar to the security guards. Once inside the embassy, they took 13 ambassadors, 
including those from the United States, Switzerland, Austria, Israel and México and 
the Papal Nuncio as hostages. They demanded the liberation of 311 political 
prisoners, the payment of $50 million dollars and publication of a communiqué in 
exchange for not bombing the building and killing every one inside.299 In its “Letter 
to the Reader,” the magazine issued a stern condemnation of the act, once again 
directly contradicting M-19’s terrorist actions. It was also a sign of the limits of the 
implicit alliance between the magazine and the urban guerrilla movement, and that 
Alternativa were not in the loop as far as decisions on military actions were 
concerned. The position of the magazine was very critical.  
 
Politics is not a cowboy movie. It is not just a question of boldness—
even though it is important at some moments—nor should it be reduced to 
audacity or spectacularity. In this sense, the fascination that the takeover of 
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the Dominican Embassy has produced in many sectors of the population by 
M-19 should give way to a more critical reflection on this fact, accounting for 
the possible repercussions in Colombia’s political landscape…  
And it is this weakness, the still precarious consciousness, which 
cannot be hidden or replaced by the actions of armed vanguard, no matter how 
intrepid or heroic they may be. Because what these operations, such as the 
embassy takeover, pretend, is precisely to supplant the masses’ presence and 
participation in the process of political struggle against the regime. 300
 
Again M-19 monopolized the political and information agenda in a coup 
calculated to have repercussions around the world and inside the country. While 
common people showed ambivalent feelings toward the attack, the far right took 
advantage of the situation to launch a campaign headed by Álvaro Gómez against 
leftist opposition. Alternativa expressed the fear that, as it happened before with the 
arms robbery, the government was going to use the attack to orchestrate another 
widespread hit against the opposition, but not before the midterm elections of June 9.  
Alternativa’s coverage of the takeover was complete. It consisted of a ten-
page spread with three sidebars, including an exclusive interview with commanders 
One and Five, from inside the compound.   
The consequences of the monkey wrench thrown to the promising process of 
FIRMES by the arms robbery at Cantón Norte, was still fresh in the minds of the 
people of Alternativa, who had spent most of the previous year fighting for the 
survival of the political option generated by the movement. Now that the goal was 
close, again M-19 won the upper hand with a very calculated move, as Commander 
One expressed to Alternativa in a world-wide exclusive interview. The interviewers 
pressed the M-19 militants on the issue of the usefulness and correctness of their 
action, asking questions such as whether such an action could unleash another wave 
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of repression and perhaps a military coup, how could it facilitate the popular struggle, 
whether the M-19 fight was against the military apparatus leaving out the people, 
among others. 
Because of M-19’s coup, the coming elections almost disappeared from the 
information agenda. The magazine, however, called the people to vote for its 
candidates and those of the coalition. It gave a succinct list of people from most 
places in the country, one of which was its own editor, Enrique Santos Calderón, in a 
rare appearance in a stand-alone picture. But another article enumerated the many 
ways in which an election could be rigged, thus calling attention to the futility of the 
exercise.  
The elections took place before the resolution to the impasse at the Dominican 
Republic Embassy. The great winner on this occasion, as in many other instances 
before, was abstention, which reached the record number of 73 percent of the voting 
potential in the country. The unquestionable message was that people, especially in 
the urban centers, were fed up with politics as usual. The traditional Liberal and 
Conservative parties and their candidates took advantage of the control of the State to 
gather the so-called “captive votes,” especially in the countryside, to reelect 
themselves and kept absolute control of the government. 
As for the left, the showing again was dismal, although FIRMES did not do 
badly at all, considering its campaign lasted just a few months. However, it was not a 
spectacular showing either, at least not the breakthrough many people expected from 
a movement so full of brilliant and dedicated candidates. The bright spot was the 
election of Gerardo Molina, the movement’s patriarch, to Bogotá’s City Council. 
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Santos failed the cut and that was the end of his political career for he never ran for 
public office again. FIRMES, according to the magazine, was the victim of electoral 
inexperience in many neighborhoods, where people could not find the movement’s 
ballots and had to stand in line for long periods to get them.  
The results for the rest of the left were modest with an upsurge in Bogotá, 
where abstention reached 86 percent, and a few other cities and losses in the rest of 
the country. A few bright spots were Caquetá and Santa Marta, where the left 
managed to collect one third of the votes each. In cities like Medellín and Cali, the 
results were dismal. In Barranquilla, now as then the most corrupt city in the country, 
the usual mechanism was the wholesale purchase of votes, a fraud not even FIRMES 
could stop.301  
The final analysis, after most of the results were tallied, was the stagnation of 
the left in all fronts, with modest gains in some places and bitter loses in others. In 
total, the left received 3,000 more votes in 1980 than in 1976, with a percentage of 
4.5 of the votes cast, but 20,000 less votes than in 1978 for a mere 4 percent. 
FIRMES, however, remained cautiously optimistic, given the short life of the 
movement and the lack of organization that marred its efforts in many places of the 
country. 
However, the results were disappointing for Alternativa, which had decided to 
put all the eggs in the electoral basket, going out of its way to achieve the supreme 
goal of the unity of the left, or at least get a foot in the State’s legislative chambers. 
The poor showing at the pools was also a reminder, when the magazine was in its last 
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weeks, of the decreased influence it exerted in the political landscape of the country, 
due to the reduced circulation, which was now around 6,000 copies a week.   
As for the situation at the embassy, four negotiating meetings did not bear 
fruit and there were even rumors of dissatisfaction among the hostages-diplomats 
who complained about the stalling tactics of the Colombian government using 
judicial arguments that had little to do with the urgency of the situation. The position 
of the armed forces in the sense of not negotiating was well known, with the result 
that the government found itself between a rock and a hard place, having to contain 
the growing pressure from several fronts.  
The government, through its Foreign Minister Diego Uribe Vargas, promised 
in a televised speech, not to take over the embassy through a military assault, as long 
as the kidnappers did not harm the hostages, one of which, the Uruguayan 
ambassador, had managed to escape unharmed. The Minister again presented the 
usual judicial arguments against negotiating the exchange of hostages for political 
prisoners, while denying in the process the existence of political prisoners in the 
country. The diplomats, however, responded with a communiqué issued on March 13, 
whereby they claimed the government was trying to ignore the Vienna Convention on 
the rights of diplomatic personnel by invoking internal laws. The United States 
representative was the only one not signing the document.  
Amid rumors of a preparation for an assault, the Colombian press complained 
bitterly of the lack of cooperation from the government and the armed forces, which 
had them removed from their places of observation. Also, M-19’s political prisoners 
jailed in La Picota expressed in an interview to Alternativa that the main goal of the 
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takeover was to let the world know the real situation in the country and to promote 
their political ideals. That explained why the list of prisoners was reduced from 311, 
which included names of persons from other organizations, to just 28. At one point, 
the magazine reported the situation was in a stalemate, with neither side willing to 
concede defeat and with the government trying the only real play it had to make 
time.302  
 
The end of ALTERNATIVA.  
In issue 256, which circulated March 20, the magazine announced in its Letter to the 
Reader under the headline “Bad News,” that it was closing. The editorial was careful 
not to announce a permanent closing but a suspension “for as long as necessary,” of 
the publication. The argument was the chronic financial crises of the magazine, fueled 
by the rise in the production costs ranging from 100 percent in photographic material 
to 60 percent in ink and 40 percent in paper. Under these circumstances, a new rise in 
the price of the magazine, which had gone from costing $10 pesos to $50 pesos, was 
unthinkable. The magazine said:  
 
This is about evaluating these six years of journalistic practice, looking 
ahead to restructuring of an information project that guarantees the true 
professional stability and journalistic resources to compete efficiently with the 
system’s press. On these future perspectives, on the concrete circumstances of 
the imminent closing and on the compensation we will offer to the people who 
have subscribed recently, we will inform in the next issue. Let it be enough for 
now with the news that we have communicated today to all our readers and 
friends. Which is undoubtedly one of the bitterest we have had to publish.303  
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Issue 257, which began circulating March 27, was the last Alternativa. As 
expected, it was a nostalgic number wherein the editors tried as best as they could to 
review what they called, in the headline of the cover drawn by cartoonist Naide, “6 
years of a compromise.”304 The last editorial was called “To Look Forward”305 a 
history of Alternativa and the circumstances that had let to this farewell issue. It 
spoke of the commitment to remain uncompromisingly independent, thanks to the 
support of am understanding reading public and to the mystique, abnegation and work 
capacity of the writing and administrative team. The magazine claimed to have 
created, out of a formidable human, journalistic and political team, a current of 
opinion and thought destined to leave a decisive mark in the immediate future of this 
country. The unavoidable closing of the magazine, rather than a defeat or a failure, 
was seen as a temporary and passing setback, for new challenges on the national 
political scene were ahead, “preparing the conditions to participate actively in a new 
political-informative enterprise with bigger reach and significance, which will allow 
us to overcome past difficulties and to agglutinate the best of the new generations that 
believe in a better future for Colombia.”306
Again, the truth of the matter went beyond what transpired in the magazine. 
According to Corral, at one point he began to sell the idea that the magazine had to 
close because the risks it was taking by allying itself with M-19.  
One day I found out there had been a meeting of M-19 cupola where 
they named a new direction, which included Bateman, Ivan Marino Ospina, 
Fayad and Pizarro and Jorge Restrepo as the Alternativa representative. Then I 
called Enrique and Jorge and I told them they could do whatever they wanted 
with their lives but they should leave me out of it. They reacted very well and 
                                                 





realized what they had gotten into. I asked Jorge to let M-19 know that it had 
been a mistake and that if he wanted he could be a part of M-9 leadership but 
not in the name of the magazine. And they agreed completely in not taking 
part of it, neither in the name of the magazine or personally.   
It was a costly fight for me but I don’t regret having done it. It was 
very private, very secret, I never wanted to point to anybody in public or to 
come out fighting. I realized the M-19 was really deep inside Alternativa and I 
had no sympathy left for anything violent, or the armed struggle. The M-19 
people were coming in and out of the magazine, they even said I was a 
detective or something, When Bateman realized this he told them that instead 
of fighting with me they should try to be my friends.  
That is when I began to sell the idea of closing Alternativa, first 
because it was not a business. As you remember our salaries were very low, 
which we did not care much about.307  
 
The last straw was when the threats against the magazine came directly from 
the military. According to a version by García, retired General Matallana once told 
him that a military person had informed him the military had hard proof that the bi-
color machine, huge staff and house used by the magazine were paid by M-19 and the 
general could save the situation by speaking with the Santos family about closing that 
magazine  and telling Enrique to leave or be jailed, that the military were very angry 
and had all the strings secured. 
The short story of Alternativa, written by Santos Calderón and signed with his 
own initials, was preceded by his own picture and that of García Márquez, the main 
protagonists of the six year journalistic adventure. But an angry and desolate article 
written by columnist Daniel Samper was the real epilogue for the story of Alternativa, 
a publication that gave so much to the country and revealed the true nature of its 
political regime.  
 
Alternativa fought during more time than the pessimists hoped for and 
prolonged through six years the desperate struggle not to end. In one occasion, 
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it even suspended its publication but reanimated by new Quixotic shots and 
the breaking of a few piggy banks, went back to the streets after a few weeks. 
However, the stubbornness of its editors could not defeat the system’s 
impassive machine. In debt and frustrated to a point, Alternativa closes today 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions  
 
The conclusion of this dissertation necessarily brings us to Colombia’s present time. 
The questions that linger on are how does the story told in these pages contribute to 
answer the interrogations outlined in the introduction, all of them related to the 
objectives and mission the magazine set for itself from the start. As in any other story 
of this type, there are no definitive answers but some of them are clearer than others. 
From the beginning, Alternativa positioned itself as an agent of change, part of the 
opposition to the State and the government. Its objective was to help bring about 
change in the country initially by way of an insurrection by the working classes, 
organized by the political left, with the help of revolutionary guerrilla movements 
spawned in the 1960s by the intransigent governments of the National Front bent on 
eliminating any opposition to their rule. The methods of bringing about change in the 
country advocated by the magazine changed with it and at the end, Alternativa 
became an active political player in Colombia’s electoral scene, helping to create a 
united front to try to gain at least some power in the capitalist legislative chambers, 
by the hand of scarce and hard-won ballots. The change the magazine advocated was 
to be effected through a novel journalistic model: doing opposition journalism based 
on a Marxist persuasion, but independent and neutral toward the forces of the left, 
without advocating any specific position, while trying to reach a general, mass 
reading public. Inasmuch as Alternativa, and the political left, did not bring about a 
socialist revolution or any meaningful change in the control of power, the journalistic 
model of the magazine failed. It was a historical defeat, that of the magazine and of 
the left, one that brought unforeseen consequences for the future of the country.  
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However, there were journalistic accomplishments and partial triumphs. On 
the objective of counter-informing, the magazine achieved the goal of showing a 
reality of the country that few people knew about. It unmasked the big and partial lies 
spread by the Establishment through a willing and accommodating media. In this 
sense, the magazine highlighted, for the benefit of those studying the phenomena, the 
role that the mainstream press plays in a society such as Colombia, in terms of the 
political and ideological control and manipulation. No, the truth of Alternativa did not 
set Colombians free, but it helped many of them understand the real dimensions of 
their lives and, in however few cases, act accordingly. It showed that it was possible 
to give different, and more complex, interpretations of the comings and goings of the 
political class, to expose the deep cancer of corruption at all levels, the connections 
between all the big players of the establishment and even recover portions of the 
country’s history from officialdom. If anything, by using Marxist interpretation 
methods, the magazine brought about a different way of seeing things and of being 
political, disputing the terrain of social representation to the hegemonic view of 
political class. 
On the objective of doing investigation, analysis and interpretation on the 
country’s reality, the magazine inaugurated many aspects in Colombia’s journalism. 
It brought investigative reports on the nation’s economy, to a depth hardly seen in 
general interest publications, using information hitherto available only to experts and 
those in the know. It began to talk about human rights in a systematic way and it 
contradicted and put in the context of the class domination system most of the great 
cultural myths of the country, from sporting events and beauty pageants to theater, 
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television and cinema, and the plastic and performing arts. In this regard, from the 
journalistic style perspective, the magazine proposed and carried out a new way of 
narrating and telling about the events, a way charged with irony and satire, all of it 
complemented by the greatest number and quality of editorial cartoons of any 
publication in the country, past, present and future.   
On the issue of informing about popular struggles, Alternativa brought to the 
fore hundreds of fighting fronts in the quest for equality and justice. It gave faces and 
voices to manufacturing workers, peasants, Indians, students, urban dwellers. It 
showed a situation far from the joyful picture mainstream media showed. It portrayed 
a population struggling to keep its head above water while being confronted by a 
repressive regime, which used the state to issue and enforce oppressive laws through 
its armed institutions.  
As for the unity of the left, the failure of the magazine was to believe that by 
knowing each other’s position and being uncritical, neutral and independent, a leftist 
could create a community of tactics, strategies and ideas to fight the system. The 
magazine, as this dissertation shows, tried very hard.  It was this principled position 
of the predominant sector on the staff, which led to the successive crises and the 
eventual demise of the publication.  At the end, the magazine changed course but the 
new direction was not enough to keep it alive, nor to maintain the illusions and 
aspirations that gave it birth. It starved to death, economically and politically. 
How could a magazine have survived under those conditions, against a 
repressive, corrupt and unjust system of government, for six years? The narrative 
offers as an answer a combination of factors. One was the convenience of the system 
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to keep it alive, to pretend that it upheld the constitutional principle of freedom of the 
press, while constantly undermining it through different ways and mechanisms such 
as the economic asphyxiation and sabotage and bomb attempts and permanent 
anonymous threats. Also important was the prominence of its staff, especially García 
Márquez, who was the image of Colombia abroad and was recognized as the founder 
of the magazine and its most important writer; Enrique Santos Calderón, scion of the 
most important media family in the country, and Antonio Caballero, who belongs to a 
prominent family related to the president of the Republic. But most importantly, 
Alternativa survived because of the power and the immediate success and prominence 
it acquired by daring to confront the system and the government using as its tool a 
type of journalism nobody dared to do until then.  For much of its life, touching 
Alternativa would have generated unforeseen consequences for the country inside and 
outside. 
Once Alternativa died, M-19 monopolized the political scene and forced the 
successive governments to negotiate an amnesty and a general peace agreement, 
which was finally achieved in the late 1980s, leading to the de-mobilization of the 
movement and its incorporation to the political life. This did not happen without 
bloodshed. In 1985, the country saw with horror how the armed forces stormed the 
Palace of Justice, located in the other side of the place in which the Capitol stood, 
which had been taken by M-19 in one of its spectacular coups. Dozens of people died, 
including 11 of the 12 magistrates of the Supreme Court, all the guerrilla operatives 
and many innocent civilians who disappeared and were never seen again. 
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The defeat of M-19 on that occasion and the peace negotiations following left 
open the terrain for the violent eruption of organized crime, fueled by the enormous 
profits of the burgeoning drug trade, which forged an alliance with the political class, 
the military and big landowners. Out of that alliance, and under the pretext of 
combating the numerous guerrilla groups in the country, came the paramilitary armies 
that besides controlling the drug trade and other criminal activities, took millions of 
hectares of land by force, using naked and brutal terrorism as their main weapon. 
Thus, the prediction of Alternativa came true. The void left by the historic defeat of 
the legal left was filled by the extreme right, allied with organized crime that had 
thrived under the Lopez and Turbay administrations. 
Despite an attempt to re-write the social contract in 1991, when a new 
constitution was negotiated between the main political sectors, the country practically 
drowned in violence during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. Because of 
the expressions of naked terror, human rights violations, population displacement, 
massacres, extortion, kidnapping and the corruption and complicity of the political 
class, this period can be compared to that of La Violencia.  
Today Colombia continues in a chronically critical state. An agreement 
between the government and numerous paramilitary bosses has led to the dismantling 
of many armed bands of criminals. The agreement included an exigency that the 
criminals that led the violence during that period confess to their crimes. Suddenly, 
the country has begun to watch in consternation the public airing of connections 
among the political class, its pacts with organized crime and the complicity of the 
armed forces, police and intelligence in taking over economic and political life in the 
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country. Suddenly, a panorama not unlike that shown by Alternativa during its six 
years of existence, has begun to emerge, showing that deep inside the country not 
much has changed and that Colombia seems immersed in recurring cycles of violence 
and despair. 
Which leads us to the main points of this dissertation. One is that the main and 
perhaps only valid reason to study the past is to understand the present in all its 
complexity. In that sense, the careful reading and analysis of the life and times of 
Alternativa offers, for those who read it, an invaluable instrument to understand the 
harsh reality of Colombia today. In a way, it can be said that Alternativa foretold, 
with its relentless quest for the truth behind the appearances and discourse put out by 
the ruling class through the mainstream media, what is going on today in Colombia.  
The second point has to do with journalism. Since Alternativa died, no other 
publication has occupied its place. Investigative journalism was drowned in Colombia 
by threats and murders.  To be an investigative and committed reporter in Colombia 
became a truly dangerous profession, as the bodies of so many assassinated 
colleagues bear witness. This does not mean publications such as Alternativa are not 
needed. In fact, and this may sound as a cliché, they are needed now more than ever. 
And it is the wish of this researcher that this work helps to bring about a truly 
committed, independent and activist media in Colombia, one that helps to uncover the 
crude reality of our country, with the hope that sooner or later the promise of true 
journalism, that the truth will set us free, sooner or later can become a reality. Let this 
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